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Abstract
This dissertation explores the use of security ceremonies as a way of extending the
reach of current methods for social, technological and contextual analysis of web au-
thentication schemes and the reasons they do not protect effectively against phishing.
A security ceremony extends the concept of security protocol to include both user
interface and human-protocol interaction. This thesis enhances the understanding
of security ceremonies and their importance in the analysis of web authentication
schemes. The modelling of the human elements of a ceremony is an active research
area. Our focus is the modelling of human communication processing in authenti-
cation ceremonies.
Phishing is a form of electronic fraud that tries to steal users’ authentication
credentials by spoofing the login page of a legitimate, trusted website. Various anti-
phishing authentication schemes are being proposed to help users resist attacks.
The threat analysis and security proofs of these schemes rarely specifically take into
account the human user limitations as a potential threat. When authentication
protocols are implemented and used by humans, the underlying assumptions about
human-protocol interactions are often susceptible to social engineering attacks such
as phishing. Incorrect human trust decisions, i.e. human factors, play a big role in
phishing.
In this thesis we present the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication
Ceremonies (HF-APAC) Framework as a way to analyse the communication pro-
ii
cessing performed by human users in authentication ceremonies.
We demonstrate a usage of the HF-APAC Framework by designing a Model
for Analysing HF-APAC. The model examines how users process authentication
tasks and how these tasks impact the user’s decision-making and consequently their
detection of spoofed login prompts. The model proposes communication processing
principles that can be used as part of the design process of authentication ceremonies.
To demonstrate how these principles can be applied to provide enhanced anti-
phishing resistance we designed a new authentication ceremony, MultiStep Mutual
Authentication (MSMA). The graphical part of the MSMA ceremony is a Human
Perceptible Authenticator (HPA) that helps the user establish the legitimacy of the
website and mitigate phishing attacks. We found evidence that MSMA helped users
resist attacks.
We evaluated MSMA, the Model, and in turn the Framework, with a user study.
Our findings suggest how communication processing affects decision making; we
found that increasing the number of recall and recognise communication processing
tasks improves the phishing resistance of a ceremony.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Problem
The focus of this thesis is on the use of security ceremonies as a way of extending
the reach of current methods for social, technological and contextual analysis of
web authentication schemes and why they do not protect effectively against social
engineering threats such as phishing.
Phishing is a form of electronic fraud [128] whose purpose is to obtain confi-
dential information from a victim. Attackers, also known as phishers, use email or
other types of communication (e.g. messaging service on social media sites) that
trick users into taking an action, which is usually to click on a link to a spoofed
website. Phishing attacks spoof the login page of a legitimate, trusted website to
steal authentication credentials. In spite of significant legal and technical approaches
to fight it, phishing remains one of the main forms of electronic fraud [9, 115] and
the number of phishing attacks is still high. According to the Anti-Phishing Work-
ing Group (APWG) [11], the total number of reported phishing attacks in 2016
was 1,220,523; and already, up to September 2017, reached 710,350 [10, 13]. As
countermeasures are deployed, phishers are modifying their techniques as well.
Human factors, incorrect human trust decisions, play a big role in phishing.
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Different to other computer security threats, phishing takes advantage of the way
humans interact with computers or interpret messages. Phishers exploit the fact that
most computer users do not possess understanding of how computer systems work;
they do not pay attention to security indicators or notice the absence of security
indicators [57].
The majority of the websites that are spoofed require that users authenticate
themselves. Therefore, phishing attacks usually involve spoofing a login webpage
and the authentication method used by the service provider. Phishers target the
human users and their usage and interpretation of authentication schemes that fools
them to make mistakes.
The most common mechanism for online authentication is username and pass-
word. Its weaknesses are well researched, but the alternatives offered have drawbacks
that means that username/password authentication will stay in use for some time
[85]. In the rest of thesis we use the term password as any secret knowledge, that
may be either character, PIN, graphical, one-time password or their combination.
We use the term text password to mean a traditional short character string, as used
in username/password authentication. In an obvious context, we only use the term
password to mean text password.
Security researchers have proposed many alternative anti-phishing authentica-
tion schemes that suggest using images for authentication [54, 173, 205, 40]; using
digital objects as passwords [148] or sending one-time password (OTP) tokens out-
of-band to the user [189, 90]. However, authentication schemes that are more secure
require more effort than traditional username/password authentication, both on be-
half of the user and the service provider. If security impedes a user’s primary task,
the user will probably try to avoid the security measures [7].
Although researched extensively, existing and newly proposed anti-phishing au-
thentication schemes still do not adequately protect users against phishing attacks.
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When protocols are implemented and used by humans, the underlying assumptions
about human-protocol interactions are often susceptible to social engineering at-
tacks such as phishing [57, 123]. The threat analysis and security proofs for these
authentication schemes mostly have a technical focus and rarely specifically take
into account the human user limitations as a potential threat.
In this thesis, we explore methods to analyse web authentication schemes not
only with a technical focus but including the human into the analysis. In particular,
we explore the methods to analyse the tasks that users need to perform as part
of authentication; how the users process these additional authentication tasks; and
how these tasks impact the human decision-making process and decision outcome
in determining whether a website login prompt is spoofed or not.
We explore the use of security ceremonies as a way of extending the reach of cur-
rent methods for social, technological and contextual analysis of web authentication
schemes. A security ceremony, as described by Ellison [68] is an extension of the
concept of network security protocol that includes user interface, human-to-human
communication and transfers of physical objects that carry data. It is similar to the
conventional notion of a protocol, except that a ceremony explicitly includes human
participants as nodes in the network and network links are not limited to traditional
communications channels. Radke [182] defines a security ceremony as a protocol in
its context of use. Any technique used for network protocol design can be used for
ceremony design. A technique for verification of ceremonies is not an agreed and a
straightforward process. What is important for anti-phishing research is that a se-
cure ceremony is secure against both normal and social engineering attacks [68]. As
phishing is a type of social engineering attack researching the security of ceremonies
seems a plausible approach to try to analyse why phishing still works.
The complexity of defining a ceremony comes with modelling a ’human node’ [68],
i.e. a user. The modelling of the of the memory and processing performed by human
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nodes of a ceremony is an active research area [68, 183, 23, 152, 38]. This thesis
fills this gap in the ceremony analysis research with an approach for analysis of the
communication processing performed by human users in authentication ceremonies.
The main research questions this thesis explores are:
1. Why current web authentication schemes do not protect effectively against
phishing? This question aims at assessing the effectiveness of current anti-
phishing schemes through identification of their weaknesses specifically taking
into account human factors.
2. How can we use research on ceremonies to improve design of anti-phishing
authentication schemes?
3. How to model human communication processing in authentication ceremonies?
4. How to evaluate human communication processing in authentication cere-
monies?
1.2 Research Methodology
In our approach we use the concept of ceremony to improve analysis of the anti-
phishing security of web authentication schemes.
In order to analyse the communication processing performed by users in authen-
tication ceremonies we developed a framework of human factors affecting security
of Anti-Phishing Authentication Ceremonies (APAC). The framework, we call Hu-
man Factors in APAC (HF-APAC) Framework, is aimed to provide insights into
human behaviour in the context of web authentication and as a help in the de-
signing authentication schemes with improved phishing resistance. Our review of
existing anti-phishing authentication ceremonies and identification of factors affect-
ing human communication processing was a main base for the development of the
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Framework components and the relationships between them. By human commu-
nication we mean human-device (i.e. user interface) communication, as opposed
to human-to-human communication, e.g. speech. The framework builds on pre-
vious research from the communication processing of security communications and
warnings science literature, specifically Cranor’s Human-in-the-Loop security frame-
work [47] and Wogalter’s Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP)
Model [222]. However, our HF-APAC Framework includes the influence of elabo-
ration which neither the C-HIP model nor the Human-in-the-Loop framework did.
Elaboration can be defined as a cognitive process of making conscious connections
between the cues observed and prior knowledge, and is important part of deception
detection [218, 217, 71, 177].
We then designed the Model for Analysing HF-APAC that tests the Framework
and demonstrates how the Framework can be used. The Model for Analysing HF-
APAC is a communication processing model that makes specific assumptions about
the components of the HF-APAC Framework and explores to what extent they
influence each other. In particular, the Model examines how users process authenti-
cation communication tasks and how these tasks impact the user’s decision-making
and consequently their phishing detection.
We then applied the Model as part of the design process of a novel anti-phishing
authentication ceremony called MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA).
MSMA prototype and the Model for Analysing HF-APAC was experimentally
evaluated by a user study we designed, developed and conducted.
The methodology is depicted in Figure 1.1 and summarised as follows:
1. Review existing authentication schemes with regard to human-protocol com-
munication processing affecting their anti-phishing security.
 Result: Framework of Human Factors affecting security of Anti-Phishing
Authentication Ceremonies (APAC)
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Figure 1.1: Research methodology
2. Apply the HF-APAC Framework
 Result: Model for Analysing HF-APAC proposing human node communi-
cation processing principles for improving phishing resistance of authen-
tication ceremonies.
3. Apply the Model
 Result: MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA) anti-phishing au-
thentication ceremony.
4. Evaluate the Model and the Ceremony
 Revise the human node communication processing principles.
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1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis investigate how the concept of ceremony and human
communication processing can be used to improve the anti-phishing security of cur-
rent authentication schemes. We also contributed to the understanding, design and
analysis of security ceremonies by providing a way to model communication pro-
cessing performed by human nodes. We used a multidisciplinary approach where
we make use of concepts and ideas from different areas such as phishing, web au-
thentication, human factors in authentication, information processing and decision
making; and combine it with ceremony research.
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. An exploration into the use of security ceremonies in addressing the phishing
problem. We enhance the understanding of security ceremonies by demon-
strating modelling of communication processing performed by human nodes
in authentication ceremonies with a framework and a model.
2. Design and analysis process of human communication factors in authentica-
tion ceremonies and its demonstration. The suggested process comprises a
framework, a model, a novel anti-phishing authentication ceremony, and a
user study.
3. A framework of human factors in anti-phishing authentication ceremonies. We
contributed the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication Ceremonies
(HF-APAC) Framework that can be used by authentication scheme designers
to address human factors affecting anti-phishing security of authentication
ceremonies [105, 106].
4. A model that proposes human communication processing principles in authen-
tication ceremonies and demonstrates the usage of the HF-APAC Framework.
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We contributed the Model for Analysing HF-APAC [106, 107], a model of
human communication processing in authentication ceremonies. The Model
proposes human communication processing principles that can be used to im-
prove the phishing resistance of authentication ceremonies.
5. An anti-phishing authentication ceremony. We contributed the MultiStep Mu-
tual Authentication (MSMA) [107] ceremony that uses a HPA to allow a user
to verify that the website that he/she is accessing is legitimate, helping to
mitigate phishing attacks.
A user study [107] was conducted to evaluate the Model for Analysing HF-
APAC and MSMA. We find that the principle of increasing the number of
recall and recognise communication factors, as used in MSMA, improves the
phishing resistance of a ceremony.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The first person plural voice (we) is used in this thesis to reflect the fact that the
research was conducted by me under the supervision of my thesis advisers. The rest
of the thesis is organized as follows:
 Chapter 2 provides background and related work for the topics covered in
the thesis. These include phishing and anti-phishing countermeasures, web
authentication solutions, ceremonies, human factors in authentication and in-
formation processing and decision making.
 Chapter 3 provides an understanding of ceremony design and analysis. It
also explores assumptions and related issues about behaviour of humans who
are expected to process and react to security-related communication in online
authentication protocols.
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 Chapter 4 presents the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication Cer-
emonies (HF-APAC) Framework. It also presents design and analysis process
of human communication factors as a way of applying the Framework.
 Chapter 5 presents the Model for Analysing HF-APAC that demonstrates the
usage of the Human Factors in APAC framework by a ceremony designer and
suggests human communication processing principles for improving phishing
resistance of authentication ceremonies.
 Chapter 6 presents the MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA) Anti-
Phishing Ceremony. We designed MSMA to show how the Model can be
applied.
 Chapter 7 presents the design of a user study conducted to evaluate the Model
for Analysing HF-APAC and MSMA ceremony.
 Chapter 8 describes data analysis and presents the results of the user study.
 Chapter 9 contains summary, conclusions and future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction
The research in this thesis investigates the use of security ceremonies as a way
of extending the reach of current methods for social, technological and contextual
analysis of web authentication schemes and why they do not protect effectively
against social engineering threats such as phishing. The research builds upon the
results of multiple research areas: phishing and phishing countermeasures; anti-
phishing authentication; security ceremonies and human communication processing
and decision making. In this chapter we review notable examples from each area.
2.2 Phishing
The security of the web is proving difficult to achieve, as the human user is not
able to effectively establish the legitimacy of the server with which his/her browser
is interacting [232]. Felten et al. [74] introduced the term ’web spoofing’ as far
back as 1997 and showed how a malicious site could forge many of the browser
security indicators that humans use to determine a website’s identity. Phishing,
often referred to as web spoofing, became a real problem nearly a decade later and
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still remains one of the main forms of Internet fraud [9, 115].
Nowadays, the term phishing pertains to not only obtaining user account details,
but also obtaining access to personal and financial data of any web user by actively
impersonating an online e-commerce, financial or social media institution. Phishers
try to obtain credit-card numbers, national identification numbers, account details,
for the purpose of identity and money theft and fraud, and also for corporate es-
pionage and similar criminal activities. Phishing attacks target both organisations
and their customers.
The estimate of financial losses stemming from phishing attacks vary [108, 154,
188] and are not easy to quantify. According to the 2016 Financial Fraud Action
UK report [79] online banking fraud increased to £133.5 million (64% increase on
2015) and could be attributed to criminals using social engineering scams such as
phishing and vishing in combination with malware attacks.
Phishing has spread beyond financial institutions to other areas, retailers and
service-oriented companies such as cloud organizations, travel, insurance, govern-
ment [9, 187], web-based email providers, social media sites [160, 9], and even mas-
sively multiplayer games [200]. As a result of the growing problem of phishing and
email spoofing an Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) was formed. APWG is a
global industry, law enforcement, and government coalition focused on unifying the
global response to cyber crime [12].
The number of attacks is still high. In the 1st half of 2017, the APWG estimated
over 590,000 unique phishing emails and over 291,000 unique phishing websites.
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, that provides
recommendations for cyber security in Europe, also reported concerns on the further
rise of phishing in 2017 [70].
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2.2.1 Anatomy of Phishing Attacks
Phishing emails are only a small part of the overall phishing economy and the only
aspect seen by most people. The Figure 2.1 shows a sample of a phishing email.
Figure 2.1: Phishing email
Instant messaging (IM), Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Short Message
Service (SMS), search engines, social networks and other ways of communicating
are also used for sending attacks, as shown in Figure 2.2. In the rest of the thesis
we only refer to emails as a communication used to trick people into visiting spoofed
websites.
All phishing attacks fit into the same general information flow. Hence, a typical
phishing attack can be divided into three major stages [115], depicted in Figure 2.3:
1. Preparation and delivery of phishing attack
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Figure 2.2: Phishing attack vectors
2. Victim taking the action suggested in the phishing communication
3. Monetizing stolen information
Preparation and delivery of phishing attack. The first stage involves the
preparation of infrastructure, e.g. fake website, used to perform the attack and
collect stolen information; and the preparation of attack communication e.g. email,
voice, text, attachment. A phisher does not need specialized knowledge to send
out the emails or create fake websites. He/she only needs to acquire the right tool
to perform the mass communication. The toolkits that create a copy of legitimate
websites and collect stolen credentials are available to buy within the phishers com-
munity. They can create a complete phishing site ready to be deployed on a public
web server [46]. If corrections are needed, skilled web designers who advertise on
fraud-related forums are available for hire. Abad [1] defines the phishing market-
place as a loosely-connected group of forums where participants can trade goods,
services and money. The key goods in the phishing market place are credentials.
Victim taking the suggested action. In the second stage, the user - becoming
a victim, takes the action suggested in the phishing communication and provides
confidential information to the phisher. Typically, the email directs the user to a
fake website where credentials are entered on spoofed login web pages (i.e. server)
on behalf of the attacker. The stolen data is collected or sent to an attacker quickly,
to avoid the phishing site being taken down. The average uptime of phishing sites
has reduced to about 24 hours [16].
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Monetizing stolen information. In the last stage, phishers make use of collected
information, i.e. cash or monetize it. The cashing is done by withdrawing money
online, taking out cash advances, or making purchases of goods and services on the
accounts. In other cases, the cashing is further masked by stealing credentials for
online games or social networking sites. For example, for online games, criminals
might transfer all of a victim’s virtual gold to an accomplice and then sell the stolen
gold to other players for real money. On social networks it may involve notifying
the victim’s friends that that person is in trouble and needs money fast.
Figure 2.3: Phishing attack cycle
2.2.2 Persistence of Phishing
As technical countermeasures were deployed in response to phishing, the criminals
began introducing new techniques as well, and the arms race is still ongoing. The
problem is that most phishing attacks also use social techniques to attack people
using technology, rather than attacking technology itself. For example, users accept
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to fill out a survey for a bank in return for a small amount of money; and at the end
of the survey they need to give their account number to deposit funds into [115].
Phishing is adapting to new technologies and the way we use them and the at-
tacks are becoming more pervasive. Phishing through social media has been reported
as well [160, 96, 99].
Vishing is a type of attack that exploits the proliferation of VoIP [213, 206].
Phishers either use a voice call to lure users to divulge confidential information or a
fraudulent phone number, sent in an email or other communication. Upon dialling
the provided phone number the user’s personal data is taken.
In SMiShing [146] the attack is delivered via text messages requesting the re-
cipient to click on a link or provide credentials in a text message reply. The text
may inform the user that his or her bank account has been compromised or credit
card has been deactivated. The user is directed to call a number or go to a spoofed
website to reactivate the card. The reactivating card is then performed on the site,
or through an automated phone system, where the victim is asked for card, account
and PIN numbers.
Malware based phishing tricks users in different ways to install malware on their
computers. Regarding their use in phishing, Gupta [126] divides malware programs
into two categories: those that reside on the victim’s computer to extract sensitive
information (spyware, adware, keyloggers, trojans); and those that help to propa-
gate the first category of malware on behalf of the phishers (worms and viruses).
Malware-based phishing attacks can be performed either using deceptive email at-
tachments (e.g. greeting card or screen saver) or by social engineering where people
are lured to download a file from a fake website. Apart from the advertised func-
tionality, the attachment contains an executable program that intercepts future
communications between the victim’s computer and a legitimate institution.
Pharming attacks [203] redirect users to phishing websites by compromising the
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Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure so that DNS queries for the victim site’s
domain return a phisher-controlled IP address. In this attack the browser’s Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) displays the domain name of the website the user wanted
to visit.
Search engines can also be used to deliver phishing attacks [126]. Phishers create
web pages for fake products, or advertise fake banks offering an interest rate slightly
higher than any real bank. When the user ’discovers’ these attractive banks via
a search engine, he/she will be asked to enter their bank account credentials for
’balance transfer’ to the new ’account’.
Context aware phishing. Criminals are increasingly using more sophisticated, context
aware [122] or spear-phishing [120, 115, 28] attacks, which targets a specific user and
their organisation with knowledge of his or her information. In the latest version of
context aware attacks an attacker sends an email appearing to come from a trusted
sender containing an attachment, a PDF document (Figure 2.4a). This attachment
is really an embedded image that has been crafted to look like a PDF document.
When clicked on, instead of revealing a preview of the document the embedded
image links to a fake Google login page [97, 155]. The user may think he/she needs
to provide credentials to read a confidential document. The Figure 2.4b shows a
spoofed Gmail login page displayed to a user that clicked on an embedded email
attachment. The page looks the same as the Google login page at the time of the
attacks, apart from a difference in URL. Whaling is a special form of spear-phishing
that focuses on senior management in companies or government representatives or
corporations, or of high net-worth individuals [8].
These types of context-aware phishing attacks are getting easier to launch with
so many data security breaches reported in various organisations [96, 78, 196]. Ac-
cording to Symantec [207], at the end of 2015, the total publicly reported number
of exposed records was 191 million and 429 million of exposed identities. Unfortu-
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(a) Phishing email with an image link, dis-
guised as a PDF attachment
(b) Spoofed Gmail login page
Figure 2.4: Spear phishing sample [155, 97]
nately, companies are not reporting the full extent of their data breaches. Symantec
estimates that the real number of exposed records is more than half a billion [207].
2.2.2.1 Visual Deception
Phishers use visual deception to spoof websites, mimic legitimate emails, windows,
text, images or security indicators [57, 56, 126, 74]. Even experienced users can
be tricked by visually deceptive text used in URLs (i.e. URL obfuscation [143]);
windows and text masking underlying web pages and producing deceptive look and
feel [52, 220, 226]; or looking the same as a ’secure login’ page [127]. Examples of
phishing techniques that has been recorded to directly exploit visual deception [52]
are described bellow.
Windows masking underlying windows. During this attacks phishers place
an illegitimate browser window on top of a legitimate window, or near it. If the
windows have the same look and feel, users may be tricked to believe that both
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windows are from the same website [52]. A variation of this technique is so called
picture-in-picture phishing attacks, that can place an image of a web browser in the
content area of a web browser [119, 57].
Similar name attack [143, 226, 57, 115]. Homograph attacks exploit the visual
similarity of characters. For example, a website that is hosted at ’bankofthevvest.com’
with two ’v’s instead of a ’w’ in the domain name [57]. Even simpler schemes
are used successfully by the phishers, e.g. attackers can use a hostname that
bears a superficial similarity to the imitated website’s hostname, for example ’pay-
pal.com.mysite.com’ [226].
Deceptive look and feel. Phishers can create phishing websites that look like
legitimate websites, with logos, images and look and feel identical to the legitimate
website. [52, 74, 126]
Images mimicking browser chrome. Many people cannot differentiate between
the browser chrome, which can usually be trusted, and the browser content, where
attackers can show anything [115]. This has been exploited to spoof login prompt
web pages. As the spoofed image looks exactly like a real login prompt, a user can
be tricked to submit login credentials to a spoofed website [52, 144, 110].
2.2.3 Phishing Countermeasures
Current capabilities to investigate phishing, identify perpetrators, present evidence
and convict criminals are still inadequate. An integrated approach on multiple levels
is needed to mitigate phishing effects. Technical and non-technical measures need
to be combined to reduce the success rate of phishing attacks [103]. Therefore,
research of phishing problem spans into diverse areas such as social psychology,
human computer interaction, machine learning, economics, public policies and law
enforcement and user training [115].
The countermeasures can be broadly categorised as follows, depicted in Figure
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Figure 2.5: Phishing countermeasures
2.5:
1. User awareness
2. Legislation
3. Technical countermeasures
2.2.3.1 User Awareness
Training users to enhance their awareness of phishing attacks is an important strat-
egy for phishing protection. Most security experts agree that user awareness about
Internet and general computer security, not just phishing, should be improved.
There is disagreement among researchers on whose responsibility this should be,
i.e. whether it is the operating system manufacturer’s, product producer’s or the
institution’s whose websites are used, or if the user himself should be responsible
for it. Some, like Lininger [145], argue that it is unrealistic to expect users to teach
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themselves something that they are not interested in. For most users, the Internet
is just a tool to play a game or to access the bank.
Most websites, companies and government agencies provide guidelines and secu-
rity advice on phishing and other online safety rules [84, 214, 3, 19]. For example,
both eBay and Amazon specifically advise their customers how to recognise if their
respective website (or email) is spoofed [62, 6]. Previous studies [141] found that
this way of educating users is good if you can get users to read the training material.
This can be difficult to achieve as security is never the users’ primary goal [221].
Notable examples of specific training tools developed are: PhishGuru [141, 140]
that uses simulated phishing attacks to train users; Anti-Phishing Phil [199], an
online game that teaches users to identify phishing web sites; ’Smells Phishy?’ [20],
an educational board game that raises users’ awareness of online phishing scams.
APWG was formed to raise awareness about cybercrime and phishing in par-
ticular and it also provides educational material. The APWG landing page [14]
teaches consumers online safety when they have just accessed a link in a phishing
communication.
2.2.3.2 Legislation
Phishing is a multinational crime. According to APWG [10] the top ten phishing
sites hosting countries in the first half of 2017 were: United States, Brazil, Ireland,
Canada, Germany, France, Czech Republic, Argentina, Netherlands and the Virgin
Islands. The phishing victims are not necessarily based in the same country as the
attackers. In order to prosecute and stop the phishers international cooperation
must be achieved, and that makes the law enforcement task even more complex.
In response to blacklisting and takedowns anti-phishing techniques, the criminals
adapt their techniques as well. Phishers move fake websites from one server to
another, perhaps in a different country, very quickly. Some use a large number of
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proxies and domain names to hide the their true location [159, 156].
There is no shortage of laws applicable to phishing [215, 169, 212, 102] but the
number of phishing prosecutions is very low. Some of the reasons are [161]:
 Many victims of phishing are slow to discover that their information has been
compromised. By the time they discovered it, the perpetrators/phishing web-
site, has been moved.
 Phishing is a multinational crime. Most of the countries impose constraints
on information sharing.
 Not enough resources. Investigators need to keep up to date with the evolving
phishing techniques. Sufficient funding is still lacking in both the public and
the private sector for the continuous training, hardware and software, and
other tools necessary to keep up with the phishers.
 Number of people involved in phishing. Different people may be involved in
different phishing phases and they even may be located in different countries.
Differences in language, laws, and legal procedures make it very difficult to
conduct criminal investigation, especially as most countries pick and choose
legislation they want, and are concerned of too much information sharing.
2.2.3.3 Technical Countermeasures
As our focus is on human factors in phishing, we categorise technical countermea-
sures from the user’s point of view as follows:
1. Automated phishing detection techniques - invisible to users.
2. User interface improvement - offering more protection or helping users make
better security decisions [115].
Improving user interfaces spans the following areas:
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 Security warnings
 Indicators for verifying legitimacy of websites
 Anti-phishing authentication
Since the anti-phishing approach we propose in this thesis falls in the improving
authentication techniques, we will focus on that in Section 2.3. We will now only
give a brief overview of other technical countermeasures.
Detecting phishing via automatic techniques
In order to prevent the phishing email ever reaching the intended recipient specific
anti-spam phishing filters are deployed at email servers. Heuristic solutions look
for specific techniques used by phishers, such as encoding the name of a financial
institution in the local part of a URL and using IP addresses as the host part of
the URL. Heuristic schemes perform quite well against phishing, especially if the
solutions are specifically designed to detect phishing attacks [77]. Fingerprinting
schemes work by comparing known samples of phishing messages against incoming
email [147].
PhishTank [179] is a collaborative anti-phishing site that allows to submit, view
or confirm phishing URLs. Microsoft and Google also operate anti-phishing that
blacklists URLs manually verified as phish. Once verified and blacklisted, phishing
websites can be taken down. Finding the actual server hosting the phishing site
needs to be done fast, as phishers move their websites from one server to another
very quickly. Moore and Clayton [159] showed that phishers are improving their
phish sites architecture to allow them to be moved very quickly.
Improving user interfaces
Users rely on indicators used in the non-digital world, i.e. the logo, and familiar
look and feel to decide if a website is legitimate. To make the problem even worse,
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users are not aware how easy is to create a webpage that looks nearly the same as
the legitimate webpage. As a help, most browsers nowadays include blacklists based
phishing warnings; Internet Explorer with Microsofts blacklist; Firefox and Chrome
integrates Google’s blacklist and safe browsing [91]. Users only need to notice and
interpret the warnings.
Browser indicators such as location bar information and certificate information,
also tell the user whether to trust a server and identify what site they are on.
Empirical studies have been performed to examine effectiveness of these security
indicators. These studies have shown that many users ignore security warnings
[65, 236, 57, 226]. Even if the user pays attention to these indicators, Ye et al. [231]
showed how easily they can be forged.
Extended Validation (EV) certificates were introduced to indicate that the com-
pany purchasing the certificate is legitimate. They use colour-coding of the browser’s
address bar. Green browser navigation window indicates an authentically validated
site. The brand name of the organization that owns the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol certificate and the issuing authority are also shown. It turns red
for an untrustworthy site. However, Jackson et al. [119] found that EV certificates
were not effective in protecting users against picture-in-picture or the homograph
phishing attacks.
2.3 Anti-Phishing Authentication
Improving the authentication mechanisms is another approach to the phishing prob-
lem, complementary to improving phishing indicators and warnings.
In this section we mention notable examples of knowledge-based web anti-phishing
authentication schemes relevant to our research, but do not attempt to survey the
entire field. As our newly proposed ceremony combines text, PIN and graphical
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passwords, we will review them in more detail than other authentication techniques.
Our focus is on knowledge-based authentication (KBA). Knowledge-based au-
thentication can be defined as a process in which a human entity authenticates itself
by proving the knowledge of some secret that was previously shared with the party
requesting the authentication [48]. In this definition we include all authentication
systems that require users to remember a secret; the user may choose to rely on
writing the secret down or remembering said secrets. Our research excludes the bio-
metric [121], token-based [167] and key-based authentication systems where secret
keys are not stored or memorised by a human.
We specifically concentrate on text and graphical password authentication schemes.
We also review in more details the schemes that were used as a base for the imple-
mentation of ceremonies used in our user study (Chapter 7): Browser-Based User-
Aware Mutual Authentication [86] and TwoStep [216]. As our proposed MSMA
ceremony is based on Delayed Password Disclosure (DPD) [127] we describe it in
more detail as well.
2.3.1 User Authentication
The most common mechanism for user authentication is a username and text pass-
word. In most cases, the user’s password is sent after the secure, encrypted con-
nection to the server is established via TLS. TLS is an an updated version of Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL). TLS uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates to
authenticate the server, i.e. websites, by installing trusted certificates on client’s
browsers. The weaknesses of text password authentication are well researched, but
the alternatives offered have weaknesses that mean that username and password
authentication will stay in use for some time [85, 109].
Another widely used and persisting type of authentication are Personal Identi-
fication Numbers (PINs). PINs are passwords that consist of only digits and were
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initially used for systems with mainly numeric input, e.g. at Automatic Teller
Machines (ATMs). In spite of well known weaknesses, small password space and
memorability problems [7], they also continue to be used. They have also been
widely adopted as a password choice for mobile phones and chip and PIN credit
card transactions.
Alternative authentication schemes suggest using two-factor authentication; send-
ing one-time password (OTP) tokens out-of-band to the user [158, 90]; introducing
variations of Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols [118, 176];
or using graphical passwords [40, 205, 216].
Two-factor authentication. For two-factor authentication, the user is re-
quired to satisfy two criteria in order to prove its identity. As phishers normally
hold only a password as a means to impersonate a user (as one criteria), as long
as the second criteria/token is safe, the phisher will not be able to impersonate
the user. Most two-factor authentication schemes use shared secrets, tokens (USB
token devices, smart cards, or password-generating tokens) [189, 90] or biometrics.
Shared secrets are questions that are asked during the authentication process, which
a fraudster would be unlikely to be able to answer. The most widely used form of
two-factor authentication is when withdrawing money using an ATM, where the
user must present both an ATM card (something the person has) and a password
or PIN (something the person knows).[73]
Another widely deployed second-factor authentication mechanism is the use of
one-time password (OTP) tokens.
One-time passwords. In response to phishing, banks, governments, and other
institutions are deploying one-time passwords (OTP), i.e. passwords that are valid
for only one login session or transaction. Using OTP as a second factor has been
suggested and adopted by many commercial institutions (RSA SecurID [189]). OTP
tokens can be sent out-of-band to the user, for example as an SMS to the user’s
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phone, e.g. Google Gmail [92]; in the form of transaction numbers (TANs) - adopted
by various banks, or quite recently, combining with graphical passwords [45]. OTP
tokens are devices that generate random passwords that are only valid for a single
use, hence limiting the amount of damage should the password be intercepted by a
phisher. Also, for time-based tokens, the generated OTP is only valid for a limited,
short time period, requiring a phisher to act immediately. In organised phishing
schemes, where collected passwords are sold to other parties, use of OTPs would
protect the user.
Paterson in [176] considers the use of one time passwords in the context of PAKE,
which allows for mutual authentication, session key agreement, and resistance to
phishing attacks.
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE). PAKE research explores
an alternative approach to protecting passwords without relying on a PKI. PAKE
schemes only require that a human memorable secret password is shared between the
participants. Using PAKE by itself does not protect against phishing, as keyloggers
can record the password. Also, if PAKE is to be used for web authentication both
server and client side need to be changed and must participate in the PAKE protocol.
Some of the PAKE anti-phishing protocols employ zero-knowledge authentication,
which is a practical application of the concept of a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In
a zero-knowledge proof, one party can confirm whether or not a statement is true
without revealing any other property about the statement. Others combine it with
TLS. The deployment problem with these schemes is the high computation cost.
[104]
Graphical passwords. Graphical passwords is another notable user authenti-
cation type that has been researched as an alternative to text passwords. Graphical
passwords can be defined as knowledge-based authentication mechanisms where im-
ages or sketches are used as a pre-defined secret between the user and the server
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[30]. Graphical authentication schemes usually ask users to perform some kind of
image-based task to login. The main advantages of using graphical schemes as an
alternative to textual passwords are as follows:
 Increased memorability - they utilise the psychological finding that the hu-
man’s ability of remembering images is far superior than remembering text
[171].
 Easier to use on smaller or touch screen devices.
Graphical schemes can be classified into three categories [30]:
1. Recognition-based : In recognition-based graphical passwords, users need to
recognise and then select a set of correct images from a larger set, e.g. [173].
2. Cued-recall : In cued-recall, the images cue the user, for example, to click a set
of points on an image, e.g. [205, 40].
3. Recall-based : In recall-based, users are required to recall a password without
any cues, such as drawing a doodle in Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [130, 209].
A number of graphical authentication schemes have been proposed [148, 41,
205, 101, 54]. Everitt et al. [72] studied multiple graphical passwords in a real
usage situation, i.e. where users have multiple graphical passwords and they use
them infrequently. Their study shows that the time required to authenticate can be
significantly impacted by frequency, interference, and training even when the failure
rate is not. They suggest that the design of systems that utilise graphical passwords
in applications needs to take into account realistic estimates of the time that will
be required to authenticate using a particular graphical password system. However,
Stobert and Biddle [205] found that authentication schemes leveraging both recall
and recognition memory have good memorability and also that login times were
faster than in schemes utilising only recognition-based graphical password.
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2.3.2 Server Authentication
The success of phishing can be attributed to the user’s inability to authenticate a
website. i.e web server. Most e-commerce financial institutions use TLS certificates
for server authentication and rely on trusted third parties to authenticate certifi-
cates. In spite of this, phishers succeed in taking users to the spoofed websites, as
certificates can be acquired by any party including phishers. Tan and Teo [208] and
Clayton [43] pointed to the limitations/weaknesses of the current SSL protocol and
its inefficiencies against phishing attacks. TLS weaknesses have been reported as
well [201, 138].
2.3.3 Human Perceptible Authenticators
In this section we review authentication schemes that provide mutual authentication
between a user and a server using a Human Perceptible Authenticator (HPA); a HPA
allows the human user to authenticate the server. Mutual authentication refers to
a process or technology in which both the server and the client authenticate each
other.
Gajek et al. [86] introduced the term HPA as an item the user has to recog-
nise to identify the server. The HPA can be anything, e.g. an image, video, or
audio sequence, such as voice recording; a piece of music or excerpt from a book.
Unlike certificates, authentication with HPA is more familiar to users as a way of
identification in the physical world where identities are provided in an easy, human
recognizable form.
A trusted path is a protected channel that provides the secrecy and authenticity
of communication between the user and the program with which the user intended
to communicate. A trusted path between a browser and a server is in general
established via TLS and PKI. Jakobsson [126] pointed out that the notion of trusted
path is very relevant to defend against phishing and an effective way of combating
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phishing must involve establishing a trusted path between a user and a server.
The establishment of trusted path usually involves extra shared secrets between
the user and the server. The problem is that while using more complex shared
secrets increases security, it decreases usability of the resulting interface [113].
A number of systems have been proposed that address the phishing problem by
creating a trusted path between the user interface and the user by using mobile
phones, being variations of the original proposal by Parno et al. [172]. There have
also been a number of investigations to determine how to establish a trusted path
between the user and the browser [232, 69, 86].
Our focus is on authentication schemes that provide a trusted path between
the user and the server using images as a type of HPAs. Dhamija proposed Dy-
namic Security Skins (DSS) [55], a scheme that allows establishment of a trusted
path between the user and the password window with the user recognising a photo-
graphic image only known to the user. DSS use a randomly generated visual hash
to customize the browser window to indicate the successfully authenticated sites.
Examples of authentication with DSS where the trusted password window displays
the randomly generated image; and the image as a border around the authenticated
website, are shown in Figure 2.6.
Passfaces [174] is a commercial recognition-based system that assigns each user a
set of three faces. To log in, users are shown a different arrays of nine faces multiple
times, as shown in Figure 2.7. The user must select the face that is part of their
assigned password. To improve security and reduce predictability, Passfaces assigns
a random set of faces as a password. A study by Hlywa [111] found that using either
houses or other objects instead of faces in schemes equivalent to Passfaces increased
the memorability.
Security images. Security images are a type of graphical authentication scheme
that has been used by internet banking and other websites as a part of the login
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(a) Password window (b) Authenticated website
Figure 2.6: Examples of authentication with DSS [55]
Figure 2.7: The Passfaces login screen [174]
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Figure 2.8: Security image on a banking website
process as a help to prevent phishing attacks [18, 192, 180, 192, 228]. Security
images are usually combined with a phrase or caption as shown in Figure 2.8. They
are used for server authentication, rather than user authentication. In order to prove
its identity to the user on logins, the server displays the security image chosen at the
time of registration. Some studies have shown that website authentication security
images are not very effective in protecting users, prompting some well-known banks
to remove them [234, 149, 181]. Schechter et al. [194] have shown that 92% of users
entered their account passwords even though their site-authentication images were
absent, in spite of being instructed not to do so. Lee et al. [144] got quite similar
results exploring whether users will login when the security image was replaced with
an ’under maintenance’ image.
Browser-Based User-Aware Mutual Authentication
Gajek’s et al. proposed Provably Secure Browser-Based User-Aware Mutual Au-
thentication (BBMA) over TLS [86]. BBMA specifically considers the user and the
browser as protocol participants, and tie the user’s authentication to the TLS secure
channel. The server identifies the browser on the basis of client certificates, ensuring
that the server establishes a secure channel to the browser. However, it does not au-
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Figure 2.9: BBMA login screen [86]
thenticate the user. In order to prove its identity to the user, the server sends a HPA
[86, 185], e.g. a personal picture or a voice recording (Figure 2.9) that was chosen
during the registration. The user has to recognise the authenticator at the login.
Verification of server certificates (and the underlying public key infrastructure) and
any security indicator (e.g. URL, padlock) is irrelevant. The user is authenticated
to the server via a text password.
TwoStep Authentication
TwoStep [216] is a hybrid user authentication scheme that combines text passwords
and recognition-based graphical passwords in a two-step process. In step one, a
user is asked to supply the username and text password. After this, even if the
username/password combination is not correct, in step two, the user is presented
with an image portfolio, an example of which is shown in Figure 2.10. The user
must correctly select the images previously selected at the time of registration in
each round of graphical password verification. If the selection is not correct, access
is denied despite a valid text password. Both the text password and all graphical
passwords must be correct for a successful login. The TwoStep scheme may be
implemented in different ways according to a specific graphical password policy
with regard to: number of rounds of verification; display layout; number of images
to be selected in each round; an ordered or unordered image selection.
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Figure 2.10: TwoStep login screen [216]
Delayed Password Disclosure
Jakobsson and Myers introduced Delayed Password Disclosure (DPD) [127] as an
attempt to make PAKE protocols more immune to phishing/spoofing attacks [126].
DPD is built on top of Oblivious Transfer (OT) and PAKE [25]. The aim of DPD
design is to allow a user interface that provides users with visual character-by-
character feedback as they enter their passwords into a login form and permit the
user to stop entering their password if the feedback is not correct. Jakobsson and
Myers point out that there are many ways in which the interface to such a protocol
could be implemented, but their goal is to provide a secure protocol on which such
interfaces can be built upon [127].
DPD is aimed at promiscuous users, using devices that may not have been used
before. Hence, there are no pre-established secrets between user’s machines and
target sites.
The gradual feedback is not well received in the cryptographic community, i.e.
processing secret credentials little by little, because of the design principle that one
should maximise the entropy of the distribution from which secret credentials are
drawn. For example, if a design allows a server to verify password character by
character as entered, and stops if an incorrect character is seen, that could help the
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attacker to determine the password by repeating an attack multiple times. Jakobsson
and Myers address the gradual feedback problem by placing two requirements [127]
on their solution: (1) The server does not obtain any partial credentials during the
execution of the protocol, but only after the user has approved all gradual feedback.
(2) Each feedback item depends on the most recent prefix on all the characters that
have been entered. They solved the contradiction between these two requirements by
Oblivious Transfer techniques that allow the client to index a database of feedback
items that is unique to the specific user. The indexing is done using the entered
credential prefix. DPD also introduces an important blinding technique that is used
to reduce the costs of communication and computation of the OT component.
2.3.4 User Studies of Authentication and Phishing
Security researchers have conducted a number of studies [57, 55, 110, 226, 119,
101, 80, 129, 75, 144, 194] that tried to evaluate how well individuals can identify
phishing web pages.
A particular concern in any user study, and especially phishing studies, is how
to realistically simulate experiences users have in the real world, perform it in an
ethical manner and yet employ an element of deception [80, 125, 66]. A form of
deception is a necessity in many phishing research studies [80]. Using deception in
phishing studies means that researchers intentionally withhold some of the research
procedures from the participants, aiming to hide from the participants that they are
participating in a phishing experiment. [66]
There are three main approaches in phishing user studies. The first involves
using questionnaires, in the form of survey, interviews or polls relating to recent
corruptions of systems and credentials. A disadvantage of this approach is that it
may underestimate the damages, as many victims may be unaware that they have
been attacked. On the other hand, surveys may overestimate the risks, given the
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limited understanding of phishing among the public. A laboratory experimental
approach involves recruiting subjects to participate in a study of online behaviour,
often conducted in a university setting, and using an element of deception by not
fully informing participants that some of their online interactions are spoofed. A
third approach is to perform experiments outside of the laboratory environment
and try to simulate a real phishing attack in such a way that participants can not
distinguish the study from reality. [80]
A number of phishing studies have been performed in laboratory environments
where the users were either told the true purpose of the experiment or asked to
role-play a fictitious identity [194, 110, 110, 226]. Some of them have employed
deception, or an element of deception.
Wu et al. [226] conducted a study to analyse how participants use anti-phishing
toolbars to detect fake phishing websites. They created dummy accounts at various
e-commerce websites. The participants were asked to play the role of a personal
assistant that processes email messages of the (dummy) account holder, and to
protect his passwords. They found that participants were fooled 34% of the time.
When webpages looked similar enough, participants ignored toolbars though they
had been asked to focus on the toolbars.
Schechter et al. [194] conducted a laboratory based study to evaluate website
authentication measures designed to protect users from man-in-the-middle, ’phish-
ing’, and other website spoofing attacks. Their consent form notified participants
that they would be observing their actions, but to obscure the purpose of the study,
they did not detail that they were specifically observing password behaviour.
Dhamija et al. [57] performed a laboratory based user study in which partici-
pants were asked to distinguish legitimate websites from spoofed phishing websites.
Participants were asked to imagine that they clicked on a link in email to see if it is
a legitimate website or a ’spoof’. They informed participants that a website may be
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legitimate or not, independent of what they previously saw. Despite the heightened
security awareness, the study found that some phishing websites were not noticed
by a large fraction of participants.
Herzberg and Margulies [110] conducted a long-term user study of authentication
mechanisms which forced users to log in safely. Authentication mechanisms were
different combinations of bookmarks, ’non working’ links and images. They found
that interactive site-identifying images received 70% detection rates. They also
found that login bookmarks, when used together with ’non-working’ links, doubled
the prevention rates of reaching spoofed login pages. Also, when several images were
displayed in the login page, the best detection rates (82%) and overall resistance
rates (93%) were achieved. This study used an online exercise submission system
used by courses at the computer science department of a university. Participants
were students at the computer science department, which were given up to 5 bonus
points for correctly detecting attacks. This might have been a significant incentive
for students who wanted to do well in the course. Also, they did not use deception
as participants were warned that an attack could happen.
Karlof et al. [135] conducted a non-laboratory based study to evaluate their
email based authentication ceremony. They compared the security of their email
registration to the security of registration using challenge questions. The study
simulated man-in-the-middle (MITM) social engineering attacks against users of
each of the ceremonies. They employed deception to hide the study’s true purpose.
Hart et al. conducted a non-laboratory based study to measure the success of
phishing attacks against PhorceField, their newly proposed authentication scheme
[101]. In their study, participant were told that they were conducting an experiment
to evaluate the usability of graphical passwords. They acknowledged that knowing
that the study was about passwords may have had some security priming. However,
they pointed out that prior research [194] has found that such subtle security priming
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did not cause participants to behave more cautiously.
Lee and Bauer [144] conducted an online study that attempted to clarify to what
extent users notice and react to the absence of security images. Security images are
used as part of the login process on some internet banking websites, with the aim
of foiling phishing attacks. In their study, 73% participants entered their password
even when the security image was removed. Also, the condition in which participants
were security primed, i.e not fully deceived, did not show a significant difference in
the effectiveness of security images.
A number of the these studies [57, 110, 226] have shown that is possible to get
meaningful results without fully deceiving participants.
2.4 Security Ceremonies
The concept of ceremony was introduced in 2003 [67] and further developed in 2007
by Ellison [68]. Ellison acknowledged Jesse Walker of Intel Corporation as the first
person who defined the term ’ceremony’ for such a purpose. Ellison argued that
a better way for examining the security of a protocol was to consider a security
ceremony. He defined it with regard to network protocols, but it can be extended
to any group of protocols. As defined by Ellison, a ceremony is an extension of
the concept of network protocols that includes user interface (i.e. human-device
communication), human-to-human communication and transfers of physical objects
that carry data. Figure 2.11 depicts the association between protocol and ceremony.
Different to the traditional protocol analysis approach, the idea behind the cere-
mony approach is to deal with a human factor explicitly, treating humans as separate
entities from their machines, and assuming that they are being subject to social and
psychological influences or tendencies. It is an attempt to answer an open question
as how to model human behaviour in a network protocol. Human participants are
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Figure 2.11: Protocol and ceremony association
modelled as nodes in the network, separate from the computers and devices they
use. For example, typical password authentication using HyperText Transfer Pro-
tocol Secure (HTTPS) on the Internet is a ceremony where a human user needs
to type in a username and password to login to an account; or use a physically
protected personal device as out-of-band channels.
Many security decisions that cause the success of phishing are based on trust,
such as trust in a brand, rather than the strength of the underlying security protocol.
Therefore, ceremony analysis provides a more complete understanding of the security
threats surrounding the use of a protocol by a human, than analysing the protocol
alone.
A ceremony allows more detailed analysis of a security protocol. In 1978 Need-
ham and Schroeder [162] introduced the idea of an active attacker who could modify
messages, copy messages, replay messages or create messages. Dolev and Yao [59]
extended the attacker model, by adding that the attacker has complete control of
the communication channels. Nowadays, the Dolev-Yao threat model is the most
widely accepted model to analyse security protocols. Security ceremonies are a
superset of security protocols. However, to guarantee that a ceremony is secure
against a Dolev-Yao attacker, a complex model of user’s behaviour should be con-
sidered. Importantly, we also need to consider the fact that the user is likely to try
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to circumvent the security mechanisms in order to accomplish his/her tasks.
The modelling of the memory, state machines and processing performed by hu-
man nodes is yet to be accomplished [68]. The complexity of designing a ceremony
comes with modelling a human node.
Formal modelling. Areas where ceremony analysis has been directly utilised are
in formal methods [152, 151], authentication in computer-security systems [135, 184]
and e-voting systems [137]. Formal modelling was one of the techniques mentioned
by Ellison, that could be used for security protocol analysis. Martina et al. sup-
ported this idea [150] as they further developed it in the context of PKI [152] build-
ing on previous work by Ruksˇe˙nas [190]. To declare a ceremony secure and trusted
requires a large number of states and conditions to be covered.
Radke defines a security ceremony as a protocol in its context of use [182]. Radke
[184] extends the concept of ceremony to a higher level protocol which uses the un-
derlying protocol as a cryptographic primitive or building block [183]. Radke builds
on practice-oriented-provable security (POPS) by Bellare and Rogaway. A basic
idea of POPS [24] is that at no point should a protocol be able to be broken without
breaking the underlying cryptographic primitive, and hence the protocol should not
be weaker than the underlying primitive. That means the way to break the protocol
is to break the cryptographic building block, and as long as the building block re-
mains secure, the protocol remains secure. Radke focuses on mutual authentication,
using browser-based protocols, defined by Gajek as protocols realizable within the
constraints of commodity web browsers [86].
Gajek’s et al. [86] used Bellare and Rogaway’s concept of practice oriented
provable security for specification of their Provably Secure Browser-Based User-
Aware Mutual Authentication (BBMA) over TLS [86]. They did not explicitly used
the term ceremony, but theirs was the first model that proved a protocol including a
human to be secure. Gajek added formal actions render and recognise to a security
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model. Render is the process of a web browser rendering an HTML page, and
presenting that page to the user. The ceremony specifically considers the user and
the browser as protocol participants, and ties the user’s authentication to the TLS
secure channel. In order to prove its identity to the user the server sends a digital
artefact, a HPA [86]. A HPA can be an image, video, or audio sequence, such as
voice recording.
Condition-safe ceremonies. More specific use of ceremony analysis is taken by
Karlof et al. [135], who show that security can be achieved by regulating human
node behaviour via use of forcing functions. Karlof et al. [135] proposed a concept
of conditioned-safe ceremony which is a ceremony that deliberately conditions users
to automatically take actions that protect them from attacks. They found that we
should not rely on humans to figure out the attack situation, but we should design an
authentication protocol in such a way that it makes users safe even in the presence of
an adversary. Their results suggest that conditioned-safe ceremonies may be useful
in building ceremonies which resist social engineering attacks. Forcing functions
were used by Karlof et al. [135] as user behaviour constraints, helping to achieve a
conditioned-safe ceremony, a ceremony that forces users to take actions that are safe
for them. Karlof pointed out that conditioned-safe ceremonies are based on lessons
learnt from human factors and human reliability areas: forcing functions, defence in
depth, and the use of human psychological tendencies, such as rule-based decision
making [136].
A forcing function is a type of behaviour constraint designed to prevent human
error. Forcing functions usually work by preventing a user from progressing in a task
until the user performs a specific action whose omission would result in a failure or
accident. As users must take this action during every instance of the task, the forcing
function trains them to always perform this action, and after a short experience it
will become automatic.
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Karlof [135] argues that to resist social engineering attacks, condition-safe cere-
monies need defence in depth, i.e. that conditioned-safe ceremonies should have (at
least) two levels of protection: an attack should succeed only if a user both omits the
conditioned action required by a forcing function and makes an action not normally
used in the ceremony.
Psychology research shows that humans tend to prefer rule-based decision mak-
ing over more tedious analytical approaches [42]. This means that users tend to
apply problem-solving rules of the form ”if (situation) then (action)” for frequently
encountered situations. This tendency helps us go through our daily lives, reserv-
ing our time and energy for tasks requiring more detailed analysis. Unfortunately,
adversaries can exploit rule-based decision making in social engineering attacks.
For example, the majority of websites require a user to log in before he can do a
task, many users have developed a rule of the form ”if (login form) then (enter user-
name/password)” and will apply it when they encounter login prompts on webpages
which look familiar, genuine, or trustworthy [136].
Hart et al. suggested PhorceField [101], a password ceremony that uses user
laziness rather than vigilance in the fight against phishing. In PhorceField the user
chooses a number of images during registration. These images are stored in a secret
file on the user’s device that only the legitimate website has access to. When the
users try to log in, they need to click on images among a set of others that are not
part of the password.
Ceremony analysis
Radke et al. [183] showed that ceremony analysis is a powerful tool for capturing
flaws in a protocol otherwise proven to be secure. Significantly, Radke also pointed
out the weakness of current ceremony analysis, which is that ’a different context,
even for the same set of protocols, is a different ceremony’. This means that if the
context, i.e application of the set of protocols is changed, then what was secure may
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Figure 2.12: Human-protocol interaction layers [38]
no longer be secure.
Bella and Colles-Kemp [22] also observed that it is a big challenge to develop
methodologies for the analysis of general ceremonies. They extend the ceremony
analysis by proposing a layered model for integrated technical and technology prac-
tice analysis. Their approach is somewhat similar to human-protocol interaction
layers defined by Carlos [38]. According to Carlos, the ceremony analysis goes
through all the layers of system security, as shown in Figure 2.12. The specification
layer is the protocol specification; the application layer is the implementation of the
specified protocol in an application; the interface represents interaction between the
application and the user.
While analysing the causes of attacks on systems against the non-cryptographic
components, such as the human interaction with the system, Carlos et al. [38] have
shown that there are many factors that should be taken into account when consid-
ering human-protocol interaction. They proposed a taxonomy of human-protocol
interaction weaknesses.
Ceremony analysis should include the analysis of the user communication pro-
cessing, i.e. processing of messages that the user inputs, receives or provides to the
user interface. It should also include the analysis of human interaction errors. This
involves identifying potential causes of security failures that can be attributed to,
so called ’human error’.
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2.5 Human Communication Processing
The importance and challenge of the relationship between human users and secu-
rity mechanisms had been recognised long before the term ’user-centred security’
was introduced in 1996. Back in 1975 Saltzer and Schroeder [191] recognised the
importance of the human interface being designed for ease of use, so that users can
automatically apply the security mechanisms in the correct way.
The design of user interaction for security applications, and user authentication
systems in particular, has very specific non-functional requirements that sets them
apart from ordinary computer applications, such as follows:
 In performing tasks, security is almost never the main goal of the user [221].
If security impedes a user’s primary task, the user will probably try to avoid
the security measures [7].
 Apart from ordinary, legitimate users, there are malicious users, cybercrimi-
nals, who may try to attack the system.
 Users do not understand how to interpret security indicators [57].
The importance of better understanding how users perceive security mechanisms
as a way of improving security, has long been recognised. For example, Dhamija and
Tyger [55] suggested design changes that could provide users with guidance to make
better security decisions. Carlos et al. [38] built a set of recommendations to assist
designers in the task of minimizing security threats from user interaction. Their rec-
ommendations are based on a thorough study of the existing work, among different
areas, to learn and understand the most common characteristics and behavioural
patterns of human-protocol interaction. Unlike Cranor, they do not suggest a defi-
nite process as how to apply their recommendations.
In the next sections, we examine the two most relevant communication processing
models for evaluating secure systems used by humans.
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2.5.1 The C-HIP Model
Wogalter proposed the Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP)
Model as part of warnings science research. C-HIP is recommended to be used
to identify reasons why a particular warning is ineffective [222]. The C-HIP model
begins with a source delivering a warning to a receiver through a channel. The
receiver goes through a number of information processing stages that determine
whether the warning results in any change in receiver’s behaviour, that protects the
receiver from harm. Each stage is a necessary condition for the steps that follow.
The stages of the model, shown in Figure 2.13, are as follows:
1. Attention switch: A warning attracts the receiver’s attention.
2. Attention maintenance: Attention must be maintained on the warning for a
certain amount of time to be properly processed.
3. Comprehension, Memory: Comprehension concerns understanding the in-
tended meaning of the warning.
4. Attitudes, Beliefs: The receiver decides if the warning is applicable to him/her.
5. Motivation: The receiver judges importance of warning information and whether
to take an action (if required).
6. Behaviour: Resulting warning compliant safe behaviour.
The C-HIP model has been applied to many applications in the physical world
to improve safety warning indicators. Cranor was one of the first to use the C-HIP
model in the computer security communications, as part of the Human-in-the-Loop
framework [47]. The Human-in-the-Loop framework adapts and extends the C-HIP
model for computer security scenarios. It distinguishes five types of communications
as being relevant to security functions: warnings, notices, status indicators, training,
and policies.
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Figure 2.13: Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) Model [222]
Bravo-Lillo [34] used both the C-HIP model and the Human-in-the-Loop frame-
work to produce a theoretical framework for analysing the different stages that occur
whenever a person faces a computer security dialog.
Egelman has also applied the C-HIP model to qualitatively examine computer
security warnings, specifically indicators alerting users to phishing websites and
SSL/TLS errors [64].
In the context of web authentication, we distinguish the authentication com-
munication that is displayed via login prompts. The receiver is the user of the
application. The user needs to notice the login communication, accept it, and act
on it appropriately. The flow of login communication processing may or may not
result in an appropriate communication response, i.e. behaviour. Using the C-HIP
model and the Human-in-the-Loop framework as a theoretical base, allowed us to
analyse the influence on communication processing that occurs whenever a user faces
an authentication communication, as a type of computer security communication.
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Figure 2.14: The Human-in-the-Loop Security Framework [47]
2.5.2 Human-in-the-Loop Security Framework
Cranor proposed the Human-in-the-Loop Security Framework [47] that can be used
by security system designers to identify problem areas and address these deficien-
cies before the system is built, hence reducing opportunities for human security
failures. She emphasizes the importance of designing secure systems in such a way
that human computer interactions should be kept to the minimum required, hence
the potential cause of human failure will be minimised. The Human-in-the-Loop
framework builds on Wogalter’s C-HIP [222] model, adapting it to better fit com-
puter security scenarios. The Human-in-the-Loop framework, shown in Figure 2.14,
can help understand the behaviour of humans expected to perform security critical
functions. The framework is a communication processing model in which a commu-
nication receiver is a human user. The communication sent triggers some behaviour
that depends on the outcome of several information processing steps taken by the
receiver, the personal characteristics of the receiver and the possible communication
impediments.
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The Human-in-the-Loop is not a precise model of human information processing,
but it provides a systematic approach for identifying potential causes for human
failure. It was designed to be used as a part of a four-step iterative process. This
human threat identification and mitigation process can be conducted at the design
phase or after a system has been implemented and deployed. Either way, the goal
is to identify and proactively reduce opportunities for human security failures. As
there are limits of security automation [63], a possible approach may be to determine
how humans might be better supported in performing these tasks.
Masone [153] applied the Human-in-the-Loop framework to evaluate his Attribute-
Based, Usefully Secure Email (ABUSE) system. Kainda [134] used it as a base to
design a framework for understanding and reasoning about different factors that are
important in developing or choosing secure empirical channels in ad hoc mobile de-
vice interactions. In his thesis, Bravo-Lillo [34] used it to analyse computer security
dialogs.
In this thesis, we use the Human-in-the-Loop [47] framework and the C-HIP
[222] Model as a basis for our framework.
2.5.3 Decision Making and Deception Detection
In this section we give an overview of human information-processing models for
identifying weaknesses in users’ decision-making. Deception is a crucial part of
phishing attacks. Therefore, prior research in cognitive processing and deception
detection is important for identifying weaknesses in users’ decision making that can
lead them to fall for phishing attacks [202, 123].
Johnson [131] defines a deception as a cognitive interaction between a deceiver
and a victim under conflict of interest. The deceiver manipulates the environment
of the victim in order to achieve a desired action [95]. The Internet is a very
convenient medium for deception as it makes it easy to falsify an identity and difficult
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to authenticate. Various forms of deception are on the rise on the Internet [124],
including phishing.
We examined two main decision-making models, the Theory of Deception [132,
131] and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) [178]. These were chosen because
they were used in prior research to identify areas of weakness in users’ decision-
making with regard to phishing [95, 217, 218, 4, 100].
Theories and models place values on some of the variables identified as impor-
tant in a framework [195, 168]. Frameworks only organize information but do not
themselves provide explanations for, or predictions of behaviour and outcomes. By
placing values on some of the variables identified as important in a framework ex-
planation and prediction is performed by theories and models [195].
Theory of Deception. The Theory of Deception [132, 131] proposes an infor-
mation processing model in which individuals recognise deception by noticing and
interpreting the inconsistencies between the deceptive event and their past expe-
riences. The Theory of Deception [132] provides a process model of how potential
victims evaluate the deceptiveness of information provided to them, but does not ex-
plain how that determination fits in the overall decision making; for example, if the
login page is authentic or fraudulent. It has provided a theoretical underpinning of
research on internet deception [94, 95] and processing of phishing emails [217, 218, 4].
It was originally proposed to understand information processing involved in fraud
detection.
The process of recognizing deception is composed of four steps [95, 131], as shown
in Figure 2.15:
1. Activation. The target of deception pays attention to inconsistencies between
what is observed and what is expected. This process may require more detailed
evaluation.
2. Deception hypothesis generation. Users either ignore inconsistencies or use
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Figure 2.15: The Theory of Deception fraud detection method [131, 95]
prior knowledge to generate interpretative hypothesis to explain the difference
between expectations and observed cues.
3. Hypothesis evaluation. Once a hypothesis is generated, it is evaluated by
comparing against some criteria.
4. Global assessment stage. The last step is to reach the conclusion, where the in-
formation is combined to form a single, synthetic assessment of deceptiveness.
The assessment of deception can be the result of either a single hypothesis or
it can be the result of several, less strong ones.
The Theory of Deception is recognised to be appropriate to analyse how indi-
viduals detect deception in information-intensive environments such as email-based
phishing or e-commerce [95, 218, 217].
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Researchers have used Petty
and Cacioppo’s [178] Elaboration Likelihood Model to explore how cognitive pro-
cessing influences deception (e.g. Vishwanath et al. [217], Workman [224]). ELM
explores how consumers respond and process communication such as persuasive ad-
vertising messages. ELM is a dual-process model that suggests that users process
message information via two main routes: the central route and the peripheral route.
The central route involves diligent consideration of the information presented using
comparisons and prior experience and consists of two sub-processes known as atten-
tion and elaboration. Attention is the first stage in information processing and is
determined by the amount of mental focus given to specific elements of the message
[177, 71]. The elaboration sub-process that follows happens when individuals make
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connections between the elements and their prior experience. ELM defines elabo-
ration as the extent to which a person thinks about the issue-relevant arguments
contained in a message [178]. The ELM notion of attention is similar to the concept
of activation in the Theory of Deception, but in the Theory of Deception activa-
tion consists of allocating attention to cues based on the presence of discrepancies
between what is observed and what is expected [93] and it potentially may require
more detailed evaluation, i.e. individuals need to elaborate on the cues.
The peripheral route does not consider all elements of the communication and
only relies on simple cues, such as its overall appearance to make a decision regarding
communication. This tendency to process information in different ways could affect
users’ behaviour and decision-making towards a particular message and result in
different levels of susceptibility to the persuasive advertising material [178]. Prior
phishing research suggests that phishing emails are peripherally processed [223] and
that users who fall victim to phishing emails are those who use the peripheral route
[217]. The process of elaboration, used during central information processing, is
also recognised as important to deception detection in other models of mediated
information processing such as the cognitive mediation models [71].
ELM provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the communica-
tion processing during phishing attacks as it allows a concurrent examination of how
attention to phishing communication and elaboration of communication can result
in either resisting or succumbing to a phishing attack [100].
An integrated information processing model of phishing susceptibility proposed
by Vishwanath et al. [217] is based on the Theory of Deception [132, 131], ELM [178]
and research on mediated cognitions [71]. Vishwanath et al. [217] examined how
individuals process a phishing email and decide whether to respond to it, i.e. how the
users detect deception. Their model structured the information processing activities
leading to deception detection into two sub-processes: attention and elaboration,
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based on Eveland’s et al [71] research in mediated cognitions and learning from the
news.
The reviewed models suggest the information processing that underpins the
users’ decision making of the legitimacy of a communication messages. The Theory
of Deception provides a process model of how potential users evaluate the decep-
tiveness of information provided to them, it does not suggest how the evaluation
of deceptiveness happens [95]. Paying attention to the communication message is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for detecting deception. Individuals need to
make conscious connections between the cues they observe and their prior knowl-
edge, i.e. they need to elaborate on the cues [177, 218].
2.6 Conclusion
Online security is proving difficult to achieve, as users are not able to effectively es-
tablish the legitimacy of the server with which their browser is interacting. Phishing
is a social engineering attack that is a main threat to web authentication.
Various anti-phishing techniques are being proposed, and can be broadly cate-
gorised into: user awareness, legislation and technical countermeasures. From the
user’s point of view technical countermeasures can be categorised into those that
are invisible to users, that use automated phishing detection techniques; and those
that provide user interface improvement by offering more protection against visual
deception attacks or helping users make better security decisions. Improving user
interfaces spans the following areas: security warnings, indicators for verifying legit-
imacy of websites; and improving the authentication mechanisms by using stronger
authentication protocols than just username and password.
Common to the reviewed alternative authentication schemes [86, 216, 135, 55,
101, 127, 176, 41, 174, 172, 158, 90, 32] is that, as part of the authentication pro-
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cess users are expected to perform a greater number of tasks than in the traditional
username/text-based schemes. Additional tasks are often more complex cognitive
tasks than simply remembering and typing a password. For example, users may
be expected to recall and recognise some credentials, read/write a value from an
out-of-bound device, perform a comparison, and then provide it to the authentica-
tion scheme. These additional tasks are usually necessary because to provide anti-
phishing resistance, these schemes often include not only a protocol to authenticate
the user but also a protocol to authenticate the server [127, 86]. This additional
part of the protocol is designed for the user to verify that the website that he/she
is accessing is legitimate.
Graphical passwords are a notable user authentication type that have been used
as an alternative to text based password schemes. They utilise the psychological
finding that the human’s ability of remembering images is far superior than remem-
bering text; and we explore this possibility in Chapter 6.
Security researchers have conducted a number of studies trying to evaluate how
well individuals can identify spoofed web pages, and spoofed authentication, i.e.
login pages in particular. A number of reviewed phishing studies have shown that it
is possible to get meaningful results without fully deceiving participants, as described
in Section 2.3.4. Notable examples are as follows. In the study by Dhamija, Tygar
and Hearst [57, 55] participants were aware that they were part of a security study
and that spoofed websites would be present in the study. In the study by Herzberg
and Margulies [110], students participants were specifically warned that an attack
could happen. In the study by Wu, Miller and Garfinkel [226, 225] subjects were
given a consent form to read that explained that the purpose of the study was to test
web browser security indicators that detect fake web pages that look like pages from
legitimate websites; and that the purpose of these fake websites is to trick people
into making dangerous decisions or actions.
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The success of phishing can be attributed to the user’s inability to authenticate
websites. i.e web server. Some authentication schemes provide mutual authentica-
tion between a user and a server using a Human Perceptible Authenticator (HPA); a
HPA allows the human user to authenticate the server. Authentication with a HPA
is more similar to identification in the physical world and more familiar to users.
Our focus is on authentication schemes that use graphical passwords as a type of
HPA.
Social engineering attacks target human users and their usage and interpretation
of authentication schemes that leads them to make mistakes. There is a need for
research that would investigate human processing of phishing attacks and expand
the understanding of this form of social engineering attacks. Ceremony analysis
provides a more complete understanding of the security threats surrounding the use
of a protocol by a human, than analysing the protocol alone. We use the concept of
ceremony to analyse authentication schemes and why they do not protect effectively
against phishing.
The review of decision making and deception detection models [132, 131, 178,
95, 177, 218, 71, 100] points to attention and elaboration as being the main informa-
tion processing activities that underpin the users’ evaluation of deceptiveness. Both
the C-HIP model [222] and Human-in-the-Loop framework [47] include attention to
the communication and a form of communication judgement, as an important step
in communication processing that helps identifying weaknesses in users’ decision-
making. We combine the Human-in-the-Loop [47] framework and the C-HIP [222]
model for evaluating secure systems used by humans, with the research in infor-
mation processing and decision making [132, 71, 95, 178, 218, 217], to explore the
factors influencing user’s behaviour in authentication ceremonies and to develop a
framework of human factors in anti-phishing authentication ceremonies (Chapter
4).
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Models place values on variables identified as important in a framework and can
provide explanation and prediction. The model we develop in Chapter 5 places
specific values on the variables of our framework, that we identified as important in
authentication ceremonies.
In the next chapter, Chapter 3 we explore the issues that may arise due to the
user’s behaviour assumptions.
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Chapter 3
Communication Processing in
Authentication Ceremonies
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore the behaviour of humans who are expected to process and
react to security-related communication as part of web authentication ceremonies.
We describe the issues that may arise due to these behaviour assumptions. Recog-
nising these issues may help to discover additional vulnerabilities that attackers
exploit.
This was the starting point of our research, which led us to identify human factors
that should be considered during the threat analysis of anti-phishing authentication
ceremonies. The work presented in this chapter was published in [106].
3.2 Ceremony Analysis and Phishing
The advantages of extending protocol design and analysis to ceremonies are sup-
ported by previous research [37, 182, 68]. Some of the advantages are as follows:
more realistic protocol analysis, improved usability, earlier problem detection, re-
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ducing the gap between protocol and HCI communities; prediction of the impacts
of user misbehaviour [37]. A particularly important analysis to phishing research is
the analysis of, so called, user misbehaviour. These misbehaviours are in fact flawed
system design assumptions as to how a human user processes the communication
from an authentication protocol. These assumptions can compromise security of the
authentication protocols. Many protocol security design specifications do not hold
once they are implemented and deployed in the real world and used by people.
The notion of a ceremony indicates that the classical protocol description must
be expanded with a representation of humans as nodes in the network and the
extra communication between the humans and the other nodes, that can be either
human or computer nodes. Human node communication in ceremonies may involve
communication of a human node to user interface, human-to-human communication
or the transfers of physical objects that carry data.
Any design process that we use for network protocol can be followed for cere-
mony design [68]. Analogue to a computer protocol node, a human node receives
and sends messages, sometimes through human computer interfaces, sometimes by
human-to-human communication or peripheral devices (e.g. using a smartcard or
an USB token). Unfortunately, human input and output messages are often subject
to errors, that are quite regularly treated as arbitrary faults by some of the proto-
cols’ correctness models. These errors happen mainly because users, i.e. ’human
nodes’, have different capabilities from ordinary computer nodes. The importance
of modelling the memory and processing performed by human nodes is recognised
and is yet to be accomplished. [68, 37, 182]
Ceremony design needs to explicitly specify the user interaction, e.g. messages
that the user inputs, receives or provides. It should also include a design of process-
ing human interaction errors. This involves identifying potential causes of security
failures that can be attributed to human error. In the case of phishing attacks
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Figure 3.1: A degenerate web authentication ceremony
these human errors may be partially caused by protocol specification that does not
model human communication processing sufficiently. As a basic example, in tra-
ditional username/password authentication, users are conditioned to type in their
username and password when they see a login form on the legitimately looking web-
site. But, phishers can redirect users to a website that seemingly looks the same as
the legitimate website and causes users to reveal their credentials. As part of the
ceremony design process every human interaction should be considered and defined.
It is proving to be a complex research task and is being undertaken by a number of
researchers [37, 182, 23, 151, 136].
Our focus is on the communication between a human node and a computer
user interface, i.e. computer nodes, that convey messages to or from the protocol’s
technological nodes as represented in Figure 3.1. As such, we focus on the rep-
resentation of web authentication ceremonies as a degenerate ceremony [68] of two
nodes: a computer application and a human user. The application is in most cases
a service provider’s website accessed via a web browser. We will refer to it as the
application throughout the thesis, only sometimes as a website or service provider.
We do not explore the other parts of ceremonies that involve protocols between
computer nodes or between human nodes.
In our ceremony analysis we assume that the authentication protocol specifying
communication between computer nodes in ceremony is working as required. We
ignore it as it is part of protocol specification and security analysis in traditional
sense. We concentrate on the main design assumptions about the human node to
computer node communication part of the authentication ceremonies. That com-
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munication is normally referred to as human-computer interaction (HCI). We then
identify those that can compromise ceremony security.
Users are often advised to verify a web page’s domain and TLS certificate before
entering their credentials, but the research shows that users largely ignore these
security indicators [65, 194, 57, 60, 226]. Therefore, we do not take into consideration
the influence of browser security indicators.
3.3 Communication Processing
As a result of security limitations of the traditional text-based passwords researchers
have proposed a number of different anti-phishing authentication ceremonies [86,
216, 135, 55, 101, 127, 176, 41, 174]. In order to provide anti-phishing resistance,
these ceremonies include not only a protocol to authenticate the user but also a
protocol to authenticate a server. This additional part of the protocol is designed
for the user to verify that the website that he/she is accessing is legitimate. Some
ceremonies offer a choice of images, some a piece of music [88], instead of, or in
addition to text, as part of the server authentication.
For anti-phishing ceremonies, as part of the login process, the user may be ex-
pected to recall some credentials, read/write a value from an out-of-bound device,
perform a comparison, and then provide it to the authentication ceremony. There-
fore, users (i.e. human nodes) in a ceremony are often required to make decisions
that demand significant human abilities and knowledge. Variation of the behaviour
of human nodes, such as limited memory, probabilistic memory access, fuzzy com-
parisons, etc. introduces additional flaws in a ceremony. Research shows that recog-
nising these flaws could lead to improved ceremony design [184].
There are a few variations of these newly proposed ceremonies, where the server
sends digital artefacts (an image, voice, music) in order to prove its identity to the
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user, i.e. HPA. Examples of ceremonies are: De´Ja` Vu [54], Provably Secure Browser-
Based User-Aware Mutual Authentication over TLS [86], TwoStep [216], Delayed
Password Disclosure (DPD) [127], PhorceField [101], Passfaces [174].
3.3.1 Analysis of Sample Authentication Ceremonies
We focused on ceremonies in which a server sends and presents a graphical feedback
(i.e. a HPA) to the user as proof of its identity. For most of these ceremonies the
graphical feedback is in the form of images. These types of ceremonies can be broadly
classified as recognition-based graphical passwords. They harness the ability of the
human memory to recognise events or stimuli that have been previously seen when
authenticated. This ability is far superior to the recall ability. Previous research
shows that images are remembered better than words in tests of item recognition and
recall [163, 114]. While most of the ceremonies are implemented as prototypes, some
are available for deployment [45, 173] or variations of them. In these ceremonies, as
part of the login process the user will:
 Type 1: Recognise an image. The main examples is BBMA [86] and its vari-
ations, often used on internet banking websites [18, 180, 192].
 Type 2: Select images from a larger challenge set. Examples are: TwoStep
[216], Passfaces [174], Confident ImageShield [45], PhorceField [101].
For Type 1, security image ceremonies, we specifically analysed Gajek’s et al.
Provably Secure Browser-Based User-Aware Mutual Authentication over TLS [86]
and commercial variations similar to BBMA, such as Sign-in Seal [228]. Some of the
commercial variations were [18], or still are being used by major Internet banking
websites [192, 180]. As part of BBMA, in order to prove its identity to the user, the
server sends a HPA. A HPA can be an image, video, or a voice recording. The HPA
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is chosen during the registration phase and the user has to recognise it at the login
phase. The user authenticates himself/herself to the server using a text password.
For Type 2 ceremonies we analysed TwoStep [216], PhorceField [101], Passfaces
[175]. In these ceremonies, as part of the website login the user is presented with
an image set. The user must correctly select the secret images previously selected
at the time of registration. As phishers do not have access to the secret images,
it would not be easy to present victims with the set of images containing the right
ones.
The focus of our analysis was the communication between the human and com-
puter node in these ceremonies. Radke et al. [184] have also researched human
computer interaction issues that can arise due to implementation variation of han-
dling a HPA in Gajek et al. BBMA [86] protocol. Exploration of related research
findings, such as Radke et al. [184] and our own investigation of Type 1 and Type 2
ceremonies reveals a number of issues arising from assumptions as to how a human
is supposed to use these ceremonies as well as the ceremony implementation.
3.3.2 Assumptions and Related Issues
The main assumptions made about how human nodes behave while processing com-
munication from the computer nodes in the reviewed ceremonies and related issues,
are summarized in Table 3.1 and described in detail below.
 The user will expect a HPA as part of the authentication ceremony. This
assumption implies that a user is familiar with the ceremony steps and will
find it strange to be asked to enter a password without a HPA being displayed.
Issue. The login webpage may be spoofed; a phisher may trick a user to enter
a password in a non-secure manner, so that the secure protocol that is using
HPAs is never used [176].
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Behaviour Assumptions Issues
The user will expect a HPA Spoofed login, secure
protocol never used
The user will wait for a HPA Delay in displaying the HPA
Skipping security step
The user will notice a HPA User busy with primary task
The user is able to recognise a HPA Not able to recognise the right HPA
The HPA is human distinguishable User interface design - usable security
Table 3.1: Behaviour assumptions and related issues
 The user will wait for a HPA. Implementing a display of HPA may slow down
the execution of ceremony steps. For example, a user may be offered a set of
images to choose their HPA from, and their downloading may be very slow. It
is assumed that the user will not skip these tasks that potentially slow down
his/her primary task offered by a service provider after the login.
Issue. Research shows that users are prone to skip a security step if it slows
down the primary task [184].
 The user will notice a HPA. Most ceremonies assume that users will notice the
HPA being presented to them, but the HPA may be obscured by some other
computer applications or stimuli around the user.
Issue. The user may be concentrating on the primary task to be accomplished
on the website and not pay enough attention to notice the HPA [57, 60]. To
make things worse, some implementations of the website login pages contain
service provider’s advertisements (e.g. Yahoo’s [229]) which may further dis-
tract a busy user.
 The user is able to recognise a HPA. It is assumed that the user will switch
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attention to the right HPA being presented and have the capability to distin-
guish the correct one. This is in the case of multiple HPAs being presented
and only the right one being chosen.
Issue. The user may not have capability to recognise the right HPA.
 The interface will make the HPA human distinguishable. It is assumed that the
implementation of website login forms will make HPAs human distinguishable
and memorable.
Issue. This assumption highly depends on the user interface design and imple-
mentation. Also, the user senses can be affected if displayed just after some
other computer applications or a stimuli around her.
Each of the above assumptions and issues will also be affected by the type of the
input and output medium that can make it easier or harder to receive a HPA [83].
For example, small screens on phones make it more difficult to type a password.
On the other hand, the phones are the easiest medium to send/receive an one-time-
passwords used in some ceremonies.
3.3.3 Influencing Factors
The issues identified in the previous section may be exacerbated by different factors
in different ways. Some of the factors that may influence the user’s communication
processing and can cause these issues are described in this sections and summarised
in Table 3.2.
 Spoofed login, so secure ceremony is never used. An essential precondition
to security is getting users to use the security protocol. If a phisher tricks a
user into entering their password in a spoofed web page, so that the secure
protocol is never used, then the cryptographic countermeasures are bypassed
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Issue Influencing Factors Supportive
literature
Spoofed login, secure Knowledge of the ceremony ([176], [38], [57],
ceremony never used Interference, delivery channel [47], [83])
Format, font size, length
Delay in displaying a HPA Technology failures, deficiencies ([47], [184], [83])
Interference, delivery channel
Format, font size, length
User skipping security step Distraction from primary task ([47], [184], [135],
Doing more interesting things [47], [222], [34])
Motivation, habituation
User busy with primary task Distraction from primary task ([226], [38], [202],
Interference, delivery channel [221], [47], [83],
Format, font size, length [57], [60])
Habituation
Not able to recognise the HPA Cognitive or physical skills ([193], [68], [47],
Memorability [38], [83])
Interference, delivery channel
Format, font size, length
User interface design Cognitive or physical skills [47], [38], [186],
Delivery channel [83])
Format, font size, length
Table 3.2: Communication processing issues and influencing factors
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[176]. Knowledge of the ceremony with user training, and user interface fea-
tures such as format, font size, length and type of delivery channel are the
main influencing factors to consider for this issue. Interference with the login
prompt by an attacker or other related and unrelated communications such as
advertisements may also contribute to the user not switching attention as to
whether the login prompt is correct or if the HPA is presented. [57, 47, 38, 83]
 Delay in displaying HPA. If there is a delay in displaying HPA due to technol-
ogy failures, deficiencies or interference, in some ceremony implementations
the user can still enter their login and password and proceed with login with-
out checking the HPA. [184, 47] Format, font size, length and type of delivery
channel could make this problem better or worse. [83] There is no guaran-
tee that the user’s attention will be switched to or maintained if there is a
considerable delay in presenting the HPA.
 User skipping security step. Research shows that if security tasks are not re-
quired actions (i.e. acting on security warnings, checking security indicators),
then users routinely skip them as usually there are no immediate visible con-
sequences of not doing so [194, 144]. Users may not be motivated to perform
security steps properly, as they require extra time and effort [57].
According to Karlof [135], human psychological tendency to develop automatic
responses to frequently encountered situations is one of the main contributors
to success of the phishing attacks. Some researchers define this tendency as
habituation [47, 222, 34]. This notion of habituation seems to be the same as
what the psychologist Cialdini [42] refers to as human click-whirr responses.
Habituation or click-whirr responses means that the user automatically enters
his/her username/password on any login page which looks familiar and legiti-
mate. Especially as they will usually be doing something more interesting on
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a website after they complete the login.
 User busy with primary task. When logging in to a website, security is almost
never the main goal of the user [38, 221, 226, 202]. Hence, users may not
switch attention to the HPA, or notice that it is missing or that is different.
Habituation and predictability is an important influencing factor as a busy
user may over time ignore a HPA that they observe frequently and they are
usually correct [57, 60]. Characteristics of the HPA and user interface design
such as format, font size, length, delivery channel will strongly influence this
issue [47, 83]. If they switch the attention to the HPA, it is not guaranteed that
that they will examine in detail and elaborate on the security communication
presented to them.
 Not able to recognise the right HPA. A wide range of people with mixed capabil-
ities use authentication ceremonies, including different cognitive and technical
abilities. Depending on the type of communication, i.e. whether the user
needs to recall, recognise or compare as part of the authentication, specific ca-
pabilities, knowledge, attention or memory may be necessary to complete the
login. [47, 38, 83] Overloading humans’ memory by requiring them to remem-
ber large amount of data has become a big problem of online authentication.
Even more so as many password policies force users to choose a random data
as a password. [68, 193]
 User interface design. The importance of usable security is widely accepted
and recognised as one of the factors that can compromise the protocol security
[48, 233]. It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use,
so that users apply the security mechanisms correctly without too much effort
[191]. Therefore, the design of input/output communication, i.e. login prompt,
will affect the ceremony’s security level and should be taken into account
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during the user interface design. Also, it is important that user interface design
(format, font size, length, delivery channel) is able to cater for people with
mixed cognitive and physical skills to allow successful completion of security
tasks. [47, 83, 38, 186]
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown how the assumptions about the behaviour of humans
in authentication ceremonies can affect its anti-phishing security. We described
related issues that can arise due to these assumptions as to how humans process
communication within authentication protocols. We presented the main factors
that may influence these issues in different ways.
We have shown that there is no guarantee that a user will switch to, pay enough
attention to, or examine in detail the authentication login prompt presented to them.
The user also may not be motivated enough to perform additional security tasks. In
addition, some users may not have cognitive or technical abilities to perform them
correctly.
Recognising these assumptions, issues and influencing factors (presented in Sec-
tions 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, and summarised in Table 3.2) helped us to identify the
components of the framework described in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Human Factors in Anti-Phishing
Authentication Ceremonies
(HF-APAC) Framework
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication Cere-
monies (HF-APAC) Framework that is designed to help authentication ceremony
designers to analyse security threats and improve the design to alleviate them. De-
pending on the context, we may refer to it only as HF-APAC Framework ; or Human
Factors in APAC Framework ; or the Framework.
The focus of the Framework is on helping to analyse the communication process-
ing performed by human users in authentication ceremonies. That in turn should
help to adapt the ceremony design to better resist social engineering threats such
as phishing.
The base of the Framework is the exploration of existing research on human-
protocol interactions [68, 37, 182, 42, 47, 222] and findings of various phishing user
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studies [57, 136, 194, 144, 110, 123]. The Framework specifically builds on Cranor’s
[47] The Human-in-the-Loop Security Framework and Wogalter’s Communication-
Human Information Processing Model (C-HIP) model [222]. It incorporates aspects
of these frameworks and combines it with the ceremony research.
The main source of development of the HF-APAC Framework components and
the relationships between them was a review of existing anti-phishing authentication
ceremonies and identification of issues and factors affecting human communication
processing as presented in Chapter 3 and summarised in Table 3.2. Identified
issues and factors influencing them pointed out which components of C-HIP model
and the Human-in-the-Loop framework should be incorporated into the HF-APAC
Framework.
The rationale behind developing a new framework is that neither the C-HIP
model nor the Human-in-the-Loop framework considered the influence of elabora-
tion. In information-processing science, elaboration is defined as the process of
making conscious connections between the cues observed and prior knowledge [218].
Elaboration in this thesis means the process through which a human connects the
authentication communication they observe and their prior knowledge and experi-
ence of these communication elements. The importance of elaboration in deception
detection is supported by prior phishing research [57, 123, 217, 218]. Significantly,
it has been recognised that deception, visual deception in particular, is at the core
of the social-engineering attacks, such as phishing [52, 225, 202, 95].
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. We first present the place of the HF-
APAC Framework in broader ceremony analysis, followed by a detailed description
of its components. We then propose a design and analysis process of human com-
munication factors in authentication ceremonies and describe how the HF-APAC
Framework can be applied either to improve an existing ceremony or design a new
ceremony. The work presented in this chapter was published in [105, 106].
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4.2 HF-APAC Framework in Ceremony Analysis
Security protocol analysis is a well researched area, a notable example is Needham
and Schroeder’s modelling of an active attacker [162], further extended by Dolev
and Yao [59] and further developed by many [24, 25]. Recent research [136, 22, 182,
37, 152] advocates analysing a protocol in context to cater for a more realistic threat
model applicable to the concept of a ceremony.
A security ceremony expands a security protocol with the out-of-band commu-
nication, which in ceremony can be human-computer (via user interface), human-
human (face-to-face, phone calls, etc.) or physical (e.g. use of a smartcard or USB
token). In a protocol design and specification any out-of-band communication is
generally part of the design assumptions and left open for arbitrary people to sat-
isfy in arbitrary ways. [68] Some of these assumptions turn out to be security issues,
as we have shown in Chapter 3.
The modelling of processing performed by human nodes in ceremonies is yet to be
accomplished. Our Framework is aimed at helping the analysis of the communication
processing performed by human users in authentication ceremonies.
Both Carlos and Price [38] and Bella and Coles-Kemp [23] suggest a layered
approach to ceremony analysis. As our Framework is designed to be used at the hu-
man application interaction points, we adopt the human-protocol interaction layers
similar to those suggested by Carlos and Price [38], shown in Figure 2.12.
The layers underlying our ceremony analysis approach and the place of HF-APAC
Framework, shown in Figure 4.1, are as follows:
 Protocol Specification - is a ’traditional’ protocol specification between com-
puter nodes;
 Application - is the implementation of the protocol;
 User Interface - is the point of interaction between the application and human
69
Figure 4.1: HF-APAC Framework in Ceremony Analysis
node; and
 Human Node - represents a user of the application.
The HF-APAC Framework design takes into consideration the application im-
plementation as users may exhibit different behaviour with different services. For
example, a user may be better motivated to consider security indicators while inter-
acting with an online banking site than when browsing a discussion forum.
The Framework, presented in Figure 4.2 is described in detail in the rest of the
chapter. We also discuss how the Framework can be applied. The foundations of the
components were the issues and factors affecting human communication processing
identified in Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and summarised in Table 3.2.
4.3 The Framework
Our Framework builds on The Human-in-the-Loop Security Framework [47] and
Communication-Human Information Processing Model (C-HIP) model [222]. The
Human-in-the-Loop framework is not a precise model of human information process-
ing, but it provides a systematic approach for identifying potential causes of human
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security failure in a wide context of computer security. Different to the Human-in-
the-Loop, our Framework considers the different factors specific to the anti-phishing
authentication ceremonies context and indicates more precisely the temporal flow
between the components. This temporal flow builds on the C-HIP model [222],
adapted to fit to web authentication ceremonies. The C-HIP model comes from
psychology literature and is recommended to be used to identify reasons why a
particular warning is ineffective [222]. The C-HIP model analysis consists of going
through a number of information processing steps, which determine whether the
warning results in any change in receiver’s behaviour. Similar to the C-HIP model,
in the HF-APAC Framework communication goes through several processing steps
affecting the outcome of user’s behaviour.
A review of existing anti-phishing authentication ceremonies and identification of
issues and factors affecting human communication processing presented in Chapter
3, particularly in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, and summarised in Table 3.2, helped
us in identifying the Framework components.
The HF-APAC Framework is based on C-HIP and the Human-in-the-Loop com-
munication processing models, in which a communication is sent to a human node
triggering some behaviour, as shown in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.2 depicts a temporal
flow of authentication communication delivered through input/output and processed
through the Framework components, described in Section 4.3.1 and presented in
Table 4.1. The flow between the components should not be interpreted as a linear
process but one that can go back and forward between them. One of the goals of
this research is to give more insight as to how this communication and processing
flows and how it influences the security of the authentication.
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Figure 4.2: HF-APAC Framework
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4.3.1 Components
This section describes the components of the HF-APAC Framework in detail, Table
4.1 gives an overview of the components. The foundations of the components were
the issues and factors affecting human communication processing identified in Sec-
tions 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and summarised in Table 3.2. The components were identified
by reviewing existing anti-phishing authentication ceremonies and identification of
issues and factors affecting human communication processing (Sections 3.3.2 and
3.3.3, Table 3.2).
4.3.1.1 Communication
The first component of the Framework is the communication to the human node,
which should trigger an appropriate behaviour in an authentication ceremony. The
Human-in-the-Loop framework [47] distinguishes five types of communications as
being relevant to security functions: warnings, notices, status indicators, training,
and policies. We distinguish three types of communications that are relevant to
authentication ceremonies: recall, recognise, and compare. They may be combined
in an authentication ceremony. Recall communications are those that require a
user to memorise and recall a specific authentication credential, e.g. recalling a
password (and username) in a typical username/password authentication. Recognise
communications are used in graphical password schemes, e.g. where the user has
to recognise a previously seen image. Compare communication is mainly used in
one-time password schemes, where a user is supposed to read/write a value from an
out-of-bound device, perform a comparison, and then provide the resulting outcome
to the ceremony. There are specific issues that may arise from each, most notable
being a huge demand on users’ memory [193]. For example, humans tend to perform
fuzzy comparisons [68], which means ignoring comparisons that cannot be completed
because information is lacking or because some other factors suggest a different
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Component Factors to Consider Source
Communication Recognise ([47], [68], [193])
Recall
Comparison
Input and Output Keyboard, Mouse, Touch ([83], [47], [233],
Visual, Auditory [191, 186])
Out-of-Band Devices
Attention Switch Format, Font, Size ([222], [47], [83],
Motion, Sound [177], [71], [218])
Attention Maintenance Format, Font, Size ([222], [47], [83],
Length, Habituation [57], [42], [34],
[60], [177], [71])
Capabilities Memory, Comprehension ([222], [47], [68],
Knowledge [193], [83])
Specific Cognitive or Physical Skills
Motivation Distraction from primary task ([222], [47], [221],
Convenience, Risk perception [219], [202])
Incentives/Disincentives
Elaboration Automatic responding ([178], [71], [131],
Cognitive effort [217], [218], [135])
Behaviour Skip a required step ([222], [47], [184],
Predictable [186], [35], [173])
Perform an action incorrectly
Table 4.1: The components of the HF-APAC Framework
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outcome.
How the user inputs authentication credentials and receives feedback (i.e output)
from the ceremony, can affect communications processing [47]. It can as well affect
security and vulnerability of the authentication process and influence a number of
issues as described in Section 3.3.3. Hence, input/output is the next component of
the Framework.
4.3.1.2 Input/Output
Many anti-phishing authentication ceremonies use methods other than the standard
keyboard or keypad to enter credentials. Examples are mouse, touch, visual, au-
ditory, combining with out-of-band devices. The format, font, size or length and
type of input affects usability and the level of user’s acceptance of the ceremony
[83, 191, 233] and hence the anti-phishing security. We have shown (Sections 3.3.2
and 3.3.3, Table 3.2) that these factors may influence a number of communication-
processing issues.
The human decision-making process is not linear, i.e. does not follow a direct
path from communication to the response (i.e. behaviour) [217]. The delivery of a
communication consists of two phases: attention switch and attention maintenance,
and they are the important components of the HF-APAC Framework. Attention
indicates the amount of mental focus given to specific elements of an event or object.
[177, 71, 218].
4.3.1.3 Attention Switch
In traditional protocol analysis it has been easy to overlook a failed delivery as a
source of design error. The assumption was that the communication was sent as
per protocol specification. However, the successful sending of a communication does
not mean that it was successfully received [57]. For example, a picture used to
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authenticate a server to the user, may not get displayed/downloaded successfully
before the user enters his password, or the download may be delayed. Hence, it is
not guaranteed that the user switched attention to the communication. As shown
in Section 3.3.3, this can cause a number of security issues. Ceremony security
analysis needs to make sure that the human node has indeed received the intended
communication. The main factors to consider are: format, font, size, motion and
sound.
4.3.1.4 Attention Maintenance
Once the communication has attracted the user’s attention, it needs to keep his/her
focus long enough to be understood. [177, 71] The length of attention kept may not
correspond to the effort necessary to complete a necessary authentication task. The
user may get frustrated and try to avoid the task if possible - or provide any input
only to move to the next step. This component is vulnerable to habituation, the
tendency for users to pay less attention to stimuli they experience frequently. For
example, entering username and password in the username/password fields without
considering other authentication factors [135]. Another common behaviour is the
user who skips a security step, as he/she is rushing to finish a primary task provided
by a service provider [184]. The type of input/output will have an influence as well
as format, font, size.
4.3.1.5 Capabilities
An important aspect of any authentication is how newly created authentication cre-
dentials are remembered and later retrieved at login. The user’s long term memory
abilities is a well recognised issue that influences users to create passwords that are
easy to remember, but not strong and are easily guessed by attackers [204]. More
and more of the general population are using online services and are required to re-
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member dozens of passwords. Hence, more users with mixed capabilities, including
cognitive and technical abilities are required to accomplish login tasks. Depending
on what the user needs to remember or recognise as part of the authentication, spe-
cific knowledge, memory or comprehension may be necessary to complete the login.
This is becoming a bigger issue as the general population is being encouraged more
and more to use online services for day-to-day business, not only by financial insti-
tutions but also by government service providers, such as revenue, social protection
sites and health providers. [38, 83, 68, 193] We distinguish the following capability
types that affect the communication process in authentication ceremonies: memory,
comprehension, knowledge or some other cognitive or physical skill.
4.3.1.6 Motivation
Motivation plays an important role in how users decide what action they are willing
to take. Research shows that users are not good at recognizing risky or dangerous
situations. Users are prone to believe they are not important or rich enough to be
a target of an attack and that the likelihood of being targeted personally is seen as
small [219]. This is often supported by a human tendency to only take into account
confirming evidence for one’s belief and ignore disconfirming evidence. This aspect
of human reasoning is known as confirmation bias. [164] Also, users who are by
nature risk averse take less risks in the digital world compared to those who are not.
Risk perception is also determined by the perceived financial or other importance of
a particular website to a user and also how busy the user is with the primary task.
[202]
In general, authentication to a website is an extra task that creates an overhead
for the user, who is required to use it as a tool to achieve a primary, real-world
task [219]. As the compliant ceremony security behaviour often slows down the
receiver’s primary task, incentive can be difficult to provide [221]. As the benefit of
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completing the authentication task quicker (i.e doing something more interesting)
is more certain than the probability of being a target of an attack, there is a strong
incentive for the user to proceed with security steps even if they do not look right.
The convenience of an authentication ceremony will influence the user’s motivation
to accomplish all the tasks with enough attention.
Hence, risk perception, distraction from primary task and convenience are the
factors that influence motivation.
4.3.1.7 Elaboration
Phishers use deception to trick users to submit their login credentials to fake web-
sites. Present research on phishing explores various factors that influence this form
of deception [217, 218, 100]. Also, previous researchers [223] have explored how
cognitive processing such as elaboration influences deception in social engineering
attacks such as phishing.
The importance of elaboration in deception detection has its roots in the human
psychological tendency to apply rule-based decision making and develop automatic
responses to situations that are encountered more than once [42]. We tend to classify
a communication according to a few key features, and if one or more features match
what we have encountered in the past, we may respond mindlessly with the action
that we learned was most appropriate. For example, many users will automatically
enter their login credentials on any page which looks familiar and legitimate. This is
an important and generally positive feature, otherwise we would spend a considerable
amount of time analysing everyday situations [136]. Unfortunately, the phishers have
learnt to exploit this predictability of human behaviour.
Elaboration in this thesis means the extent to which a user thinks about the
authentication factors they observe and make connections between these factors
and their prior knowledge and experience. This definition is based on research
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in deception detection and mediated cognitions [177, 178, 132, 71, 131, 217, 218]
Attention to authentication factors is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
detecting phishing. In addition, users need to elaborate on the security cues. [123,
223, 217, 100] Therefore, elaboration is a very important component of the HF-
APAC Framework.
4.3.1.8 Behaviour
The Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS) was developed by James Reason for
understanding human errors during decision making and problem solving [186]. Re-
searchers have also used it to model human errors which can lead to security failures
[35, 47]. Reason categorizes behavioural errors according to the performance level
at which they occur. Mistakes are errors at the rule-based and knowledge-based
levels. Humans make them due to picking an inappropriate/deficient rule or incom-
plete/inaccurate understanding of the system. Slips are errors at skill-based level.
They are execution failures, in which the user decides on an action, but the result
is not what was intended. For example, selecting a wrong item on a menu.
As we have shown in Section 3.3.3 behavioural errors in authentication cere-
monies may result in a protocol step not achieving the desired goal, users skipping
a required step or performing an action incorrectly. [194, 144, 135] For example, the
user may not pay enough attention to a website login prompt or examine it in detail
to notice that it does not look correct before submitting his/her password. Karlof
et al. [135] and Herzberg and Margulies [110] show that security can be achieved by
regulating human node behaviour via use of forcing functions. A forcing function is
a type of behaviour constraint designed to prevent human error by preventing a user
from progressing in a task until the user performs a specific action, i.e. a forcing
function prevents the user skipping a required step.
An important consideration in our research was also to consider the fact that the
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user is likely to try to circumvent the excessive security demands in order to accom-
plish his/her primary task. The predictability of behaviour is also very important,
as phishers may exploit it. For example, a choice of passwords depending on gender
or race [173].
4.4 Applying the Framework
The HF-APAC Framework was designed as a constructive way of analysis of human
communication factors affecting anti-phishing security of authentication ceremonies.
The Framework helps in extending the ceremony’s threat model by specifically tak-
ing into account issues and factors affecting processing of authentication communi-
cation by human users, that can affect their phishing detection.
The next sections describe how it can be applied to improve the design of either
an existing, or a new ceremony.
4.4.1 Design and Analysis Process of an Existing Ceremony
The Framework can be used by designers of authentication ceremonies at the threat
analysis phase to improve the human interface weak points of a ceremony and reduce
the success of phishing attacks. In the factor analysis phase a designer analyses
the components and factors of the Framework that pertain to the authentication
ceremony being designed. In general, models place values on some of the variables
identified as important in a framework, present relationships among the variables,
and make predictions about likely outcomes [168, 195]. A model that places a specific
value on the components of the HF-APAC Framework identified as important in
the ceremony is then designed. An experiment is then designed and conducted to
evaluate the model hypotheses and provide empirical evidence as to which factors
improve or reduce phishing resistance. After the data analysis phase, the ceremony
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Figure 4.3: Design and analysis process of human communication factors in au-
thentication ceremonies with the HF-APAC Framework
design can be amended if needed. The model can be modified accordingly, and the
experiment re-run.
The application of the HF-APAC Framework in ceremony analysis, shown in
Figure 4.3, can be summarised as follows:
1. Identify the components and factors of the HF-APAC Framework that are
important for the context in which an authentication ceremony is being used.
2. Design a model that places values on the identified components of the HF-
APAC Framework.
3. Design and run an experiment to evaluate the factors.
4. Analyse outputs.
5. Amend the ceremony design if necessary.
This process can be modified for a design of a new ceremony (Figure 4.4).
4.4.2 New Ceremony Design Process
Ceremony design and analysis process with the HF-APAC Framework for a new
ceremony is shown in Figure 4.4 and can be summarised as follows:
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Figure 4.4: New ceremony design and analysis process with the HF-APAC Frame-
work
1. Identify the components and factors of the HF-APAC Framework that are
important for the context in which an authentication ceremony is being used.
2. Design a model that places values on the identified components of the HF-
APAC Framework.
3. Design a new ceremony according to design principles suggested by a model.
4. Design and run an experiment to evaluate the factors.
5. Analyse outputs.
6. Amend the ceremony design if necessary.
We demonstrate this usage of the Framework with the Model for Analysing HF-
APAC, described in Chapter 5 and a new, MSMA, ceremony (Chapter 6).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication
Ceremonies (HF-APAC) Framework that can help in security analysis of authentica-
tion ceremonies. The Framework helps in extending the ceremony’s threat analysis
by taking into account issues and factors affecting processing of authentication com-
munication by human users, that in turn can influence their phishing detection. A
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review of existing anti-phishing authentication ceremonies and identification of is-
sues and factors affecting human communication processing presented in Chapter
3, particularly Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, helped us in identifying the components of
the Framework.
We described the place of the HF-APAC Framework in a broader ceremony
analysis followed by a detailed description of its components. We proposed a design
and analysis process of human communication factors in authentication ceremonies
with the HF-APAC Framework and described how it can be applied either to improve
the design of an existing ceremony or when designing a new one.
Chapter 5 presents the Model for Analysing HF-APAC that demonstrates how
the HF-APAC Framework can be used as part of the proposed ceremony analysis
process.
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Chapter 5
Model for Analysing HF-APAC
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the Model for Analysing HF-APAC that demonstrates the
usage of the HF-APAC Framework by a ceremony designer. Sometimes we refer to
it only as the Model. Most of the work presented in this chapter was published in
[106].
Models place values on some of the variables identified as important in a frame-
work [195, 168]. The Model for Analysing HF-APAC places values on the com-
ponents of the HF-APAC Framework identified as important in anti-phishing cer-
emonies that use HPAs as part of the authentication process. It explores to what
extent the identified components influence each other.
The main purpose of the Model is to explore how users process authentication
communication conveyed through a website login prompt and what influences their
decision-making process and behaviour, that can ultimately result in an error of
submitting login credentials to a phishing website.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the Model ele-
ments. After that we present the development of hypotheses. We then present the
human communication processing assumptions proposed by the Model.
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5.2 The Model Elements
In this section we describe the elements of the Model and how they correspond to
the specific factors of the components of the HF-APAC Framework.
Models place values on some of the variables identified as important in a frame-
work [195, 168]. The Model for Analysing HF-APAC considers and tests specific
factors of some of the components of the HF-APAC Framework, described in Section
4.3.1 and summarised in Table 4.1.
The Model for Analysing HF-APAC is grounded in the prior research in infor-
mation processing and decision making [132, 131, 95, 71, 177, 71, 217, 218], the
most important were reviewed in Section 2.5.3. The review points to attention and
elaboration as being the main information processing activities that underpin the
users’ evaluation of deceptiveness.
The human information processing activities are structured into two main sepa-
rate sub-processes: attention and elaboration [71]. Attention to phishing indicators,
or a fake login prompt, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for detecting phish-
ing deception. Users also need to elaborate on the indicators. During elaboration,
users make conscious connections between the elements they observe and their prior
knowledge. [217] The attention to the ceremony communication and the elabora-
tion on discrepancies between what is observed and what is expected are important
components in HF-APAC Framework and also important elements of the Model.
Communication via Input/Output
The model classifies authentication ceremonies with regard to a specific communi-
cation type (i.e. tasks) that the user is required to perform. Many authentication
ceremonies consist of either recall or recognise or their combination. Specific is-
sues may arise from each communication type, most notable, the demand on users’
memory [193]. Other issues that may arise are described in Sections 4.3.1 and 3.3.3.
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Hence, the types of communication and their combinations that the Model con-
siders are:
 Recall. Typically used in traditional username/password authentication.
 Recognition. In a typical login procedure for recognition-based, graphical pass-
words ceremonies, the user would see an image and must recognise it. Exam-
ples are: Passfaces [174], Dynamic Security Skins [55], PhorceField [101].
 Combination of recognition and recall. In the simplest form, it is provided as
a combination of a security image and caption [228, 192].
The communication is an authentication ceremony login prompt webpage. It
is conveyed to the user via input/output elements, directly corresponding to the
communication and the input/output components of the HF-APAC Framework.
The login page may be spoofed. If used in phishing attacks it perhaps contains at
least some false content which may or may not be noticed by the user. We assume
that the security mechanisms for detecting phishing webpages are in place, but may
or may not be noticed by a user. The ceremony relies on the human to perform
authentication steps bound to the login webpage and to decide whether to proceed
giving their credentials; essentially deciding if the webpage is legitimate or not.
Attention
Attention is the first stage in communication processing [178, 222] and in our
model it is the attention given to either a recall or recognise authentication task. We
assume that an attention switch has happened - as the user is prompted with a login
page. The format and the size of the HPA will influence the switch, as described
in Sections 4.3.1 and 3.3.3. Different authentication ceremonies will influence the
length that attention is maintained, and appropriate factors are considered. Hence,
the attention element in the Model comprises the attention switch and attention
maintenance of the HF-APAC Framework (Section 4.3.1).
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Capabilities
The HF-APAC Framework distinguishes the following capabilities that can affect
the communication process in authentication ceremonies: memory, comprehension,
knowledge or some other cognitive or physical skill (Table 4.1). The capabilities
element of the Model considers the knowledge of the ceremony and web security
factors. That is, users knowing what credentials are expected to be sent/received
to/from a server and having a knowledge about web security. Users’ knowledge, or
rather the lack of it, has been exploited by attackers [38, 57, 226].
Motivation
The motivation element considers risk perception and distraction from primary task
as factors of the corresponding motivation component of the HF-APAC Framework.
Risk perception is assessed by the perceived importance of a particular website to
the user and also how busy the user is with the primary task. (Section 4.3.1, [202])
Elaboration
Users need to make conscious connections between the communication they observe
and their prior knowledge, i.e. they need to elaborate on the communication to
detect phishing. Previous research in communication processing of phishing emails
suggest that users who do not attend to the emails upon receipt would neglect to
elaborate on the information received, increasing the likelihood of making a wrong
decision. [218, 123, 223, 217, 100] The elaboration element considers the cognitive
effort the user puts into assessing the authentication communication they observe
and make connections between the presented communication and their prior knowl-
edge and experience.
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Behaviour
The specific human behaviour that the Model evaluates is whether the user per-
forms an action incorrectly. In this case the action is to notice if the login prompt
is spoofed; or to make an error and get phished. The model tests how users pro-
cess communication messages in authentication ceremonies and determine if they
are genuine or not. Specifically, how the number and combinations of recall and
recognise communication types influences the user’s decision-making processes and
consequently their decision outcomes, regarding submitting the credentials to the
website.
5.3 Evaluation Methodology
We used the hypothetico-deductive method from empirical social sciences research
[89, 76] to test the Model. The hypothetico-deductive experimental method is
generic enough to be applied in the design and implementation of user related exper-
iments for socio-technical systems (systems that depend on how human use technical
’parts’). It starts with the definition of the research questions to be explored. It
is followed by developing hypotheses to answer the research question. The process
continues with the definition of the most appropriate research methodology (e.g.
user studies, surveys, laboratory experiments, interviews, surveys) to test the hy-
potheses. The next step is to design and implement the selected methodology. After
that the experiment is run and output data is collected, analysed and interpreted.
What is important for our research is that the hypothetico-deductive method can be
adapted to different socio-technical scenarios and that different research methodolo-
gies can be combined to collect empirical data in order to evaluate the hypotheses
[76].
We applied the hypothetico-deductive method as follows (shown in Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: The Model evaluation methodology
The research question was specified in the human behaviour to be evaluated. Once
the hypotheses were developed, they needed to be evaluated. As the Model for
Analysing HF-APAC involves research constructs, such as attention, motivation,
and capabilities, we needed to use quantitative data to test the Model hypotheses.
We collected empirical data by performing a user study in order to evaluate the
hypotheses. The user study design is presented in Chapter 7. Data analysis and
results of the user study are described in Chapter 8.
Human Behaviour to be Evaluated
The specific behaviour to be evaluated is whether the user will notice if the
login prompt is spoofed, or to make an error and get phished; and what and how
influences their decision-making process, that can ultimately result in an error of
submitting login credentials to a phishing website.
5.3.1 Hypotheses Development
The Model for Analysing HF-APAC, with suggested hypotheses, is presented in
Figure 5.2 and detailed below in terms of the key constructs laid out in previous
sections.
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Figure 5.2: Model for Analysing HF-APAC and hypotheses
5.3.1.1 Communication Processing Activities
Attention is the first stage in communication processing and indicates the amount
of mental focus given to a specific element of communication presented via in-
put/output. The attention paid to each communication component might have
a distinctly different influence on the user’s likelihood to detect a fake login page.
Apart from paying attention to the communication, users need to elaborate on the
details, in our case on the credentials needed to be entered or evaluated. Research
shows that users who elaborate on communication details are more likely to under-
stand, learn, retain and recall the information than users who merely pay attention
to them [42].
Recall and Recognition. Many anti-phishing ceremonies suggest a challenge-
response mechanism where the user is supposed to verify a website by a set of
pre-agreed credentials. Current practices involve using challenge questions or graph-
ical passwords. Graphical passwords schemes generally expect a user to recognise a
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previously registered image. Seeing a login prompt that does not include a familiar
image allows a legitimate user to immediately realize that she entered an invalid
text or graphical password (and then go back to re-enter it). It prevents an attacker
from knowing that the text or graphical password tried is invalid.
During a normal login, users must perform an image recognition task, which is
relatively easy for humans. During a phishing attack the right image(s) may not be
present, therefore the user will not be performing a recognition task, but the recall
of trying to remember the right image(s), i.e. during a recall phase.
Recall requires that a user remembers information without cueing. It is gener-
ally accepted that recall is substantially harder, and will require an extra cognitive
effort during elaboration phase, which otherwise may be used to notice phishing
indicators. Human ability for recognition far exceeds that for recall. Stobert [205]
showed that it is easier to memorise recognition-based graphical passwords, but their
usability was limited by slow login times. A graphical password scheme that utilised
recognition and recall memory was most successful at combining memorability and
usability. Stobert’s explanation is as follows: recognition memory involves making
a binary decision for each image while traversing the entire image set (on offer). Us-
ing this decision-making process to recognise an entire password can be very slow.
In contrast, recall memory involves fewer but more complex tasks. The user is less
likely to successfully complete these tasks, but when successful, the process is faster,
as it can often be typed from muscle memory [32]. Hence, time to login should be
longer during a phishing attack, i.e. during a recall phase.
Recent studies explored whether users will login in spite of the security image
being absent or replaced with a static ’under maintenance’ image [144, 194]. They
have shown that single site-authentication security images are generally not very
effective. Therefore, we wanted to explore whether requiring participants to inter-
act with multiple site-authentication images in combination with text passwords
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improves effectiveness of using images as part of authentication process.
We assume that a login prompt to recall a password, enter it and/or recognise an
image(s), forces a user to pay the attention to it. We seek to explore how much the
user elaborated on these additional communication factors and whether it lowered
the likelihood of the user getting phished. Hence:
H1: Increased Number of recall and recognise Communication factors of the
authentication ceremony will result in a lower likelihood of a user making an error
during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
H2: Increased Number of recall and recognise Communication factors of the
authentication ceremony will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentication
login prompt.
The model distinguishes between the specific communication component types
and how they may influence human behaviour. The attention paid to each of these
components might have a distinctly different influence on the user’s behaviour.
Hence we posited the following hypotheses:
H2(a): The level of Attention given to the Recall communication factor of the
authentication ceremony will be negatively related to the level of Elaboration.
H2(b): The level of Attention given to the Recognise communication factor of
the authentication ceremony will be positively related to the level of Elaboration.
5.3.1.2 Impact of Capabilities
A user’s knowledge of the ceremony steps is considered an important factor that
affects elaboration. It ties in with a user awareness and training approach for reduc-
ing user phishing susceptibility. Consistent with this approach, we expect increased
ceremony knowledge to influence user phishing likelihood indirectly, by influencing
the user ability to effectively elaborate and find anomalous or deceptive information.
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H3: Increased Capabilities will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentica-
tion login prompt.
5.3.1.3 Impact of Motivation
The concept of motivation is important in understanding human information pro-
cessing. We define motivation as the perceived relevance of a particular website to a
user. Generally, information processing is more likely to occur when the user finds
the services offered by a website sensitive to his/her needs and is thereby motivated
to consciously evaluate website credibility. Also, the motivation to elaborate will be
hampered by the need or urgency of the primary task, to be completed after the
login to the website. Hence:
H4: Increased Motivation will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentica-
tion login prompt.
5.3.1.4 Impact of Elaboration on Phishing Detection
The influence of elaboration in phishing detection is supported by prior research
[57, 123]. We posit that users are more likely to fall victim to a phishing login
webpage because they fail to elaborate on additional credentials, thereby failing to
make connections between what they are presented with and the knowledge stored
in their memory.
H5: Increased Elaboration will result in a lower likelihood of the user making
an error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
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5.4 Human Communication Processing
The human communication processing assumptions proposed by the Model hypothe-
ses can be summarised as follows:
1. Increasing the number of recall and recognise communication factors results
in a higher phishing detection rate.
2. Increasing the number of recall and recognise communication factors results
in increased elaboration.
3. Increased elaboration will result in a lower likelihood of the user making an
error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
4. Increased attention to recall communication factors of the authentication cer-
emony results in less elaboration.
5. Increased attention to recognition communication factors of the authentication
ceremony results in more elaboration.
6. Increased user’s motivation leads to increased elaboration.
7. Increased user’s knowledge of the ceremony and online security leads to in-
creased elaboration.
The assumptions 1 to 5 can can be used by ceremony designers when design-
ing (or evaluating) authentication ceremonies to improve anti-phishing resistance.
We specifically applied the assumption 1 as part of the design of MSMA, a novel
authentication ceremony, presented in Chapter 6.
The assumptions 6 and 7 could also be used by system designers to choose
the most appropriate authentication ceremony for the particular user profile (e.g.
technical knowledge) or the application context (e.g. if used in e-commerce or less
security demanding environment).
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5.5 Conclusion
The Model for Analysing HF-APAC is a communication processing model that
demonstrates how the Human Factors in APAC Framework can be used as part
of the design process of authentication ceremonies described in Section 4.4. The
Model considers and tests specific factors of some of the components of the HF-
APAC Framework, described in Section 4.3.1 and summarised in Table 4.1. The
Model examines how users process authentication communication tasks and how
these tasks impact the users decision-making and consequently their phishing de-
tection.
The Model proposes human communication processing assumptions that can be
used during the design of authentication ceremonies. In Chapter 6 we show how
these assumptions can be used as part of the design of a novel ceremony called
MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA).
We evaluate the Model experimentally by performing a user study described in
Chapters 7 and 8.
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Chapter 6
MultiStep Mutual Authentication
(MSMA) Ceremony
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a novel MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA) anti-
phishing ceremony. MSMA demonstrates how the HF-APAC Framework can be
applied during the design and analysis process of a new authentication ceremony, as
described in Section 4.4.
The aim of MSMA is to make it more effective for the user to establish the le-
gitimacy of a website, i.e. provide mutual authentication, and mitigate a phishing
attack. MSMA combines PIN, text passwords and recognition-based graphical pass-
words in a multi-step process. The graphical part of MSMA authentication is a HPA
and enables the user to verify that the website, he/she is accessing, is legitimate.
The HPA provides server authentication to the user.
This chapter provides a detailed description of the MSMA protocol used between
the user and the user interface. We also outline a secure protocol between the
client and server upon which the MSMA ceremony can be built. In particular, how
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MSMA can be built on an adaptation of the Delayed Password Disclosure (DPD)
[127] protocol developed by Jakobsson and Mayers.
The MSMA design was published in [107].
6.2 Design Goals
The MSMA ceremony design is a result of the research described in previous chapters
and is built to satisfy the following requirements. We aimed to show how to apply
some of the human communication processing assumptions developed as part of
Model for Analysing HF-APAC, described in Section 5.4 and also discussed in
Chapter 3. The specific assumption we applied was that increasing the number of
recall and recognise communication factors would achieve higher phishing detection
rates. This demonstrates the application of the HF-APAC Framework during the
design and analysis of a new authentication ceremony (Figure 4.4). Another aim
was to mitigate phishing attacks by creating a HPA based trusted path between the
user and a server, via the user interface (i.e. website login prompt).
In this section we describe how these requirements are met and also how they
are combined with other anti-phishing design principles.
Human Perceptible Authenticator
A number of ceremonies have been proposed that address the phishing problem
by creating a trusted path between the user interface (normally via a browser) and
the user [55, 18, 45, 230]. Some of them use a variation of graphical passwords to
create a trusted path using a HPA, for example BBMA [86] or PhorceField [101].
What is similar among these approaches is that images are used as a HPA for the
user to verify that the website the user is accessing is legitimate. The same images
may or may not be used as part of the user authentication to the server.
To establish a trusted path from the user to the server, our aim was to create
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a ceremony in such a way that an attacker can not easily present a credible login
prompt to their victims. MSMA satisfies this requirement by presenting users with
feedback as they enter their passwords. This feedback is a HPA [86] that authen-
ticates the server to the user. This, HPA enabled, trusted path provides mutual
authentication between the user and the server, as the server authenticates itself
via HPA providing the user with assurance that the login prompt is legitimate.
The HPA is created during the registration phase and is stored at the server and
memorised by the user.
The HPA can be anything, but we have chosen a visual HPA, to be provided
in the form of images, rather than a piece of music or excerpt from a book. This
was to leverage the picture superiority effect [171]. The picture superiority effect is
a human psychological trait that postulates that humans have better memory for
images than words. It is attributed to the brain’s dual coding feature. According
to dual coding theory [170], the human brain encodes visual information in two
ways: a visual form corresponding to the image, and also in a verbal descriptive
form. This dual encoding makes it easier to remember an item than if it was coded
one way. The choice of images for visual feedback is also in line with our human
communication processing assumptions suggested in Section 5.4. Using images as a
feedback should lead to an increase in attention given to recognition communication
factors and a higher detection of visual deception attacks.
For the visual feedback, i.e. image to be recognised, a cognometric graphical
password scheme is used. Cognometric schemes present users with a set of distractor
images and request that the user recognise and identify images belonging to their
set of password images. The MSMA user is presented with a grid of images, where
one image belongs to a known set of password images, and the other images are
distractors.
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Distractor images
Distractor images were added to the design as they exploit strengths of human
memory that helps in resisting phishing attacks. They leverage the strengths of
recognition memory in the presence of the right image being displayed [171, 173,
205, 30]. The phisher would have difficulties to present image sets to the user
containing the images belonging to the user’s set of password images. Therefore,
during a phishing attack users would experience memory interference while looking
through distractor images without recognising their own image. [101] The user
would then use a recall memory, as the right image would not be displayed to be
recognised. Recall memory requires more effort and would cause errors or suspicions
which may cause a user to give up login. This behaviour should help foil a phishing
attack.
Forcing functions
The user may ignore the fact that his/her image is not present among the set
of distractor images displayed, and start entering the text password. In order to
safeguard against this type of behaviour we introduced a forcing function.
Forcing functions are constraints used by designers in the human reliability area
to help prevent human errors in safety-critical environments [165]. They were also
shown to be a useful tool in regulating human node behaviour in security ceremonies
[135, 110, 38]. They are designed to prevent the user from progressing in a task until
they perform an action which must be taken to avoid a failure. The user is prevented
from skipping a required step, as skipping the step may result in a security failure,
as we described in Sections 3.3.3 and 4.3.1.
We introduced a forcing function to prevent the user skipping a task of recog-
nising the right HPA, i.e. an image, among the displayed distractor images. This
forcing function prevents an MSMA user from entering a part of the text password
without first selecting an image from the set of distractor images. This should help
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Symbol Logical context Reads as
∧ conjunction ’and’
∨ disjunction ’or’
= equality ’is equal to’
∈ set membership ’is in’
/∈ negation of set membership ’is not in’
Table 6.1: Logical notation
the user to foil a phishing attack in which a set of the distractor HPAs not containing
the right HPA is presented.
Communication factors
The decision to have PIN, text password and images as part of the user authen-
tication was based on the following.
First, most users are now using tablets or smartphones and are used to entering
PINs as part of authentication. Therefore, using PIN and text password largely
preserves the existing user sign-in experience, given their resilience and persistence
[109].
The second reason was the application of our human communication processing
assumptions proposed by the Model for Analysing HF-APAC (presented in Section
5.4); specifically, that increasing the number of recall and recognise communication
factors should result in a higher phishing detection rates. The PIN, text password
and images are MSMA communication factors
6.3 Ceremony Analysis Approach and Notation
This chapter contains logical expressions. In Table 6.1 we present the logical sym-
bols used, followed by how they are read in English.
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Symbol Explanation
U, u, UI User, username, user interface
C Client - application
S Server
Password Text password
C/S Protocol Authentication protocol between client and server
PIN Personal Identification Number
Σ The alphabet for text password
l The length of the password in characters; and
The number of images in a set for HPA
T = (t0, .., tl−1) ∈ Σl Text password
A Set (database) of images for HPA
#         »
HPA = (a0, .., al−1) ∈ A HPA - vector of images corresponding to password T
#»α = (α0, .., αv−2) ∈ A Vector of distractor images
F = (u, PIN,T,
#         »
HPA) Pseudo - random function
m = (a′0, .., a
′
v−1) Visualisation message with distractor images
v The number of images in visualisation message
pw User’s credentials
Table 6.2: Notation used in describing MSMA ceremony
The notation we use for protocol description is presented in Table 6.2 and
described below. An apostrophe (′) symbol beside a variable indicates the value of
the variable selected or entered by the user via the user interface during the MSMA
login, rather then the pre-registered variable value, without an apostrophe.
We developed the notation specifically to present human interaction, i.e. the user
to user interface (UI) part of MSMA. That should help to formalise a threat analysis
that specifically takes into account the human user limitations as a potential threat.
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We define functions select and enter as a generic user input/output communi-
cation without considering a medium to be used, e.g. it can be achieved via a mouse
click, keyboard, touch, vocal, visual, or using eye gaze (e.g. with an eye tracker).
We define the following functions analogue to Gajek’s usage in BBMA proto-
col [87]. To model the communication from the user to user interface, we define
functions render and recognise. Visualization message m contains the login com-
munication factors and is created by the user interface function render. The human
perception function recognise denotes processing of this visualization message m,
i.e. login communication factors and tasks required to be accomplished. Upon re-
ceiving a visualization message m from the user interface, the user calls the function
recognise which takes as input the protocol message m and the rendered HPA and
returns the appropriate output.
MSMA considers the following participants:
 User - human users or human node.
 User Interface - includes user interface of the application (i.e. service provider’s
login prompt displayed by a browser).
 Client - non-user interface application processing; includes user interface and
the client side of the application (i.e. service provider’s website).
 Server - Includes all protocol specification, together with the interaction of
server with client side of application, which we refer to as client/server (C/S)
protocol.
The MSMA ceremony is used to demonstrate how the HF-APAC Framework can
be applied during the design and analysis process of a new authentication ceremony,
as described in Section 4.4 and presented in Figure 4.4. The MSMA ceremony
analysis is illustrated in Figure 6.1. It builds on our ceremony analysis approach
and the place of the HF-APAC Framework in it, depicted in Figure 4.1. The User
102
Figure 6.1: MSMA ceremony analysis
(Figure 6.1) corresponding to the Human Node (Figure 4.1); the User Interface,
delivered using U/UI protocol (Figure 6.1), corresponding to the Communication
and Input/Output components of the HF-APAC Framework (Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
As our research focus is on modelling and analysing the communication process-
ing performed by human users in ceremonies, we give the detailed description of the
protocol between the user and the user interface (U/UI protocol). The protocol
between client and server (C/S protocol) is described in less detail. This protocol
can be realised in different ways. The description of C/S protocol we present is
largely based on Jakobsson’s DPD protocol [127] which was chosen as the most ap-
propriate to build the MSMA upon. In our description we refer to where the DPD
protocol can be directly incorporated or suggest an alternative approach. DPD is
built on top of Oblivious Transfer (OT) and PAKE [25]. DPD also introduces an
important blinding technique that is used to reduce the costs of communication and
computation of the OT component. A high level description of DPD was given in
Chapter 2.
We describe the setup and the operation of MSMA ceremony in next sections,
illustrated in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, using notation presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
6.4 MSMA Setup
Before MSMA can be executed, a setup, or registration phase, is necessary to es-
tablish shared secrets between the user and the target website, i.e server. No shared
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Figure 6.2: MSMA Setup
secrets between the user machine and the target website are pre-established. As
part of the registration, the user specifies a username, a PIN, a text password and
a number of images. To prevent, so called, birthday-based guessing attacks, it is
recommended to have a PIN randomly assigned [33].
The text password is divided into parts; each part corresponds to one of the
chosen images, e.g. the first character of the text password corresponds to the first
image; the second character corresponds to the second image; and so on.
The HPA provides server authentication to the user. From the protocol’s point
of view, the HPA is a vector of images
#         »
HPA = (a0, .., al−1) that corresponds to each
user’s username, PIN and text password. From the user’s point of view, the HPA
images correspond to the characters of the text password. The user only needs to be
able to associate the first character of the text password to the first image of HPA;
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the second character corresponds to the second image and so on.
MSMA setup proceeds as follows. The user is prompted to choose a username and
PIN. The uniqueness of the username is checked. If satisfied - the user is prompted
to enter characters of the text password and associate images with it. The images
presented are the images from a database of images A. The images are offered
sequentially for the user to choose in size and format defined as A = (A0, ..,Al−1).
MSMA allows the database of images to be stored either on the user’s device or
the server. Those design decisions can vary depending on the details of the protocol
between the client and a server. During the operation of the protocol it may be
slow to transfer a large number of images from server to the client. One approach,
as suggested by Jakobsson and Mayers [127] is for the server to have a database of
indexes to images (instead of a database of images). The client then uses the index
to generate the images from a local database. This solution would not be feasible in
cases of users that use a large number of semi-trusted devices or public terminals.
Σ is the alphabet over which the password is chosen, l is the length of the pass-
word in characters, which also determines number of HPA images, and the number
of rounds of HPA verification. We refer to HPA verification steps, i.e repeated server
authentication, as rounds. The image set in round n is pseudo-randomly generated
from a seed value derived from the entered username and PIN in Round 0, and from
the images selected in previous rounds, up to Round n− 1, when n ≥ 1.
Therefore, the password used for server authentication consists of a vector of
images
#         »
HPA = (a0, .., al−1) associated with text password T = (t0, .., tl−1) ∈ Σl.
The PIN and text password are used for user authentication to the server.
At the end of the setup phase, the user’s credentials pw consist of username,
PIN, text password and a HPA - images corresponding to each of the characters in
the text password, as shown below and in Figure 6.2:
pw = (u, PIN, T = (t0, .., tl−1),
#         »
HPA = (a0, .., al−1))
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The server then creates a function F, a pseudo-random function (PRF), that is
associated with user’s credentials. This function can be used as part of client/server
protocol to check the matching between each ti character entered and the value of
the matching image F (a1, .., aj). This function can then be used to compute an
additional pseudo-random function to be used for a protocol between the client and
the server.
An example PRF is provided as part of the DPD [127] protocol. Another use
of PRFs is in verifier-based protocols between client and the server, such as Secure
Remote Password Protocol (SRP) [227], where a PRF can be used as a verifier that
the user recognised an image displayed and entered the right portion of the text
password, without revealing neither the image nor the text password to the server.
6.4.1 User Training
As part the setup phase, a short user training session is used to improve memorability
of the HPA, i.e. images corresponding to the text password parts. The setup and
the training should be conducted in a secure environment, where no other person
can see the image sets, to avoid shoulder-surfing attack.
6.5 MSMA Operation
As part of the MSMA operation (i.e. login phase), the username and PIN are used
in step one. In subsequent steps, a combination of a graphical and a text password is
used. The HPA, set of distractor images together with the correct one, are presented
after the user enters his username and PIN and provide visual server authentication.
The user enters the text password in parts: each part may consist of a number of
characters/digits. Each of the text parts is augmented by one HPA (i.e. an image).
MSMA can be adapted to have fewer or more steps, depending how many seg-
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ments the text password is divided into. The segment size can vary. Further on, we
assume that each segment of the text password consists of one character.
If the user is presented with an HPA that does not contain the image corre-
sponding to the next part of text password, the user should halt entering the text
password to avoid disclosing all parts to a spoofed website.
If either the PIN or the image selected by the user in a previous round is incorrect,
the image set presented to the user will not contain the image corresponding to the
next part of the text password. The same incorrect images are displayed, no matter
how many times the protocol is invoked to prevent a variation of a dictionary attack.
The example attack would be as follows: an attacker would guess the first character
of the password, and look at the images displayed [127]. By repeating the login
attempt with the same first character, the attacker would establish if this was the
correct first character of the password, and then for the next character, etc.
If the username, the PIN and the image selected by the user in the previous step
are correct, the presented image set will contain the corresponding image as defined
during the registration phase. All authentication credentials: the PIN, the set of
images and the text password must be correct for a successful login.
To be able to enter a part of the text password, the user must first select an
image from the presented HPA image set. This step was introduced as a forcing
function so that the user would not ignore the HPA and proceed entering passwords
without checking if the correct image is displayed. It is modelled as the human
perception function recognise as follows; upon receiving a visualization message m
from user interface, the user calls the function recognise which takes as input the
message m and the rendered HPA, and outputs true, when the message contains
the right corresponding HPA (i.e. an image) from the
#         »
HPA. Otherwise, recognise
outputs false.
Figure 6.3 illustrates MSMA interaction between user U, user interface (UI),
107
Figure 6.3: MSMA Operation
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client C (i.e. application) and server S. Boxed messages denote a protocol between
the client and the server. The interaction steps are described below.
1. The user U initiates the ceremony by communicating the server’s URL to the
client’s application (C) and enters username u and PIN in the user interface
UI.
1a. The client C sends the username u and PIN to the server S.
1b. The server S sends user specific pseudo random function
F = (u, PIN,T,
#         »
HPA) to the client C. F is used by the visualization function
render to form the login prompt.
2. The user interface (UI) presents the message m=render(F, a0,
# »
A0) to the user.
If the PIN and username match, then the distractor image set
# »
A0 will contain
the right a0, otherwise not.
2a. If the user does not recognise the HPA, (i.e. recognise(m, a0 /∈ m)) then
stop input of text password. Otherwise, proceed:
2b. User U selects select(a′0 ∈ m) and enters enter(t0).
2c. C/S protocol Round 0 HPA verification is performed.
3. If the entered part of the text password is correct and the selected image is
correct, i.e. (t′0 = t0)∧ (a′0 = a0), UI presents to the user visualization message
m = render(F, a1,
# »
A1).
If the entered part of the text password differs from the pre-registered one, i.e.
(t′0 6= t0), the visualization message render(F, a′1,
# »
A′1) with the same incorrect
distractor images is displayed for each round.
Steps 3a, 3b and 3c analogue to 2a, 2b and 2c are then performed.
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For 3 < i < l rounds of HPA verification are analogue to steps 3, 3a, 3b and 3c.
Step (i+2). Message m=render(F, ai,
# »
Ai) is presented to the user.
(i+2)a. If the user does not recognise the HPA, (i.e. recognise(m, ai /∈ m))
then stop input of text password. Otherwise, proceed.
(i+2)b. User U selects select(a′i ∈ m) and enters the i part of the text
password, ti.
(i+2)c. C/S protocol Round i HPA verification is performed.
Repeated steps until the End Round (l-1).
Step (l+1). Message render(F, al−1,
#      »
Al−1) is presented to the user. If (t′l 6= tl)
the incorrect images are displayed.
(l+1)a. If the user does not recognise the HPA (i.e. recognise(m, al−1 /∈ m))
then stop input of text password. Otherwise, proceed.
(l+1)b. User U selects select(a′l−1 ∈ m) and enters the (l − 1) part of the
text password, tl−1.
(l+1)c. C/S protocol End Round (l-1) HPA verification is performed.
Step (l+2) Client sends all (t0, .., tl−1) to the server.
If all the username, PIN, the text password and all HPA images are correct,
i.e. if (pw′ = pw), the login is successful. Otherwise, access to the account is
denied.
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6.6 Security Analysis
In this section we identify a number of possible attacks on MSMA that serve to
impersonate the user and the server. We also discuss the main threats in the context
of phishing attacks . An experimental evaluation of MSMA is described in Chapters
7 and 8.
6.6.1 Password Strength
The strength or randomness of passwords is often referred to as entropy. It is a
measure of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker faces to determine the value
of a secret and is usually stated in bits [36].
For text passwords entropy is measured as follows: a password of length l char-
acters has entropy of l × log2t where the characters are selected randomly from a
character set of t characters. For example, a 7 character password that is randomly
generated from case sensitive Latin alphabet has 7× log252 = 39.9 bits of entropy.
Character sets can also be digits only, hence the calculation also applies to PIN
passwords. As the PIN is one part of the MSMA user authentication it should be
acceptable to have 4 digit, randomly assigned PIN, which translates to 13 bits of
entropy. Depending on the ceremony context, this can be increased to more digits.
Additional MSMA password strength is achieved with the text password and
HPA. In reality, password space is usually much smaller than the theoretical pass-
word space [31]. Nevertheless, Floreˆncio and Herley [81] suggest that 20 bits of
security is sufficient password strength for everyday computing, which translates to
a 6 digit PIN approximately.
As the MSMA user password is formed from all three parts, the PIN, the text
password and the HPA images, it improves the security of the password against
both guessing and password capture attacks. Guessing entropy helps to determine
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targeted, online password guessing attacks. Therefore, it is considered an important
measure of the strength of an authentication system [36]. This added security from
the HPA helps to strengthen the password against single or multiple account attacks.
For the HPA password, one image is chosen in each round of HPA verification, i.e.
the entropy for r rounds would be r × log2v, where v is the number of images in
the visualisation message. For example, if there are 9 images in the visualisation
message, each round represents ≈ 3.17 bits of entropy. It is recommended to have
at least 3 rounds of verification which brings minimum entropy to 9.3 [36].
As the HPA (graphical part) is only used for server authentication, having 6 or
7 rounds would increase the entropy to 19 and 22.1 respectively which brings it to
the recommended 20 bits of security for user’s authentication [81]. Adding extra
rounds would increase security, but also will affect usability as the length of the text
password will be increased as well. This would increase user’s memory demand and
the effort which would inevitably affect overall ceremony usability [204].
6.6.2 Assumptions
As our focus is on the human part of the ceremony we do not analyse the security
of the MSMA client/server protocol in the threat model. The security models of
formally proven security protocols evolved to not only consider a passive attacker
but also an active attacker as defined by Needham and Schroeder [162], which was
further extended by Dolev and Yao [59]. Dolev and Yao [59] extended the attacker
model, by adding that the attacker has complete control of the communication
channels. Bellare and Rogaway’s security model [27] concentrated on authentication
and key distribution protocols. The most widely used security model for PAKE is
the one suggested by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [26]. In most of them
heavy assumptions are placed on the human communication processing part of the
protocols, which may cause a protocol to fail when implemented and used in real
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world, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Our intention is that our user to user interface threat modelling may be used
to complement the existing, well analysed security protocol models, to form more
complete ceremony threat modelling.
6.6.2.1 Attacker
We make the following assumptions regarding the underlying, i.e. network client/server,
security protocol features and the attacker:
1. There is no attacker who intercepts the registration phase, i.e. setup of cre-
dentials.
2. The attacker is unable to corrupt the server. We do not consider malware
attacks against the server, such as stealing the ephemeral and long term secrets
stored inside the server.
3. The attacker is unable to corrupt the client. We do not consider malware
attacks against the client, such as stealing the ephemeral and long-term secrets
stored inside the client, i.e. a browser.
4. The main attacker is a remote, networked phisher with the following abilities:
 Is able to eavesdrop, i.e. passively intercept communication between the
server and client.
 Is able to control the domain name resolution, and can mount phishing
and pharming attacks.
 Is able to direct selected victims from a target website to a website con-
trolled by the attacker, i.e. mount a phishing attack at the user interface
level.
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6.6.2.2 User
Since the focus of ceremonies is not only on the client server communication, we
need to explicitly define the set of premises for user communication.
1. The user is capable of performing basic information recall, such as remember-
ing a low-entropy password.
2. The user is able to recognise the high-entropy HPA (i.e images).
3. The user does not understand the meaning of public key infrastructures, i.e.
not able to identify servers based on certificates.
4. The user operates from a number of unsupervised client devices, such as per-
sonal computer; some of which may not have been used before.
6.6.3 Attacks and Countermeasures
6.6.3.1 Guessing Attacks
A guessing attack is an attack on the user’s account where the attacker knows
the username and tries to guess the rest of the password. Guessing entropy is an
important measure of the resistance to targeted, online password guessing attacks
[36]. Floreˆncio, Herley, and van Oorschots suggested [82] that 20 bits of entropy
should be sufficient to protect against online guessing attacks. The password space,
or the set of all possible passwords, of MSMA that spans PIN, text password and
HPA images increases its resistance to this type of attacks. An adversary may
attempt to impersonate the user by picking random images in the HPA distractor
set, hoping that they contain the user’s HPA. The user should recognise that the
right HPA is not present even after one attempt. However, to prevent brute-force
attacks, systems generally deny access after a small number of attempts. In the case
of MSMA, the attacker must mount an attack on username, PIN, the text password
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and all HPA images as the ceremony operation is not stopped if, for example, the
PIN does not match the username. The HPA password guessing attacks must be
done while interacting with the server (e.g. via real-time MITM attack) which
makes it more costly than guessing only the PIN or text password without real-time
interaction with the server.
6.6.3.2 Shoulder-Surfing
Shoulder-surfing is considered as the HPA is recognition based, and an attacker can
record or observe the images selected by users during login and also the PIN and
the text password. Shoulder surfing by using a video camera is a realistic threat for
ceremonies in some environments. It would be very easy to do if, for example, user
interface implementation highlights an image border upon user selection of image.
Fortunately, the problem of shoulder-surfing is now a well publicised and understood
threat in the context of ATM machines, and chip and PIN card use, that users are
getting better in protecting themselves. Randomised position of distractor images
would better protect it against casual shoulder-surfing attack. To improve resistance
against camera based attack, MSMA can be implemented to use gaze-based [139]
selection of HPA.
6.6.3.3 Phishing Attacks
Classic phishing attack
In a classic phishing attack a spoofed email containing a link to a spoofed login
page of a legitimate website is sent to the user. If a user clicks on the link he/she
will be asked to enter credentials into this fraudulent login prompt. With MSMA,
a legitimate password login prompt has access to a secret set of images that enables
it to create a password prompt. Phishers can not gain access in an easy way to
the secret images and hence must present potential victims with a fundamentally
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different and more difficult login interface. Users cannot ignore the differences,
especially being required to enter a part of text password after recognising the
image. This should eliminate user conditioning or click-whirr responses [42, 135,
101], where users automatically enter their credentials or perform a required security
step without enough consideration.
The limitation of the MSMA is that there is no mechanism to protect username
and PIN and they can still be stolen by phishing. However, obtaining the HPA parts,
i.e. images, is more difficult: without knowledge of users’ image profiles, the phisher
does not know what images to present in order to extract a graphical password.
As we described earlier on, MSMA can be adapted to use a different protocol
between client and a server. Depending on the context in which MSMA will be
deployed, if an additional level of security is required, PIN password can be protected
by choosing a verifier-based client/server protocol such as SRP in Step 1. The verifier
can be derived from a pseudo-random function established during the setup phase.
HPA missing
In the case that the HPA (i.e. images) are not being presented at all during the
login, the whole password will not be revealed as the images will not be there to
form the password. Hence, the phisher will not be able to gain access to the service
offered by the website. In this case, the phisher will be able to capture the PIN and
the username, but the rest of the login tasks will be so profoundly different that the
user should notice the difference.
Real-time MITM attack
We do not consider the much more adversarial model in which a phisher is able to
mount real-time (i.e. an active) man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. This type of
phisher has the additional power to establish one connection to the user’s prover and
simultaneously another connection to the user’s verifier and impersonate each one
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at the level that cryptographers are concerned with. It is difficult to prevent this
active MITM attack and using SSL cannot mitigate this attack [74]. To make things
worse, many websites home and login pages are not even protected by SSL/TLS and
can be spoofed by a MITM attack that targets the site’s home page.
6.6.4 Experimental Evaluation
We collected empirical data by performing a user study in order to evaluate the
ceremony against a phishing attack. We implemented an MSMA prototype for the
study. The study measured the success rate of a phishing attack against the MSMA
ceremony in comparison to the security image and password, and the multiple images
and password ceremonies. We did not attempt to measure the usability of the
MSMA or the memorability of graphical passwords – those topics have been explored
elsewhere [205, 32, 233, 112, 53]. The user study is described in Chapters 7 and 8.
6.6.4.1 Prototype
For our proof-of-concept MSMA realisation we divided the text password into three
segments: each segment consisting of one character and corresponding to one im-
age from a graphical feedback password. The prototype is used in the user study
described in Chapters 7 and 8. A 3× 3 display layout was used for presenting the
HPA image set containing the corresponding image and the distractor images. The
PIN, text password and images were randomly pre-assigned.
The MSMA login process from the user’s point of view is as follows:
 Step 1 : The user enters username and PIN.
 Step 2 : The first set of images is presented to the user.
The user clicks on the recognised image and then enters the 1st part of the
text password.
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 Step 3 : The second set of images is presented to the user.
The user clicks on the recognised image and then enters the 2nd part of the
text password.
 Step 4 : The third set of images is presented to the user.
The user clicks on the recognised image and then enters the 3rd part of the
text password.
 Step 5 : The user submits the text password, that is concatenated from the
three parts.
The policy applied gives the following password strength for MSMA, measured
by entropy in bits. The entropy for PIN part is 13 bits; for the HPA part is 9.3
and for the text part is 3× log252 = 17.7, which brings the overall MSMA password
entropy to 40. That is well above the suggested strength of 20 bits [81] for everyday
computing.
The prototype of the login page with the MSMA is shown in Figures 6.4, 6.5
and 6.6.
Figure 6.4: Login with MSMA: Step 1
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.5: Login with MSMA: subsequent Steps
Figure 6.6: Login with MSMA: the last Step
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6.7 Conclusion
The MSMA ceremony is a mutual authentication ceremony that combines PIN,
text password and recognition-based graphical passwords in multiple steps. The
graphical part of MSMA ceremony is a Human Perceptible Authenticator (HPA)
and enables the user to verify that the website, he/she is accessing, is legitimate,
helping to mitigate phishing attacks. The HPA can be anything, but we have chosen
a visual HPA, to be provided in the form of images, rather than a piece of music or
excerpt from a book.
MSMA design applies some of the human communication processing assumptions
proposed by the Model for Analysing HF-APAC (presented in Section 5.4) and
demonstrates the new ceremony design and analysis process using the HF-APAC
Framework (presented in Section 4.4). The specific assumption applied was that
increasing the number of recall and recognise communication factors will result in
higher phishing detection rates.
Experimental evaluation of the MSMA is described in Chapter 7 and data
analysis and the results are presented in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 7
User Study for Evaluation of
MSMA and the Model
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the design of a user study we conducted to evaluate the
Model for Analysing HF-APAC and the MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA)
ceremony.
The user study is a part of the Model evaluation methodology, shown in Figure
5.1 and a part of demonstration of the usage of the HF-APAC Framework during
the design and analysis process of a new authentication ceremony, shown in Figure
4.4.
Our study compares three authentication ceremonies with regard to their impact
on the user’s ability to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed website login
prompts. The study simulates a phishing attack at the user interface level against
users of each of the ceremonies. The study design was published in [107].
Data analysis and the results of the study are presented in Chapter 8.
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7.2 Design Considerations
An ongoing concern in any user study, and especially phishing studies, is ecological
validity. Ecological validity of phishing studies concerns how to realistically simulate
experiences users have in the real world, conduct it in an ethical manner and yet
to employ an element of deception [80, 125, 66]. This was one of the main design
considerations we needed to take into account.
Other mechanisms were put in place in an effort to elicit realistic behaviour and
achieve external validity to allow us to draw conclusions that extend beyond the
laboratory environment. Even without having phishing considerations it can be
very difficult to run studies that are both controlled (i.e. performed in laboratory
settings) and ecologically valid [30, 116]. We considered the profile of the partic-
ipants and their recruitment, scenario and procedure, tasks (described in Sections
7.3.2, 7.3.2.1, 7.3.2.3, 7.3.2.4). As participants were recruited from an education
institution, we could anticipate a high percent of students in the study. We did not
limit their numbers, as previous research shows that students are users who are very
vulnerable to phishing attacks as they tend to engage in more online behaviours
[141, 198, 217, 4]. This was aimed at ensuring that an experiment closely represents
a real world scenario and that obtained results are valid in the real world as much
as they are in the laboratory.
Another challenge we needed to consider was how to directly compare the cer-
emonies, as the spoofing techniques are different for each ceremony. Even without
the spoofing problem, any security comparison of authentication schemes needs to
be carefully considered and is not easy to achieve [52, 21, 39, 83, 204].
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7.3 User Study Design
We designed the study to compare the effect of the communication presented to
the user in the login prompt on the user’s behaviour - likelihood of being phished.
We selected three authentication ceremonies covering the two main communication
types and their combination from our Model for Analysing HF-APAC: recall and
recognise (Figure 5.2). All three ceremonies in the study used images as a type of a
HPA. The HPA allowed a user to visually authenticate a server.
The study overview is shown in Figure 7.1. The materials used in this study can
be found in Appendix A.
Figure 7.1: User study overview
The study was approved and received ethical clearance by the Dublin Institute of
Technology (DIT) Research Ethics Committee (Ethical Clearance Ref:15-02 ). The
study was conducted in DIT Kevin Street laboratories. There was no risk to user’s
personal data during the duration of the study as users were assigned new, temporary
credentials. To address the issue of risk to participants, participants’ usernames were
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pre-assigned. Since these usernames have no value outside the scope of the study,
this limits the potential risk to users. There was no risk to any other of the user’s
data being compromised.
In order to simulate experiences users have in the real world, i.e. ecological
validity, participants were asked to perform a task in a context. This raised a
number of challenges. It is difficult to simulate the experience of risk for users
without crossing ethical boundaries. Also, the users evaluate risk differently during
the lab studies than they would otherwise [80].
In order to motivate the user to make an effort to safeguard their login credentials
and introduce a level of risk in case the credentials are stolen, we tried to increase the
importance of the account for the website, i.e. the value of the username/password
used during the study. To achieve this, a number of prizes were awarded to randomly
selected participants providing they accomplish all required tasks in the study. Part
of each website task was to post at least one comment on the website page. In
the first line of each comment they needed to enter the Anonymous Identification
Number (AIN) corresponding to the participant’s username, that was given to each
participant at the beginning of the study (see Section 7.3.2.3). The AIN number
was then put into the raffle for the prizes. The prize was a random draw to win one
of five e 10 gift cards.
The main reason that most studies in phishing, authentication and usability
area offer incentives to participants, is to ensure that users sufficiently care about
the task to be performed and protect their password as they would if it were their
real banking or email account password. Some examples are [135, 101, 197, 133, 61].
Other reasons for the incentive are to encourage participation and avoid a high
dropout rate, as is often the case in user studies, especially where students are
involved. Because of high demands on students’ time, non-participation and study
dropout remain big challenges for researchers [50].
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The prize eligibility, that could be lost if the account was compromised, was put
in place to increase the value of their account used during the study, and introduce
a level of risk. The awarding of the prizes also served as an incentive to participants
to complete all study tasks (described in Section 7.3.2.4).
To introduce an element of deception and avoid priming, we did not inform
participants about the study true purpose, i.e. that we were researching phishing.
Participants were told that the main focus of the study was security usability of
graphical authentication methods, i.e. using images for authentication; and how
easy and secure it is to use them. The information sheet they were given to read
before signing the consent form also mentioned that the purpose of the study was
to compare the schemes regarding their help in distinguishing between legitimate
and altered login pages. The information sheets were taken away together with the
consent forms before the participants started the study tasks. The study website
only referred to ’Usability Study’; there was never any mention of security during
the experiment. We never mentioned word phishing or web spoofing.
The study scenario and procedure is described Section 7.3.2.3.
7.3.1 Conditions
The study design was between-subjects, where participants were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions, the three different authentication ceremonies, as shown
in Figure 7.1. We chose the between-subject design for several reasons. First, we
needed to preserve a level of deception. Experiments employing any form of de-
ception cannot be done within subjects, as participants should not become aware
of the purpose of the experiment. Users could have learned to notice the spoofed
login prompt easier when using a subsequent authentication ceremony. Also, as we
sought to determine the effect of the login tasks in ceremonies, a between-subject
study design was the most appropriate choice. To adequately compare authentica-
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Condition Login communication Number of
communication tasks
One Recognition and Recall 2
Two Multiple Recognition and One Recall 4
Three Multiple Recognition and Multiple Recall 7
Table 7.1: Study conditions
tion ceremonies, the tasks that the users needed to perform needed to be exactly
the same apart from the login task. Another reason was that it was simpler for the
user. It would have taken extra effort for our participants to learn three different
password schemes that they do not normally use.
In order to compare the communication presented to the user in login pages and
its effect on his/her behaviour we selected authentication ceremonies that utilised
the two main communication message types and their combinations, recall and recog-
nise, as referred to in Figure 5.2. The combination of recognition and recall in the
ceremonies is defined as follows, and shown in Table 7.1:
1. Recognition and Recall. The user needs to recognise an image and then recall
a text password. In some figures, we refer to this condition as Single image +
text.
2. Multiple Recognition and One Recall. The user needs to recognise multiple
images and recall a text password. In some figures, we refer to this condition
as Multiple images + text.
3. Multiple Recognition and Multiple Recall. The user needs to recognise multiple
images and recall a PIN and multiple segments of a text password. In some
figures, we refer to this condition as Multiple images + multiple text.
For our study, all three ceremonies were using images as a type of a HPA. The
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HPA allowed a user to authenticate a server. For ceremonies One and Two we im-
plemented the user interaction for password registration and login broadly matching
the original BBMA [86] and TwoStep [216] ceremony specifications. For MSMA, the
Ceremony Three, we implemented it as specified in Chapter 6. We omitted the ex-
act protocol implementation for the client/server interaction as that is not the main
focus of our research. For our study it was sufficient to only exactly implement parts
of ceremonies that the user interacts with, i.e. images and text passwords.
A standard text-based password mechanism was used, in which users can enter
alphanumeric and special characters. Text passwords were hidden when typed by
the users. For graphical password parts all three ceremonies were implemented using
images of everyday objects.
7.3.1.1 Password Parameters Settings
Each user created an account and setup the password for the ceremony they were
assigned to. As we were not comparing memorability or usability of ceremonies,
having equal theoretical password security for each condition was not crucially im-
portant. Nevertheless, we set the parameters of the ceremonies passwords so that
they were as close as possible. As a guideline for the security setting in the study,
we used Floreˆncio and Herley [81] suggestion that 20 bits of security is sufficient for
everyday computing. All ceremonies had more than 20 bits. The number of items
users needed to remember, was between 8 and 10, consisting of characters, digits
and images.
Table 7.2 shows the password configuration for the ceremonies used in the stud-
ies.
127
Ceremony Password configuration
One 62 characters, length 7
1 × 1 grid, 1 image
Two 62 characters, length 7
3 × 3 grid, 1 image, 3 rounds
Three 10 digits, length 4
52 characters, length 3
3 × 3 grid, 1 image, 3 rounds
Table 7.2: Password configurations of the ceremonies used in the study
7.3.1.2 Condition One - Ceremony One: Recognition and Recall
As a representative of ’Recognition and Recall’ ceremony, Ceremony One, we im-
plemented an adaptation of BBMA [86]. The high level description of BBMA was
presented in Section 2.3.3. Ceremony One login consisted of a single image (i.e. the
HPA) and a text based password. The user had to recognise the image and then
authenticate herself to the server, using a username and a text password. The text
passwords needed to be exactly seven characters long including digits, a mixture of
lower and upper-case letters and special characters.
Hence, the communication types, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, utilised in
Ceremony One were:
 Recognition: Single image.
 Recall: One text password.
The login prompt with the Ceremony One is shown in Figure 7.2
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Figure 7.2: Login prompt for Ceremony One
7.3.1.3 Condition Two - Ceremony Two: Multiple Recognition and One
Recall
As a representative of the ’Multiple Recognition and One Recall’ ceremony, Cere-
mony Two, we implemented an adaptation of TwoStep authentication scheme [216].
TwoStep high level description was described in Section 2.3.3. Ceremony Two uses
text passwords and multiple images in a two-step process. In step one, a user is
asked to supply her user name and text password. After this, even if the user-
name/password combination is not correct, in step two, the user is presented with
an image set in multiple rounds. In each round, the user must correctly select the
images previously selected at the time of registration. Both the text password and
the graphical password must be correct for a successful login.
TwoStep [216] authentication can be implemented in different ways according to
a specific security policy with regard to the number of rounds of image verification;
display layout or number of images to be selected in each round. We implemented it
with a policy to represent the second condition for our study, i.e. multiple recognition
and one recall: 3 rounds of verification; a 3 × 3 display layout. In each round, one
image to be selected from an image set of 9 distractor images containing the correct
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(a) Step 1 (b) Step 2
Figure 7.3: Login prompt for Ceremony Two
image.
Therefore, the communication types, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, utilised
in Ceremony Two were:
 Recognition: Multiple images.
 Recall: One text password.
The login prompt with the Ceremony Two is shown in Figure 7.3.
7.3.1.4 Condition Three - Ceremony Three: Multiple Recognition and
Multiple Recall
The third, ’Multiple Recognition and Multiple Recall’ ceremony, is our newly pro-
posed ceremony MSMA ceremony, described in detail in Chapter 6.
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MSMA can be adapted to have fewer or more steps, depending on how many
segments are in the text password. The size of the segments that the text password
is divided into can vary, or it can be just one character. The length of the PIN can
also vary. In order to enable comparison with the other two ceremonies, MSMA
was implemented as follows. We divided a text password into three segments: each
segment consisting of one character and corresponding to one image from a graphical
feedback password, which is in fact a HPA. An image set of 9 distractor images
containing the correct one (as described in Chapter 6), were used for visual feedback.
We chose to use 3× 3 display with 9 images for immediate memory limits, as HCI
research shows that an average human can handle maximum ’seven plus or minus
two’ items at once [157]. We used 4 digit randomly assigned PINs.
Therefore, the summary of the MSMA policy applied is as follows: 3 rounds of
verification; text password divided into 3 segments - each 1 character; 3× 3 display
layout; 1 image to be to be recognised and selected in each round; 4-digit PIN.
The communication types, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, utilised in Cere-
mony Three were:
 Recognition: Multiple images.
 Recall: Multiple text and a PIN.
The login prompt for Ceremony Three is shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5.
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Figure 7.4: Login prompt for Ceremony Three: Step 1.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.5: Login prompt for Ceremony Three: the first of subsequent Steps.
7.3.2 Methodology
This section describes our study methodology, starting with recruitment process,
experiment implementation, scenario, finishing with the description of the study
tasks.
7.3.2.1 Recruitment
Participants were recruited from the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT), Kevin
Street Campus, and included students, academic, technical and administrative staff.
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Teddlie and Yu [211] describe convenience sampling as sampling that involves draw-
ing samples that are both easily accessible and willing to participate in a study. Our
participants only needed to be able to browse the web and use websites that require
a username and password to gain access. The majority of the general population
uses various websites where they need to login providing credentials. DIT students
and staff met these criteria.
Participants for the study were recruited in three ways: (1) invitation to staff
and students through e-mail; (2) interaction by phone and in person and by (3)
posting a notice on DIT bulletin boards. Selection of participants was based on
those students and staff who identified themselves as willing to participate in the
study. They needed to be at least 18 years old. The information given during the
recruiting process was that we are conducting a user study on security usability of
web authentication schemes that use images as part of the login process (presented
in Appendix A, Figures A.1 and A.2). Our target population was primarily
composed of university students and staff. We recognise that the general population
is much more diverse, but it is adequate for a comparative study like this [116, 112,
141, 136, 204].
We aimed to recruit about 140 participants, taking into account the recognised
study dropout problem [50]. As we planned to analyse the data using non-parametric
tests, this sample size would have exceeded the recommended sample size of at least
30 for an analysis using non-parametric statistics [58].
Participants were excluded from the data analysis if they failed to complete the
tasks required by the user study. Participants that refused to sign the consent form
were also excluded.
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7.3.2.2 Implementation
A fully functioning website called ’Ireland: Life and Travel’ was created, hosted,
and maintained for the study, hereafter referred as User Study website. Figure 7.6
shows the home page of the website.
Figure 7.6: User Study website
The ’Ireland: Life and Travel’ website was implemented in such a way to allow
participants to authenticate with one of the three authentication ceremonies, i.e.
conditions (Section 7.3.1). Thus, participants were tested under identical condi-
tions, only differing in the type of authentication being used.
Surveys were designed and implemented and data was collected using a DIT
created account at an online survey tool.
We created an online study page and all the tasks including surveys were accessed
from the links from that page (Appendix A).
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7.3.2.3 Scenario and Procedure
At the beginning of the study participants were given a consent form and the study
information sheets to read. The materials used can be found in Appendix A. The
consent form was a generic DIT research form that pointed out to participants that
they were free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason
for withdrawing and without affecting their future relationship with DIT. The first
information sheet had a brief overview of the study, task, duration and anonymity.
It also mentioned that the purpose of the study was to evaluate the security usability
of three web login schemes; that we were trying to determine how easy and secure
it is for people to use these schemes; and that we were comparing login schemes
regarding their impact on the user’s ability to distinguish between legitimate and
altered website login pages. The second information sheet outlined the website and
survey tasks to be performed as part of the study; and explained that they need to
sign the consent form if they are willing to proceed with the study. It also had the
URL of the study website from which to perform the study (Appendix A, Figure
A.6). If participants had any questions, the researcher reviewed the consent form
and information sheets with them.
Neither the consent form nor information sheets mentioned the word phishing or
spoofing.
Participants that signed the consent form were given an envelope containing their
predefined account details: username, email address, AIN, username and password
for accessing the study website and surveys. The consent form and the information
sheets were then taken away from the participants.
Upon receiving the account details participants were given the opportunity to
ask questions. However, after this step, the participants were asked to continue with
the tasks without asking questions, as if they were accessing the website from home.
and the session could begin.
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Users performed all tasks by clicking on the links from the web page, hereafter
referred to as the Study page, as shown in Appendix A, Figure A.7. Each session
lasted between 30-40 minutes. Participants were offered chocolate at the end of the
session, as they were leaving the laboratory, and also they were then debriefed about
the true nature of the study. We followed Jakobsson’s [80] guidelines suggesting that
debriefing in a laboratory phishing study is appropriate. The aim of debriefing is to
heal any negative feedback and the breach of trust and the face-to-face conversation
between the participant and the researcher is proper in the circumstances.
7.3.2.4 Study Tasks
The study tasks were accessed from the links on the Study page (Appendix A) and
grouped as follows:
1. Registering
2. Website tasks
3. Post Study survey
4. Demographics survey
Participants were asked to first register for the User Study website and then
perform the tasks in order.
Registration procedures
After signing the consent form, each participant was given an envelope contain-
ing a paper strip with the following predefined details: username, email address,
AIN, username and password for accessing the study surveys. The username details
determined which condition of the user study will the user be in. Before registering,
participants were directed to familiarise themselves with the assigned authentication
ceremony.
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Tutorials. Short tutorials for using each ceremony were developed and links
to them were provided. Participants were also provided a link to their assigned
ceremony registration screen from the study page. Each user then created an account
on the User Study website, with the given username. The participants were advised
that they could use their AIN or the survey password as a text password. Both were
7 digits/characters long.
Website tasks
The website tasks consisted of logging in to the ’Ireland: Life and Travel’ website
at least 5 times, using a newly created password. During each login, they needed
to post a short comment on the topic of the specific website page and then log
out. Topics of the pages were: Food, Green Scenery, Irish Dancing, Literature and
Traditional music. Participants needed to add their AIN to comments in order to
be eligible for the raffle.
The adding comments task served multiple purposes. First, it ensured that the
users login to the pages. Second, it was added to increase the experience of risk
by giving users password-protected accounts where participants needed to add their
AIN to comments in order to enter the raffle for the prizes. The third aim was to
distract the users between login attempts to clear their working memory. It was used
instead of using a specific mental rotation tasks (MRT), often used in laboratory
studies [197, 41].
Survey tasks
After completing the website tasks participants were instructed to complete two
surveys, a Post Study and a brief Demographics survey.
The Post Study survey contained questions used to measure Elaboration, Moti-
vation and Capabilities components of our Model. Their measurement is described
in Section 7.3.4.
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The Demographics survey collected basic information about participants includ-
ing age, gender and occupation. It was intended to give a better understanding of
the user study sample.
The questionnaires, as administered to participants, can be found in Appendix
A with the other user study materials.
7.3.3 Simulated Attack
The choice of attacks to perform was determined by a couple of factors. First,
it is a recognised difficulty in comparing authentication schemes that the spoofing
techniques are very different for each scheme [52]. To adequately compare the effect
of a phishing attack, it needs to be possible to perform it for each ceremony in a very
similar way and also make the attack plausible. Another consideration we needed
to keep in mind was that if an attack was fundamentally changing the login prompt,
we could assume that the user would refuse to interact with it. That narrowed a
choice of phishing attacks. As we intended to evaluate the impact of differences in
the number of communication tasks in ceremonies, launching, for example, a missing
security images attack, was not plausible for all ceremonies. We also would not have
a difference in the number of communication tasks in ceremonies which we needed
to assess.
The attack we launched was applicable for all three ceremonies and is a recognised
type of phishing attack [144]. During this attack a secure login page was spoofed,
with the user interface providing all the interaction and functionalities with the user
in the same way as a legitimate login page would, but without the interaction with
the real server provider, making the user believe that he/she is interacting with
the intended target website. This is a type of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack,
the attacker is only interacting with the victim at the interface level, and not at
the network level, as in real-time man-in-the-middle attack. We did not consider
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real-time man-in-the-middle attack, which is more difficult to launch for attackers
as well. In a real MITM attack, the phisher poses both as a service provider and as
a user and can obtain access to any transmitted information in the process, and can
control all network traffic.
Based on the above consideration we decided to simulate a phishing attack where
we prompt the user with an invalid HPA - graphical part of the login prompt; i.e.
image(s) that are not part of the user’s password. In a real phishing attack the user
would have been redirected to the spoofed site and the phisher would then try to
present with a login prompt in order to get the user to enter the password into it.
We assumed that the user does not notice a slight difference in the URL, or lack of
other security indicators. These issues have been explored elsewhere and it has been
shown that security indicators do not adequately protect against phishing attacks
[57, 65, 194]. Many real world phishing attacks do not even attempt to alter the
destination site, as they rely on peoples lack of understanding of URLs [115].
The main website tasks of the study involved logging in five times to the user
study website and post a short comment each time. After the user logged in three
times, we simulated an attack on the fourth login attempt.
As part of the attack, we prompted the user with an invalid graphical part of the
password prompt. For Ceremony One, a wrong image was displayed; for Ceremonies
Two and Three a set of distractor images not containing the right image. We
measured if participants noticed that the correct image is not displayed or present
in the set, and if they would submit their credentials in spite of that.
The spoofed login prompt would be presented one more time. The subsequent
login attempts would have the correct login prompt restored and the users could
continue with the rest of the study tasks.
As our primary goal was to evaluate human behaviour, rather than the strength
of the security protocol, the user was allowed to enter all segments of the text
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(a) Login (b) Attack login
Figure 7.7: Simulated attack against Ceremony One: a wrong image is displayed
in the attack login screen.
(a) Login (b) Attack login
Figure 7.8: Simulated attack against Ceremony Two: a set of distractor images
shown in the attack login screen does not contain the correct image.
password even if they had clicked/chosen the wrong images of the graphical part of
the password.
The same attack was employed against users of all three ceremonies. We show
screenshots of the attack login pages in Figures 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9.
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(a) Login (b) Attack login
Figure 7.9: Simulated attack against Ceremony Three: a set of distractor images
shown in the attack login screen does not contain the correct image.
7.3.3.1 Attack Success Metrics
The attack was considered to be successful if the user submitted the password in
spite of the wrong images presented. The attack was considered to be a failure if
the user did not submit the password or abandoned the page. After launching the
attack we continued the experiment. We designed the attack in such a way that on
the second login attempt after the attack launch, the participants were presented
with the correct images and could login to the website again. This is in line with
the real life attacks where users do not realise they have been subjected to an attack
until they notice the misuse of the stolen credentials. Some participants reported it
as: ’I am not sure why my images were different at one stage.’.
7.3.4 Measures
We conducted two surveys: the first one was the Post Study survey and the second
was the Demographic survey. The questionnaires were approved by the DIT Re-
search Ethics Committee, and the full questionnaires can be seen in Appendix A.
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Both surveys and data from the experiment were designed to be anonymous.
The Post Study survey consisted of 15 questions divided into three sections, the
sections either measuring Elaboration, Motivation or Capabilities constructs. We
designed the Post Study survey based on the elements of our Model for Analysing
HF-APAC. For the most part, measures used for Elaboration, Motivation and Ca-
pabilities were based on prior validated measures developed in communication pro-
cessing [217, 71, 235] and extended and adapted for our research model.
Communication Factors. Recall and recognition communication factors was mea-
sured as the total number of recall and recognition tasks in the ceremony. We also
referred to it as Number of Communication factors.
Attention to Recall. Attention to Recall communication was measured as the
overall time span between when the text and/or PIN part of the password login
part appeared for the first time on a participant’s screen and when the participant
responded to it. It was measured in milliseconds.
Attention to Recognise. Attention to Recognise communication was measured
as the overall time span between when the image(s) to be recognised or selected
appeared for the first time on a participant’s screen and when the participant re-
sponded to it. It was measured in milliseconds.
Behaviour. Behaviour measured the attack success, i.e. whether a participant
submitted his/her credentials in spite of correct image not being displayed or present
in the set.
Motivation. Motivation was measured using the values of seven items based on
prior research in information processing of phishing emails [217] and adapted and
extended for our research model. Sample items, 5-point scale, read: ’The informa-
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Item Description
Q1 The information in the User Study Website was essential.
Q2 The information in the User Study Website was trivial.
Q3 The information in the User Study Website was significant.
Q4 The information in the User Study Website was important.
Q5 The information in the User Study Website was relevant to you.
Q6 The information in the User Study Website was of concern to you.
Q7 The information in the User Study Website matters to you.
Table 7.3: Motivation items
tion in the User Study Website was essential.’ The items were questions 1 to 7 in
the Post Study survey, shown in Table 7.3 and Appendix A.
Each item response was scored as follows: 1 = ’Strongly Disagree’, 2 = ’Some-
what disagree’, 3 = ’Neither agree nor disagree’, 4 = ’Somewhat agree’, 5 = ’Strongly
Agree’. The items were combined by using the median value.
Capabilities. Capabilities was measured using the values of three items, which were
derived from prior research in web security and information processing of phishing
emails [136, 217] and adapted and extended for our research model. Sample items,
5-point scales, read: ’How would you rate your knowledge about Web security in
general?’ The items were questions 8 to 10 in the Post Study survey, shown in Table
7.4 and Appendix A.
Each item response was scored as follows: 1 = ’Not at all Knowledgeable’, 2
= ’Slightly Knowledgeable’, 3 = ’Moderately Knowledgeable’, 4 = ’Very Knowl-
edgeable’, 5 = ’Extremely Knowledgeable’. The items were combined by using the
median value.
Elaboration. Elaboration was measured using five items derived from prior re-
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Item Description
Q8 How would you rate your knowledge about Web security in general?
Q9 How would you rate your knowledge of the authentication scheme used in the
User Study Website?
Q10 How would you rate you knowledge about Web based scams?
Table 7.4: Capabilities items
search in information processing of phishing emails [217] and adapted and extended
for our research model. Sample items, 5-point scale, read: ’After trying to login to
the User Study Website you thought about the type of authenticators you previously
used for this website.’ The items were questions 11 to 15 in the Post Study survey,
shown in Table 7.5 and Appendix A.
Each item response was scored as follows: 1 = ’Strongly Disagree’, 2 = ’Some-
what disagree’, 3 = ’Neither agree nor disagree’, 4 = ’Somewhat agree’, 5 = ’Strongly
Agree’. The items were combined by using the median value.
7.3.5 Statistical Tests
For our analyses we used a number of different statistical tests as we tested the
seven Model for Analysing HF-APAC hypotheses, developed in Section 5.3.1. For
MSMA evaluation we tested the differences between the three ceremonies regard-
ing the user’s likelihood of being phished. The choice of the tests for each of the
hypotheses was determined by the nature and number of the independent and de-
pendent variables, the between-subject study design and the particular question to
be answered by the hypothesis [142, 2].
Logistic regression was conducted to test the prediction in hypotheses where the
dependent variable was a binary categorical variable. To test an association between
variables we performed Cochran-Armitage test of trend, Somers’ delta and Fisher’s
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Item Description
Q11 After trying to login to the User Study Website you thought about the type
of authenticators you previously used for this website.
Q12 After trying to login to the User Study Website you thought about the login
page and compared it to your previous login experience.
Q13 After trying to login to the User Study Website you thought about the login
page look and feel and compared it to your previous login experience.
Q14 After trying to login to the User Study Website you thought about the security
of your passwords.
Q15 After trying to login to the User Study Website you thought about whether
the website was secure.
Table 7.5: Elaboration items
exact test. For differences between three conditions we conducted Chi-square test
of homogeneity.
Logistic regression. A binomial (or binary) logistic regression is usually referred
to as logistic regression. It is a form of regression analysis when the dependent
variable is binary (i.e. dichotomous) and the independents can be categorical and/or
continuous. It is used when we have a binary outcome (dependent variable) and wish
to carry some kind of prediction, make an estimate of the probability of a certain
event occurring.
Cochran-Armitage test of trend. The Cochran-Armitage test of trend is used in
categorical data analysis when the aim is to assess for the presence of an association
between an ordinal independent variable (IV) and a dichotomous dependent variable
(DV).
Somers’ delta. Somers’ delta (or Somers’ D) measures associations between indepen-
dent variables (IVs) and dependent variables (DVs) in terms of differences between
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proportions. It is a non-parametric test of the strength and direction of association
between an ordinal dependent variable and an ordinal independent variable.
Fisher’s exact test. Fisher’s exact test can be used to determine if there is an
association between two dichotomous variables. Fisher’s exact test does not make a
distinction between an independent variable and a dependent variable.
Chi-square test of homogeneity. The chi-square test of homogeneity is used to deter-
mine if a difference exists between two or more independent groups on a dichotomous
dependent variable. It is used to determine whether the proportions are statistically
significantly different in the different groups. If there are statistically significant
differences, a post hoc test can be run to determine where the differences between
these groups lie.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the design of the user study used to experimentally evalu-
ate the MSMA ceremony and the Model for Analysing HF-APAC. The user study
compares three authentication ceremonies with regard to their impact on the user’s
ability to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed website login prompts.
The goal of the study was to explore the impact of the number and types of
login communications (recall and recognition) on the user’s likelihood of detecting
a spoofed login page; to explore the influence of attention and elaboration on users
making an error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished; and also to
explore the influence of users’ motivation and capabilities. The second goal of the
study was to experimentally evaluate the MSMA ceremony resistance to phishing.
Data analysis and the study results are presented in the next chapter, Chapter
8.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation Results
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the results of the user study we conducted to evaluate the
Model for Analysing HF-APAC and the MSMA ceremony. The study design was
described in Chapter 7.
The study compared three authentication ceremonies with regard to their impact
on the user’s ability to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed website login
prompts. The study simulated a phishing attack at the user interface level against
users of each of the ceremonies. As part of the attack, we prompted the user with an
invalid graphical part of the password prompt. For Condition One (Section 7.3.1.2),
a wrong image was displayed; for Condition Two (Section 7.3.1.3) and Condition
Three (Section 7.3.1.4), a set of distractor images not containing the right image
was displayed. We measured if participants noticed that the correct image was not
displayed or present in the set, and if the users would submit their credentials in
spite of that. The attack is described in detail in Section 7.3.3.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. We first present the data analysis,
followed by MSMA evaluation results. Next, we present the results of the Model
evaluation. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results.
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8.2 Study Overview
A total of 135 participants were initially recruited for the study. The study was
conducted in April and May 2016 and 113 participants completed all the task of the
study.
One participant refused to sign the consent form and that precluded him of
continuing with the study. Due to unforeseen WiFi issues, 19 participants did not
complete the Website Tasks and dropped out of the study. All participants also
needed to complete a Post Study and a Demographics survey. Out of 115 partici-
pants that completed the Website Tasks, 1 did not do any of the two surveys and
1 did not complete the Demographic survey. These two sets of data were excluded
from the analysis. Therefore, only the results of 113 participants that completed all
the tasks were included in the analysis.
The data from the phished and non-phished participants composed one contin-
uous data set. Out of 113 participants that completed all part of the study: 38
were in Condition One, 38 in Condition Two and 37 in Condition Three. Condi-
tions One, Two and Three were described in Sections 7.3.1.2, Section 7.3.1.3 and
7.3.1.4 respectively.
8.3 Data Preparation
The data gathered by the study needed to be prepared for analysis. The data
comprised of data gathered by the users participating in the website experiment
and data gathered via surveys after the users completed the experiment part of the
study.
All the experiment and survey data was conducted online, and the data were
entered electronically. The data preparation involved retrieving relevant data from
the experiment and the survey databases, cleaning unrelated entries such as logs
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that were not included in the analysis and finding missing values. The data from
participants who did not complete or submit all the required questions in the two
surveys were considered incomplete and needed to be removed from the dataset.
Raw data were first exported into comma separated values (CSV) files and then
imported to SPSS statistical software [117]. All data analyses and data manipula-
tions were conducted using SPSS versions 23 and 24 [117]. We used a significance
level of α = 0.05 for all analyses.
Data Coding
Communication Factors. Recall and recognition communication factors, or the
Number of Communication factors was coded as: 2, 4 and 7; for Ceremony One,
Two and Three respectively.
Attention to Recall. Attention to Recall communication was measured in millisec-
onds and coded as a continuous variable.
Attention to Recognise. Attention to Recognise communication was measured in
milliseconds and coded as a continuous variable.
Behaviour. Behaviour was coded as a binary categorical variable indicating whether
the participants submitted password to the spoofed login page, i.e. was phished.
The attack success was coded as 1, and 0 if failed.
Motivation. The Motivation was coded as an ordinal variable on the scale 1 to 5.
Capabilities. The Capabilities was coded as an ordinal variable on the scale 1 to 5.
Elaboration. The Elaboration was coded as an ordinal variable on the scale 1 to
5. We also coded Elaboration as a dichotomous variable. The scores 1-3 as a low
Elaboration level, equal to 0; and 4-5 as a high Elaboration level, equal to 1.
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8.4 Descriptive Outcomes
This section summarises the descriptive data, beginning with the demographics.
8.4.1 Demographics
Our participants spanned a range of age groups. 51 (45.1%) participants reported
themselves to be in the 18-25 age range, 33 (29.2%) in the 26-35 range, 16 (14.2%)
in the 36-45 range, 11 (9.7%) 46-55 and 2 (1.8%) in the 56-65 range. No participant
was in the 65 and up range, as depicted in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1.
27 (23.9%) of participants reported themselves as female, 86 (76.1%) reported
themselves as male, as depicted in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.1.
Age Percent
18–25 45.1%
26–35 29.2%
36–45 14.2%
46–55 9.7%
56–65 1.8%
Table 8.1: Age percentages
Gender Percent
Female 23.9%
Male 76.1%
Table 8.2: Gender percentages
86 (76.1%) of participants reported that their area is computer science, business
and engineering 7 (6.2%) each, 5 (4.4%) science, mathematics and social science 2
(1.8%) each (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.2). The remaining 3.5% reported their area
as education, history, law and physical theatre.
53 (46.9) reported themselves as undergraduate students, 15 (13.3%) as PhD
students, 11 (9.7%) as masters students and 7 (6.2%) as trade school or apprentice-
ship students (Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2). 23 (23.9%) were reported as being lab
technicians, lecturers, technical officers, apprentices and HDip students.
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(a) Age (b) Gender
Figure 8.1: Age and gender count
Area Percent
Computer Science 76.1%
Business 6.2%
Engineering 6.2%
Science 4.4%
Mathematics 1.8%
Social Science 1.8%
Other 3.5%
Table 8.3: Area percentages
Occupation Percent
Undergraduate student 46.9%
PhD student 13.3%
Masters student 9.7%
Trade school or 6.2%
apprenticeship student
Other 23.9%
Table 8.4: Occupation percentages
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(a) Area (b) Occupation
Figure 8.2: Area and occupation count
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Construct Median Mode
Motivation 3.00 3.00
Capabilities 3.00 3.00
Elaboration 4.00 4.00
Table 8.5: Survey construct statistics
8.4.2 Data Overview
Table 8.5 shows median and mode values for survey construct measures. The me-
dian value for Motivation and Capabilities was 3, for Elaboration was 4 (Table 8.5).
The frequencies for survey constructs are shown in Figure 8.3. For Motivation, 45
(39.8%) of participants were undecided about the importance of the User Study
website, closely followed by 44 of those that ’Somewhat agreed’ to the importance
statements (38.9%). For Capability construct, 26 (23%) participants rated them-
selves as ’Slightly Knowledgeable’, 50 (44.2%) as ’Moderately Knowledgeable’; and
30 (26.5%) as ’Very Knowledgeable’, in the area of authentication and web security
in general. However, for Elaboration, the majority of participants (69, i.e. 61.1%)
’Somewhat agreed’ about thinking and considering User Study website communica-
tion.
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show the descriptive statistics of recall and recognise times
for each study condition. For Condition One (Section 7.3.1.2) Ceremony One was
used; for Condition Two (Section 7.3.1.3) Ceremony Two was used; and for Con-
dition Three (Section 7.3.1.4) Ceremony Three was used. Recall and recognition
times in ceremonies was measured in milliseconds. Mean recall time was the low-
est for Ceremony Two, which can be attributed to recall task being more distinct
from recognition task in Ceremony Two. Mean recognition time was the lowest for
Ceremony One and the highest for Ceremony Three. This is due to users having to
recognise 3 images in Ceremonies Two and Three, rather than 1 in Ceremony One.
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(a) Motivation (b) Capabilities
(c) Elaboration
Figure 8.3: Frequencies for survey constructs
The difference between Ceremony Three and Ceremony Two recognition time can
be attributed to Ceremony Three users being required to switch between recogni-
tion and recall tasks, i.e. recognise an image and recall part of text password; while
Ceremony Two recognition tasks were performed consecutively. Figures 8.4 and
8.5 show distributions of recall and recognition times by number of participants for
each study condition. We used histograms to graphically summarize and display the
distribution of recall and recognition times.
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Ceremony Mean SD Median Skewness Kurtosis
One 20076.79 20076.79 6687.35 2.42 5.29
Two 7115.64 3397.63 5868.50 0.99 0.62
Three 13082.54 13308.25 7753.00 0.38 8.75
Table 8.6: Recall time statistics (milliseconds)
(a) Ceremony One (b) Ceremony Two
(c) Ceremony Three
Figure 8.4: Recall times for ceremonies
155
Ceremony Mean SD Median Skewness Kurtosis
One 23193.31 32099.97 7289.00 1.93 3.76
Two 39694.22 28492.47 33687.60 2.00 5.53
Three 45647.03 30281.09 35459.00 0.44 -1.19
Table 8.7: Recognise time statistics (milliseconds)
(a) Ceremony One (b) Ceremony Two
(c) Ceremony Three
Figure 8.5: Recognise times for ceremonies
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8.5 MSMA Evaluation Results
Our study evaluated the MSMA ceremony in comparison to a single security image
and password, and multiple images and password authentication ceremonies. We
did not attempt to evaluate the usability of the MSMA prompt or the memorability
of graphical passwords - those topics have been explored elsewhere [205, 53].
The following hypothesis was formulated for the purpose of the study:
Hypothesis: Behaviour Difference
H : There would be significant difference among the three ceremonies regarding
the user’s likelihood of being phished.
We performed chi-square test of homogeneity to look for differences between the
three conditions, i.e. ceremonies, on the user’s likelihood to fall for the attack. A
significant difference (χ2 (2) = 6.665, p = 0.036 ) between the ceremonies was seen.
Post hoc analysis involved pairwise comparisons using the z-test of two propor-
tions with a Bonferroni correction. It showed that the only significant difference
(p<0.05) in falling for the attack was between Condition One and Condition Three
(MSMA ceremony). There was no statistically significant difference in proportions,
neither between Ceremony One and Ceremony Two conditions, nor Ceremony Two
and Ceremony Three (MSMA ceremony) conditions.
In Ceremony One condition, 23 out of 38 participants (60.53%) submitted their
passwords in spite of different image being presented at the login; in Ceremony Two
condition, 21 out of 38 (55.26%); while in Ceremony Three condition (MSMAC
ceremony) 12 out of 37 participants submitted it (32.43%). Results of the attack
success by condition are shown in Table 8.8; and Figures 8.7 and 8.6.
Significantly more MSMA users resisted the simulated attack (described in Section
7.3.3) than in the ceremony where only a single image and text password were used,
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Figure 8.6: Success rates of the attack per ceremony
Ceremony %Attack %Attack success p
successful /%participants
One 60.53% 23/38
Two 55.26% 21/38
Three (MSMA) 32.43% 12/37 0.036∗
Notes:
Pearson Chi-Square χ2 (2) = 6.665
Significance is indicated by ∗p<0.05
Table 8.8: Differences between ceremonies in detecting the simulated attack
as depicted in Figure 8.7. It gives an indication of increased anti-phishing resistance
of our proposed MSMA ceremony.
Of the pool of 113 participants in all conditions of our experiment 56 submitted
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Figure 8.7: Differences between ceremonies in detecting the simulated attack
passwords into a spoofed login window, i.e. got phished.
The participants using MSMA ceremony were significantly better in resisting the
simulated attack than the participants using the Ceremony One, where only a single
image and text password was used. The Ceremony One closely mimicked commercial
variations of security images authentication often used on internet banking websites
[18, 180, 192].
The combination of images and text password as used in MSMA, with multiple
image choices combined with text passwords seem to make users significantly less
likely to succumb to the simulated phishing attack.
159
8.6 The Model Evaluation Results
We used the hypothetico-deductive methodology to evaluate the Model for Analysing
HF-APAC, presented in Section 5.3 and Figure 5.1. The hypotheses 1 to 5 were
developed as part of that method and were used to test the Model. The testing
of the hypotheses, we present in Section 8.6.2, was the evaluation of the Model.
The hypotheses development was described in Section 5.3.1, and hypotheses are
summarised here for clarity:
1. H1: Increased Number of recall and recognise Communication factors of the
authentication ceremony will result in a lower likelihood of a user making an
error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
2. H2: Increased Number of recall and recognise Communication factors of the
authentication ceremony will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentica-
tion login prompt.
3. H2(a): The level of Attention given to the Recall communication factor of the
authentication ceremony will be negatively related to the level of Elaboration.
4. H2(b): The level of Attention given to the Recognise communication fac-
tor of the authentication ceremony will be positively related to the level of
Elaboration.
5. H3: Increased Capabilities will lead to increased Elaboration of the authenti-
cation login prompt.
6. H4: Increased Motivation will lead to increased Elaboration of the authenti-
cation login prompt.
7. H5: Increased Elaboration will result in a lower likelihood of the user making
an error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
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Construct Description Cronbach α
Motivation 7 items; 5 point scale 0.728
Capabilities 3 items; 5 point scale 0.745
Elaboration 5 items; 5 point scale 0.696
Table 8.9: Summary of survey construct measurements and reliability
8.6.1 Reliability of Constructs
The measurement reliability of variables that were captured via survey questions as
response scales was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure
of the internal consistency, or reliability, of model constructs. It is most commonly
used for multiple Likert questions in a survey that form a scale. It is computed
in terms of the average intercorrelation among the items measuring the concept.
Cronbach’s alpha measures how closely related a set of items are as a group. It
is expressed as a number between 0 and 1. It is generally accepted that values
above 0.70 are preferred [166, 210]. However, others [98, 51] suggest that alpha
reliability between 0.65 and 0.70 are also sufficient to insure internal consistency of
the scale. Elaboration, Motivation or Capabilities constructs exhibited moderate to
good internal reliability, ranging from 0.696 to 0.745 as shown in Table 8.9.
Table 8.9 shows a summary of survey construct measurements along with their
alpha reliabilities.
8.6.2 Hypotheses Testing
8.6.2.1 Hypothesis H1: Communication Factors to Behaviour
H1: Increased Number of recall and recognise authentication Communication factors
of the ceremony will result in a lower likelihood of a user getting phished.
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A Cochran-Armitage trend test for association was run to determine whether a linear
trend exists between the number of recall and recognition Communication tasks and
the Behaviour - proportion of users who fell for the simulated attack.
The Cochran-Armitage test of trend showed a statistically significant linear trend
(p = 0.015), with adding more communication factors resulting in a higher propor-
tion of users resisting the attack. The number of communication factors were 2
(Ceremony One), 4 (Ceremony Two) and 7 (Ceremony Three), and the proportion
of users that resisted attack was as follows: 26.3%, 29.8% and 43.9%, as displayed
in Figure 8.8.
Figure 8.8: H1: Cochran-Armitage association between the Number of login Com-
munication factors and Behaviour
In order to ascertain the effects of the number of login communication tasks on the
likelihood of being phished, a logistic regression was performed. The dependent
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Predictors B S.E. Wald df p Exp(B)
Communication Factors:
Recognition + Recall (Base) 6.446 2 0.040∗
Multi. Recognition + One Recall -0.216 0.465 0.216 1 0.642 0.806
Multi. Recognition + Multi. Recall -1.161 0.483 5.777 1 0.016∗ 0.313
Constant 0.427 0.332 1.659 1 0.198 1.533
Nagelkerke R2 0.078%
Chi-square 6.776, df = 2, p = 0.034∗
Notes: Multi. = Multiple; Significance is indicated by ∗p<0.05, B - regression coefficient;
S.E. - standard errors; Wald - Wald chi-square value; df - degrees of freedom; p - statistical
significance; Exp(B) - odds ratios for the predictors.
Table 8.10: H1: Results of logistic regression predicting being phished by login
communication factors
variable was Behaviour - indicating attack success or failure; and independent vari-
able was the Number of login Communication factors - a categorical variable with
three categories. The logistic regression model was statistically significant (χ2 (2) =
6.776, p = 0.034). No outliers were found. The model explained 7.8% (Nagelkerke
R2) of the variance in behaviour and correctly classified 61.1% of cases.
Login communication had statistically significant overall effect (Wald = 6.446, df
= 2, p = 0.040), as shown in Table 8.10. The Wald statistic test is used to determine
statistical significance for each of the independent variables. In logistic regression,
the B coefficient indicates the increase in the log odds (or logits) of the outcome
for a unit increase of the independent variable. The B coefficient for MSMA was
negative and significant (B = −1.161, p = 0.016), indicating that having Multiple
Recall and Multiple Recognition communication is associated with decreased odds
of falling for the attack (Table 8.10).
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The Exp(B) value presents change in the odds for each unit increase of the
independent variable. Values less than 1.000 indicate decreased odds for an increase
in one unit of the independent variable. The Exp(B) for Ceremony Three (MSMA)
was equal to 0.313. What this means is that the odds of noticing a phishing attack
was 0.313 times lower for users in Ceremony One than in Ceremony Three. For
clarity, the odds ratio is sometimes inverted, i.e. 1÷0.313 = 3.194. Therefore, we can
say that the participants using Multiple Recognition and Multiple Recall (Ceremony
Three) had 3.194 higher odds to notice a phishing attack than the participants using
Recognition and Recall ceremony (Ceremony One).
Hence, hypothesis H1 was supported by the data. Increased Number of recall and
recognition login Communication factors reduces the likelihood of the user getting
phished.
8.6.2.2 Hypothesis H2: Communication Factors to Elaboration
H2: Increased Number of recall and recognise authentication Communication factors
of the ceremony will lead to increased Elaboration of the login prompt.
A Cochran-Armitage trend test for association [44, 17] was run to determine whether
there is a linear trend in binomial proportions of Elaboration across the number of
communication factors.
The Elaboration was operationalised as a dichotomous (low and high) variable.
The scores 1-3 were operationalised as a low Elaboration level (= 0); and 4 and 5
as a high Elaboration level (= 1).
The number of communication factors were 2 (Ceremony One), 4 (Ceremony 2)
and 7 (Ceremony Three). The proportion of users with high elaboration was 65.8%,
81.6% and 81.1% respectively. The Cochran-Armitage test of trend did not show a
statistically significant linear trend between the number of communication factors
and the Elaboration level (p = 0.119).
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We performed logistic regression to examine whether the number of Recall and
Recognise communication factors predicts level of Elaboration. The Elaboration
was operationalised as a dichotomous (low and high) variable.
The number of communication factors were 2 (Ceremony One), 4 (Ceremony
2) and 7 (Ceremony Three). However, the omnibus model was not statistically
significant (p = 0.198) to establish prediction between login communication factors
and Elaboration.
Overall, there was no support by the data for hypothesis H2.
8.6.2.3 Hypothesis H2(a): Attention to Recall
H2(a): The level of Attention given to the Recall communication factor of the
authentication ceremony will be negatively related to the level of Elaboration.
Only data from Ceremony Two and Three were used to test this hypothesis as they
differed in number of recall communication factors.
We performed a logistic regression to ascertain the effects of the recall time and
ceremony condition on the Elaboration level. The Attention to Recall and ceremony
condition were independent variables. The Attention to Recall was measured as
the overall time a participant spent on considering and entering the text and/or
PIN part of the password and ceremony was coded as a categorical variable. The
Elaboration was a dichotomous, dependent variable. The Elaboration scores 1-
3 were operationalised as a low Elaboration level (= 0); and 4 and 5 as a high
Elaboration level (= 1).
Linearity of the Recall time with respect to the Elaboration was assessed via
the Box-Tidwell procedure. A Bonferroni adjustment was applied, resulting in sta-
tistical significance being accepted when p<0.0125. Based on this assessment, the
continuous Recall time variable was found to be linearly related to the logit of the
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Predictors B S.E. Wald df p Exp(B)
Ceremony 0.580 0.692 0.703 1 0.402 1.787
Attention to Recall -0.000078 0.000 4.414 1 0.035∗ 0.99985
Constant 2.63 0.508 16.517 1 0.000 7.868
Nagelkerke R2 0.136%
Chi-square 6.578, df = 2, p = 0.037∗
Notes: Ceremony is for Ceremony Two compared to Ceremony Three; Significance is indicated
by ∗p<0.05, B - regression coefficient; S.E. - standard errors; Wald - Wald chi-square value; df
- degrees of freedom; p - statistical significance; Exp(B) - odds ratios for the predictors.
Table 8.11: H2a: Results of logistic regression predicting Elaboration level
Elaboration. There were two residuals with a value of 3.023 and 2.774 standard
deviations, which were kept in the analysis. No outliers were found. The logis-
tic regression model was statistically significant, χ2 (2) = 6.578, p = 0.037. The
model explained 13.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in Elaboration and correctly
classified 84% of cases.
Attention to Recall had statistically significant overall effect (Wald = 4.414,
df = 1, p = 0.035). The B coefficient for attention to Recall was negative and
significant (B = −0.000078, p = 0.035), indicating that increased Attention to Recall
is associated with decreased odds of high Elaboration. The Exp(B) for Attention to
Recall was equal to 0.99985. For clarity, the odds ratio is inverted, i.e. 1÷0.99985 =
1.00015. Therefore, for each millisecond increase in Attention to Recall, the odds of
high Elaboration decreases by a factor of 1.00015. See Table 8.11.
Hence, hypothesis H2(a) was supported by the data. Increased Attention to
Recall is negatively related to the level of Elaboration.
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8.6.2.4 Hypothesis H2(b): Attention to Recognise
H2(b): The level of Attention given to the Recognise communication factor of the
authentication ceremony will be positively related to the level of Elaboration.
Only data from Ceremony One and Two were used as they differed in number of
recognise communication factors. The Elaboration was the dependent variable, mea-
sured as a dichotomous (low and high) variable. The Attention to Recognise was the
independent variable, measured as the overall time spent on recognising/choosing
images.
We performed logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ceremony condition
and the recognition time on Elaboration, but this model was not statistically signif-
icant (χ2 (2) = 2.484, p = 0.289).
Hence, we could not find support of hypothesis H2(b) from the data.
8.6.2.5 Hypothesis H3: Capabilities to Elaboration
H3: Increased Capabilities will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentication
login prompt.
For this test the Elaboration was operationalised as a dichotomous, low (= 0)
and high (= 1) variable.
We performed Cochran-Armitage trend test for association. The Capability level was
measured on the scale 1 to 5, and the proportion of users with increased Elaboration
was 40.0%, 76.9%, 78.0%, 76.7% and 100.0%, respectively. The Cochran-Armitage
test of trend did not show a statistically significant linear trend between Capability
and the Elaboration, p = 0.247.
Hypothesis 3 was also tested using Somers’ delta (or Somers’ D) to determine the
association between user’s Capabilities level and the level of Elaboration of the au-
thentication login prompt. Both Capabilities and Elaboration were operationalized
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as ordinal variables, on the scale of 1 to 5. There was a strong, positive association
between Capability and the Elaboration level, but it was not statistically significant
(D = 0.601, p = 0.439). Therefore, the data were only in support of the direction
of hypothesis 3.
Hence, we could not find support of hypothesis H3 from the data.
8.6.2.6 Hypothesis H4: Motivation to Elaboration
H4: Increased Motivation will lead to increased Elaboration of the authentication
login prompt.
Hypothesis 4 was tested using Somers’D measure examining the strength and di-
rection of association between users Motivation level and the level of Elaboration of
the authentication login prompt. There was a positive association between the Mo-
tivation and the Elaboration levels, and it was statistically significant (D = 0.178,
p = 0.041), as shown in Table 8.12.
Somers’ D p
Motivation to Elaboration 0.178 0.041∗
Notes: Significance is indicated by ∗p<0.05
Table 8.12: H4: Association between Motivation and Elaboration
As Somers’ D is positive, it means that as the user’s Motivation increases so
does the Elaboration (Figure 8.9).
Hence, hypothesis 4 was supported by the data.
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Figure 8.9: H4: Association between Motivation and Elaboration
169
8.6.2.7 Hypothesis H5: Elaboration to Behaviour
H5: Increased Elaboration will result in a lower likelihood of the user making an
error during the authentication process, i.e. getting phished.
We performed Cochran-Armitage trend test for association to determine if there is
a linear relationship, association, between the Elaboration and the Behaviour. The
test was run to determine whether a linear trend exists between the Elaboration
level and the proportion of users who submitted their password on the spoofed login
page.
The Elaboration level was measured on the scale 1 to 5 (high elaboration), and the
proportion of users where attack failed was 0.0, 42.9, 42.1, 53.6 and 52.9, respectively.
The Cochran-Armitage test of trend did not show a statistically significant linear
trend between Elaboration and the Behaviour of users who submitted their password
on the spoofed login page, p = 0.272.
We also ran Fisher’s exact test treating the Elaboration as a dichotomous variable.
The Elaboration was operationalised as a dichotomous (low and high) variable.
Elaboration scores 1-3 were operationalised as a low Elaboration level (= 0); and 4
and 5 as a high Elaboration level, (= 1).
The difference between the two independent binomial proportions was not statisti-
cally significant (p >0.05). Hence, we could not find evidence of association between
Elaboration and Behaviour.
Hence, there was no support for hypothesis H5 by the data.
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Hypotheses Overall conclusion
H1 Supported
Increased Number of login Communication factors results in a
lower likelihood of getting phished.
H2 Not supported
H2(a) Supported
Increased Attention to Recall communication results in a lower
Elaboration level.
H2(b) Not supported
H3 Direction as hypothesized, but not significant
A strong, positive association between Capabilities and
Elaboration level.
H4 Supported
As the user’s Motivation increases so does the Elaboration.
H5 Not supported
Table 8.13: Summary of the Model for Analysing HF-APAC hypotheses results
8.6.3 Summary of Results
Results of the hypotheses evaluation of our Model for Analysing HF-APAC are
summarised as follows and depicted in Table 8.13.
 Increasing the number of communication factors did not influence how much
users elaborated on the login prompt.
 The number of communication factors was a significant predictor of whether
an individual was phished or not.
 The elaboration level was not associated with a phishing detection rate.
 Increased user’s motivation was associated with increased elaboration.
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 Increased attention to recall communication resulted in a lower elaboration
level.
 There was a positive association between the capabilities and the elaboration
level, but not statistically significant.
 The attention to recognise communication was not associated with the elabo-
ration level.
8.7 Discussion
8.7.1 MSMA Effectiveness
The evaluation of our newly proposed MSMA ceremony involved exploring whether
the HPA using multiple authentication images in combination with text passwords
improves effectiveness of using security images as part of authentication.
Our study results showed a statistically significant difference between MSMA
and the ceremony with a single image and text password (i.e. Ceremony One con-
dition, Section 7.3.1.2) in resisting simulated phishing attack. In the single image
and text password condition, 23 out of 38 (60.53%) of participants entered their
password in spite of different security images displayed. Only 12 out of 37 (32.43%)
of MSMA participants entered their password, showing a significant improvement to
the single security image condition (Figure 8.10). Significantly more MSMA users
resisted the attack (Table 8.14) and that should imply an increased anti-phishing
resistance in comparison to single security image authentication – similar to com-
mercial variations often used on internet banking websites [18, 180, 192]. This shows
that improvements could be made in the way that the security images are currently
used which could result in greater anti-phishing resistance.
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Ceremony Attack Successful p
Single image + text 60.53%
Multiple images + text 55.36%
MSMA (Multiple images + multiple text) 32.43% 0.036∗
Significance is indicated by ∗p<0.05
Table 8.14: Percentages of participants who entered their password without the
right image being displayed
The participants using multiple images and a text password ceremony (i.e. Cer-
emony Two condition, 7.3.1.3) were not significantly more effective at noticing that
different images were displayed; 21 out of 38 (55.36%) of them logged in anyway.
Surprisingly, the difference was not significant when compared to MSMA or the
Ceremony One (i.e. single security image).
Only the HPA as used in MSMA, with multiple image choices combined with text
passwords seem to make users significantly less likely to succumb to the phishing
attack.
8.7.2 Human Communication Processing Principles
The Model hypotheses H1 to H5 testing was the evaluation of the human communi-
cation guidelines suggested in Section 5.4. Overall, the results showed support for
about half of them.
Our findings show that the attention to recall communication (i.e. text and/or
PIN password) significantly influence elaboration, which is an important step in
deception detection. Decreased attention to recall communication factors results in
higher elaboration.
The results show that neither the number of communication factors nor attention
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Figure 8.10: Count of participants and the attack outcome per ceremony
to recognise communication (i.e. images) influenced the extent of elaboration. As
elaboration is defined as the process of making conscious connections between the
cues observed and the prior knowledge, this means that the type of communication
tasks needed to be performed affected overall cognitive effort during authentication.
However, user’s motivation was found to significantly influence elaboration, with
increased motivation the elaboration was increased as well.
Another important implication of our study is the lack of significant support for
the effect of prior security awareness and knowledge on elaboration. Our results
showed a strong, positive association between capabilities (measuring web security
and the ceremony knowledge) and elaboration, but not statistically significant.
The results also show that performing additional communication tasks to log in
was a significant predictor of whether an individual was phished or not, leading to
significantly greater effectiveness in detecting the simulated attack. An increase in
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communication factors have shown significant increases in the phishing detection
rate which is depicted in Table 8.15. Surprisingly, elaboration expended in process-
ing a login communication was not significantly related to the likelihood of a user
getting phished. Hence, we could not find the evidence that those who more closely
attend to login communication end up making the right choice.
Therefore, the human communication processing principles, proposed by the
Model can be summarised as follows:
1. Increasing the number of recall and recognise communication factors results
in a higher phishing detection rate.
2. Increasing the number of communication factors does not influence how much
users elaborate on the login prompt.
3. The elaboration level is not associated with a phishing detection rate.
4. Increased user’s motivation is associated with increased elaboration.
5. Increased attention to recall communication results in a lower elaboration level.
6. Increased user’s knowledge of the ceremony and online security can lead to
increased elaboration.
7. The attention to recognise communication is not associated with the elabora-
tion level nor a higher phishing detection rate.
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Communication factor Phishing detection rate
Recognition and recall 39.47%
Multiple recognition and recall 44.64%
Multiple recognition and multiple recall 67.57%
Table 8.15: Summary of the communication factors and phishing detection rate
8.7.3 Limitations
As with other studies, our study had a number of possible limitations, which we
discuss in this section.
Even though we attempt to emphasize ecological validity in our study, it can be
very difficult to run phishing studies that are ecologically valid. The study results
were most likely influenced by participants lack of experience with the ceremonies
used, and the fact that they were still establishing mental models for how these
ceremonies work. Our study did not evaluate usability differences between the cere-
monies, especially if the increased phishing resistance of MSMA affected its usability.
While the findings of the study shed light on the communication process influenc-
ing detection of spoofed login prompt, arguments could be made that the percentage
of the students among participants (76.1%) was high. It is possible that students
are more computer-literate than the general population and that could influence
the level of detection. However, students are a relevant sample population for au-
thentication and phishing as they tend to engage in more online behaviours [217].
Students were used as the main participant sample in previous important phishing
studies [194, 110, 217].
Another limitation was that we did not use the TLS certificate for the domain
name that we used for the study, as normally used in commercial websites. While
previous research has shown that HTTPS security indicators are generally not effec-
tive [57, 194], some users might have realized that the website they were accessing
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was not via a HTTPS connection and could have behaved differently. One partici-
pant pointed out that the login page is not a secure connection, which is what one
would normally expect on a sensitive websites.
Our user study was conducted in a laboratory setting, as were a number of pre-
vious important phishing studies [57, 110, 194]. Countermeasures were taken to
ensure ecological validity, but it can be very difficult to run phishing studies that
are ecologically valid, especially in laboratory settings. Laboratory environment can
also influence a higher detection rate than in real world conditions [80, 144]. A future
study carried entirely online, not in a laboratory environment, could add a different
insights into user’s behaviour and it would allow the comparison of results. Also,
using an online micro-working platform such as Crowdflower [49], or Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk [5] would give access to a large and more diverse participants’ sample
[29]. However, some argue that perhaps the population of workers on Mechanical
Turk are more computer-literate than the general population [204].
The Ceremony One prototype used in our study closely mimicked the implemen-
tation of security images authentication as used by some websites [192, 180]. We
could not find any other study that performed the same type of attack to directly
compare our results with. However, in one study [144] the authors considered per-
forming it, but due to no definitive understanding of the most effective way to trick
users they have chosen to use absence of a security image attack instead. Therefore,
the closest comparison we could do was with the studies that explored the ability
of users to notice missing security images. These studies largely evaluated if par-
ticipants would enter their password even in the absence of a security image with
somewhat differing results. The results ranged from 92% [194], 73% [144], to 40%
[110] of participants entering their passwords without their security image being dis-
played. The differences between the results of those studies can partly be attributed
to the laboratory [194] vs. online [144] settings; or a combination of online settings
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used as part of an university submission system [110]. In our Ceremony One (i.e
security image) condition, 60.53% of participants (Table 8.14) entered their pass-
word in spite of different security images displayed which was consistent with other
studies using simulated phishing attacks.
As we mentioned security in the study information sheets given to participant to
read before signing the consent form (described in Section 7.3.2.3), arguments can be
made that participants were not deceived. However, security was never mentioned
on the website page (Figure A.6) from which participants conducted the study.
Neither phishing nor spoofing was ever mentioned in information sheets given, or
the website from which the study was conducted, on which the participants were
given other tasks to attend (Section 7.3.2.4). Also, a number of previous important
phishing studies have shown that it is possible to get meaningful results without
fully deceiving participants. For example, the study by Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst
[57, 55], where participants were aware that they were part of a security study and
that spoofed websites would be present in the study. In the study by Herzberg and
Margulies [110], students participants were specifically warned that an attack could
happen. In the study by Wu, Miller and Garfinkel [226, 225] subjects were given
a consent form to read that explained that the purpose of the study was to test
web browser security indicators that detect fake web pages that look like pages from
legitimate websites; and that the purpose of these fake websites is to trick people
into making dangerous decisions or actions.
It is likely that mentioning security in our study information sheets decreased the
attack success rates. Therefore, we would expect participants to detect spoofed login
prompt at a higher rate than in real world conditions. However, if our participants
were fooled, real-world users are likely to also be fooled. We have also shown that
our result are consistent with other studies [194, 144, 110] that simulated phishing
attacks.
178
8.8 Conclusion
The aim of the study was to experimentally evaluate the MSMA ceremony. The
results showed that significantly more MSMA users resisted simulated attack in
comparison to a security image ceremony, similar to commercial variations often
used on internet banking websites. The HPA, consisting of multiple images combined
with text passwords, as used in MSMA, makes users more resistant to phishing.
The evaluation of the Model for Analysing HF-APAC involved assessing the
impact of the number and types of login communications (recall and recognition)
on a user’s likelihood of getting phished; the influence of attention and elaboration
on phishing and how motivation and capabilities influence elaboration.
The study results showed that an increase in the number of communication
factors have improved detection rate of spoofed login prompt, but it did not influ-
ence how much users elaborated on the login prompt. Increased attention to recall
communication resulted in a lower elaboration level, but not the recognise communi-
cation. Increased user’s motivation was associated with increased elaboration. Also,
the level of elaboration on the login prompt was not associated with the phishing
detection rate.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Thesis Summary
For more than a decade, phishing has been one of the main social engineering at-
tacks on the Internet. As new legal and technical approaches are being put in place
to fight it, phishers are modifying their techniques as well, and the number of phish-
ing attacks is not abating. The majority of the websites that are being spoofed
require that the users authenticate themselves. Therefore, phishing attacks usually
involve spoofing a login webpage and the authentication method used by the service
provider. Phishers target the human users and their usage and interpretation of
authentication schemes that fools them to make mistakes.
The goal of this thesis was to explore why current web authentication schemes
do not protect effectively against phishing. We investigated the use of security cere-
monies as a way of extending the reach of current methods for social, technological
and contextual analysis of web authentication schemes. A security ceremony extends
a concept of security protocol and includes the human node (i.e. user component)
explicitly. Ceremony research stems from the recognition that information secu-
rity is much more than a technical issue. The challenge of defining and analysing
ceremonies is significant, especially the modelling of the communication process-
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ing performed by humans. The focus of this thesis was the modelling of human
communication processing in authentication ceremonies that can help to mitigate
phishing.
Multifaceted aspects of phishing was the reason that this thesis involves multi-
ple lines of research: phishing and anti-phishing countermeasures; anti-phishing au-
thentication schemes; security ceremonies; security communication processing and
decision making. The analysis of the research in these areas was provided in Chap-
ter 2. It led us to approach the phishing problem by exploring why existing web
authentication schemes, built on security protocols proven to be secure in theory,
are not as secure when they are deployed in real world and used by humans.
In Chapter 3 we explored assumptions about the behaviour of humans who
are expected to process and react to security-related communication as part of
web authentication ceremonies. We have shown how these assumptions can af-
fect its security. We described related issues that can arise due to these assumptions
and presented the main factors that may influence these issues in different ways.
Recognising these assumptions, issues and influencing factors helped us to identify
the components of the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication Ceremonies
(HF-APAC) Framework described in Chapter 4.
The Human Factors in APAC Framework was designed to be used by designers of
authentication ceremonies at the design phase to improve the human interface weak
points of a ceremony and reduce the success of phishing attacks. The Framework
can help to extend a ceremony threat model by taking into account issues and
factors affecting processing of authentication communication by human users and
consequently their phishing detection. We described how the HF-APAC Framework
fits in broader ceremony analysis and gave a detailed description of its components
and overview of the possible application of the Framework.
We proposed a design and analysis process of human communication factors
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in authentication ceremonies and described how the HF-APAC Framework can be
applied either to improve the design of a new, or an existing ceremony.
We developed a model that demonstrates how the HF-APAC Framework can
be used by a designer in ceremony analysis. The Model for Analysing HF-APAC,
presented in Chapter 5, is a communication processing model that makes specific
assumptions about the components of the HF-APAC Framework and explores in
what extent they influence each other. The Model explores how users process au-
thentication communication conveyed through a website login prompt and what, and
to what extent, influences their decision-making processes and behaviour, that can
ultimately result in an error of submitting login credentials to a phishing website.
In the Model we have proposed communication processing principles that can
be used as part of the design process of authentication ceremonies. In Chapter 6
we demonstrated how these principles can be applied as part of the design of an
authentication ceremony to provide enhanced anti-phishing resistance: we designed
a new MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA) ceremony. The MSMA ceremony
is a mutual, hybrid authentication ceremony that combines PIN, recognition-based
graphical and text password in multiple steps. The graphical part of the MSMA
ceremony is a HPA that enables the user to verify that the website, he/she is ac-
cessing, is legitimate. The HPA can be anything, but we have chosen a visual HPA,
to be provided in the form of images, rather than a piece of music or excerpt from
a book.
Chapter 7 presented the user study we designed and performed to experimen-
tally evaluate the Model for Analysing HF-APAC and the MSMA ceremony. The
goal of the study was to explore the impact of number and types of login commu-
nications (recall and recognition) on user’s likelihood of getting phished; to explore
the influence of attention and elaboration on phishing; and also to explore the in-
fluence of users’ motivation and capabilities. The second goal of the study was to
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experimentally evaluate MSMA resistance to phishing.
The data analysis and the results of the study were presented in Chapter 8. The
results show that significantly more MSMA users resisted the simulated phishing
attack in comparison to users of a security image ceremony similar to commercial
variations often used on internet banking websites [18, 180, 192].
9.2 Contributions
We summarise the contributions of this thesis as follows:
1. We further developed and enhanced the understanding of security ceremonies
and their importance in analysis of social engineering threats such as phishing.
We demonstrated modelling of communication processing performed by human
nodes in authentication ceremonies with the HF-APAC Framework and the
Model for Analysing HF-APAC.
2. We proposed and demonstrated the design and analysis process of human com-
munication factors in authentication ceremonies with the HF-APAC Frame-
work, the Model for Analysing HF-APAC, MSMA ceremony and the user
study.
The process we demonstrated fills the research gap of modelling of processing
performed by human nodes in the ceremony analysis.
3. We developed the Human Factors in Anti-Phishing Authentication Ceremonies
Framework that is used as part of the proposed ceremony design and analysis
process.
The particular focus of the Framework is on helping to analyse the commu-
nication processing performed by human users in authentication ceremonies.
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That in turn should help to adapt the ceremony design to better resist social
engineering threats such as phishing.
4. We designed the Model for Analysing HF-APAC as a communication process-
ing model that demonstrates a usage of the HF-APAC Framework. The Model
examines how users process authentication communication tasks and how these
tasks impact the user’s decision-making and consequently their phishing de-
tection.
The human communication processing principles proposed and evaluated by
the Model can be taken into account by designers when designing new au-
thentication ceremonies or adapting existing ones. Taking into account these
principles can improve the anti-phishing resistance of the ceremony.
5. We developed the MultiStep Mutual Authentication (MSMA) anti-phishing
ceremony. The MSMA ceremony is a mutual authentication ceremony that
combines PIN, text password and recognition-based graphical passwords in
multiple steps. The graphical part of the MSMA ceremony is a HPA that helps
the user verify that the website, he/she is accessing, is legitimate, helping to
mitigate phishing attacks.
We found evidence that the HPA, consisting of multiple images combined
with text passwords, as used in MSMA, improves user’s ability to distinguish
between legitimate and spoofed website login prompts.
We conducted a user study to experimentally evaluate the Model and MSMA.
The Model evaluation results show how processing of authentication commu-
nication factors impacts the user’s decision-making and consequently their
phishing detection. We found that the principle of increasing the number of
recall and recognise communication factors, as used in MSMA, improves the
phishing resistance of a ceremony.
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9.3 Future Research Directions
There are several potential improvements and further extensions of our thesis work
that would be interesting to investigate further.
We designed the HF-APAC Framework as a way in extending threat model of au-
thentication ceremonies and suggested its place in broader ceremony analysis. The
Framework contributes to ceremony research by the modelling of processing per-
formed by human nodes in ceremonies. An interesting avenue of research would be
to investigate if and how the Framework can be used in a formal methods approach
of security ceremonies analysis.
The components of our Framework consider issues and factors affecting com-
munication processing in knowledge-based anti-phishing authentication ceremonies.
For our next phase of research, we will examine factors specific to biometric, token
or other types of authentication ceremonies that could be added into the Framework
and that would further enhance its applicability.
Another avenue of research would be the design of a new MSMA prototype using
other types of HPAs, instead of images, examples of which would be implementation
of an audible HPA (e.g. a piece of music).
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Appendix A
User Study Materials
This appendix contains the materials used for the user study described in Chapter
7:
1. Emails sent to recruit participants.
2. Notice for bulletin boards to recruit participants.
3. Study information sheets given to participants to read before signing the con-
sent form.
4. Consent form given to participants to read and sign.
5. Screenshots of the user study main web page - allowing users to complete all
tasks of the study.
6. Post Study and Demographic questionnaires.
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Figure A.1: Emails sent to recruit participants
215
Figure A.2: Notice for bulletin boards to recruit participants
216
Figure A.3: User Study Information Sheet 1
217
Figure A.4: User Study Information Sheet 2
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Figure A.5: Consent form
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Figure A.6: Study home page
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Figure A.7: Study page - Website Tasks
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Figure A.8: Study page - Survey Tasks
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Figure A.9: Help with registering and login screen
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Figure A.10: Registering screen
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